majalla: Keynotes on the Islamic World in the News, Informed Comments

Asia Times Online :: Apathy in the face of cruelty

2011-12-14T08:39:00.000-08:00

Asia Times Online :: Apathy in the face of cruelty

Since the start of the Libyan uprising, mainstream news outlets have reported that African and even Eastern European mercenaries were fighting with Muammar Gaddafi's forces. The Libyan rebels, eager to minimize any support for Gaddafi among the Libyan population, have fed Western media horror stories of mass murder carried out by black Africans.

Consequently, many immigrant workers were caught between the ire of a regime that did not care much for them and a new wave of prejudice and discrimination fueled by the media and rebel propaganda. The fact that some foreigners fought for the regime

does not tell the full story. Most African immigrants were unwilling participants in a war that no one had anticipated.

In order to understand the presence of so many Africans and non-Africans in Libya, one must understand the role played by the former dictator.

Using Libya's large oil revenues as if they constituted his personal fortune, Gaddafi engaged in meddling in the affairs of his neighbors, supporting nationalist movements, and conspiring to overthrow regimes he did not like.

He also used immigrant workers to blackmail his neighbors. In the 1980s and 1990s Gaddafi gave hundreds of thousands of Tunisian workers hours, not days, to leave the country empty-handed. The sudden "dumping" of workers without their earnings was meant to create economic and social crisis for neighboring governments.

It was his way of punishing the Tunisian authoritarians Bourguiba and Ben Ali. He used the same tactic with the Egyptians. But Gaddafi's most bizarre achievement was coaxing some European leaders to use him as a gatekeeper, in charge of preventing Africans from reaching the shores of Europe.

Speaking at a ceremony in Rome on August 31, 2010 and standing next to (then) Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi, Gaddafi declared:...

Reasoned Comments (RC): Jihad Against Islam

2011-11-12T08:36:00.000-08:00

Reasoned Comments (RC): Jihad Against Islam: By Robert Steinback Illustration by James Victore Rarely has the United States seen a more reckless and bare-knuckled campaign to vilify...

Reasoned Comments: The “very scary” Iranian Terror plot: The women of al-Nahda: faces of the new Tunisian r...

2011-11-08T16:10:00.000-08:00

Reasoned Comments: The women of al-Nahda: faces of the new Tunisian r...: by Ahmed E. Souaiaia* Before January 14, 2011, al-Nahda was the main opposition group in Tunisia. No one, even its most severe critics,...

WHY ISRAEL CAN'T BE A 'JEWISH STATE'

2011-10-03T07:13:00.000-07:00

Sari Nusseibeh in Al Jazeera:

The Israeli government's current mantra is that the Palestinians must recognise a "Jewish State". Of course, the Palestinians have clearly and repeatedly recognised the State of Israel as such in the 1993 Oslo Accords (which were based on an Israeli promise to establish a Palestinian state within five years - a promise now shattered) and many times since. Recently, however, Israeli leaders have dramatically and unilaterally moved the goal-posts and are now clamouring that Palestinians must recognise Israel as a "Jewish State".

In 1946, the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry concluded that the demand for a "Jewish State" was not part of the obligations of the Balfour Declaration or the British Mandate. Even in the First Zionist Congress in Basel in 1897, when Zionists sought to "establish a home for the Jewish people", there was no reference of a "Jewish State". The Zionist Organisation preferred at first to use the description "Jewish homeland" or "Jewish Commonwealth". Many pioneering Zionist leaders, such as Judah Magnes and Martin Buber also avoided the clear and explicit term "Jewish State" for their project of a homeland for Jews, and preferred instead the concept of a democratic bi-national state.

More here.

What’s Your Theology Like? -On Knowledge, Good Deeds and Spirituality

2011-03-04T00:33:00.000-08:00

Adis Duderija

It would be fair to assert that every religious tradition in human history has highly valued and continues to highly value knowledge, good deeds and spirituality (i.e. in sense of performance of some kind of religious rituals) however differently they were/are defined or put into practice.

What is interesting to explore, and this is the aim of this short article, is the idea of the relative importance placed on these three pillars of religious tradition one vis-a-vis the other. This could be accomplished both comparatively (i.e. across different religions) and well as within the various strands of a particular religious tradition. It could also be examined chronologically tracing any possible patterns or shifts in patterns. An examination of this ‘prioritising’ is useful as it would give us an insight into the ‘ideal’ types of theologies prevalent among the adherents of religious traditions and perhaps be used as a method for developing typologies of theologies.

What I mean by prioritising or the relative importance given to one of the pillars in relation to the other can be best illustrated with the following example. Imagine you had six hours a day to dedicate to expanding your knowledge (not necessarily religious in the narrow term of the word but inclusive of it), doing good deeds or engaging in spiritual rituals? Percentagewise how would you ideally divide this time up? The answer to this question would, in my view, be indicative of the type of theology you subscribe to.

In what follows I‘d like to briefly identify and discuss three different ‘ideal types’ of theologies prevalent in my religious tradition of Islam today through the lens of this triad of knowledge-good deeds- spirituality. Of course, there is a rich history of ideas pertaining to this problematic in Islamic history, especially in relation to the definition of faith/belief (iman). The views on this problematic can be conceived as a kind of a continuum. One side there were advocates who insisted that good deeds (including the normatively prescribed rituals) were an essential prerequisites of iman with the implication that the failure to perform them was tantamount to apostasy- a crime many considered to be punishable by death. On the other hand there were those who subscribed to the view that a tacit or a verbal expression of proclaiming the faith was considered sufficient to be part of the faith community. My intention here is not to revisit these in detail but to describe in broad contours some of the contemporary theologies among Muslims and some of their implications in relation to issues such as nature of revelation and scripture, the relationship between law and ethics and others.

One such theology I call progressive. Progressive theology gives priority to orthopraxis over orthodoxy. This means that it considers performance of good deeds more important than acquisition of knowledge leading to ‘correct ‘ faith/belief or that of engaging in ritual . For this type of theology the human and the human condition are central to it. The discussions pertaining to how to arrive at ‘correct belief’, those centring on nature of God and its relationship with the cosmos and the living creation are of secondary importance. Instead, the alleviation of extreme poverty, being on the side of the wretched, marginalised, stigmatised, and the downtrodden is not only considered the purpose and the primary function of religion it is also viewed as an essential prerequisite leading to orthodoxy. In the Christian tradition this type of theology is referred to as ‘liberation theology.’ This theology, in my understanding of it, holds that humans are considered to experience the Divine most readily and immediately through their interactions with other human beings rather than by contemplating abstractly on the Divine , observing the nature or engaging in various spiritual exercises ( i.e. ritual). This theology , in my view, by implication favours inductive over deductive reasoning/thinking because its foundation and starting point is the world of the human condition with its incredible diversity (including the religious) and complexity which makes it very difficult to think in binary terms (e.g. having salvation –not having salvation). Furthermore, this theology, by giving primacy to good deeds and to the human and by being less concerned about knowledge leading to ‘correct’ belief is also more likely to be egalitarian eschewing any form of hierarchies , most notably those based on gender , sexual orientation, race or ethnicity. In addition, it is more likely to be open to and accommodating of the idea of religious pluralism, i.e. the premise that none of the reified religious traditions made in the crucible of history (as well as those in the present and the future) are capable of objectively and fully capturing the Divine, thus none can claim monopoly over God. This, in turn, translates into the notion that, according to this progressive theology, the idea of God is not fully graspable to the human either through his intellect, mind, reason or the heart. By definition it also implies that that the sacred scriptures cannot offer us humans an unequivocal , clearly accessible and once and for all valid understanding of God through the simple process of reading/interpretation. Instead, it considers the human interpreter and her subjectivities and contingencies as most significantly determinative of the process of interpretation envisaged as a never ending dynamic process that continually evolves with reason. There is, in other words, an organic and dialectical relationship between revelation and reality. Furthermore, this theology gives precedence to reason- based ethics over law. It insists that law must be in constant service of ethics and that law ought to evolve with evolving ideas about ethics as developed by humanity- and in the post-revelatory period this evolution is exclusively driven by reason/intellect. Put succinctly, this theology embraces and even thrives on pluralism, diversity and what’s fundamental to all of it, uncertainty. Based on my own observations I consider this to be a minority theological position among contemporary Muslims, especially among the clerical establishment, but, importantly, a growing one.

The second type of theology can be described as purist. According to this theology, religion is all about correct belief (i.e. knowledge) and everything else is secondary to it. The central concern for the purists is how to, or put more precisely, from whom to obtain the correct knowledge in order to arrive at correct faith/belief. The nature of legitimate knowledge and its sources is, thus, very specifically defined, delineated and guarded. What follows from this is the idea that this purist theology is fixed and focuses centrally on discourses pertaining to God’s essence and nature rather than being focused on the human condition. God is primarily to be found/discovered in the sacred and other canonical scriptures rather then It being experienced through human social intercourses or by contemplating about /on nature and the cosmos. I refer to this as a scripturalist dimension of purist theology or scripturalism. As a corollary, scripturalism is closely linked to what could be termed positivist legalistic theology which views law as not only more superior to ethics but the very embodiment of it. Furthermore, ethics and reason are considered as not subject to evolution and to possess potential for positive change and growth ( i.e. progress). The law, according to this view, does not have a scripturally independent objective, underpinning or rationale. This theology favours, as such, deductive over inductive thinking/reasoning. In its epistemology and methods it resembles natural sciences and eschews uncertainty. Purist theology also favours decontextualized thought and defines good deeds rather statically and literally-independent of their underlying moral trajectories. Furthermore, the ‘rights’ of God are defined often as independent of at times in opposition to and always given precedence over to that of the’ rights’ of humans. The purists’ legalistic theology combined with scripturalism and strong opposition to the possibility of progress defined above also facilitates hierarchical structures, especially those based on religious creed or gender. As a result purist theology shuns religious pluralism, endorses various forms of gender inegaliterianism favouring the prevalent social and cultural customs and conditions of the time of the religious traditions formation and makes forceful theologically exclusivist claims. The scripturalist and decontextualized dimension of purists’ theology also significantly contributes to its strong hermeneutical inclination for narrowing down of legitimate or ‘authentic interpretation’s of the sacred and canonical texts. This theology, in various hues and degrees, in my view has considerable presence among contemporary Muslims.

The last ideal type discussed here is what I refer to as spiritual -ritualistic theology. Here self -introspection and deep meditative-like contemplation takes central stage in contrast to the social human condition (progressive) or that of the scriptures (purists). This contemplative quality takes often form in the engagement in elaborate rituals and recitation of sacred mantras/formulae either in isolation or in a communal setting. This sort of theology often employs the symbolism of the ‘heart’ as the locus of ‘true’ source of knowledge about God in contrast to that of the ‘intellect’ or ‘the sacred text’. As history testifies what is interesting about this type of theology is that it can lead or be accommodative of both progressive-like and purist-like theologies. It can function within the confines of ‘the law’ in form of positivist legal theology mentioned above –therefore be purist –like- or transcend it entirely by adopting an ethically underpinned theology of the progressives.

What does the future hold for these three ideal types of theologies? Are certain types going to be more likely to capture the minds and the hearts of the people? This question, of course, remains open. However with the rise of the moral moral consciousness , the noonsphere, with its simultaneous strong focus on the human condition, deep sharing of emotion, and the embrace of diversity it seems that the progressive theology is best equipped for meeting the ‘religious-spiritual’ needs of those humans who identify themselves to be ‘people of faith’.

Dr. Adis Duderija is currently a research associate at the Centre for Muslim States and Societies at the University of Western Australia in Perth

Building civil society institutions in post-authoritarian regimes

2011-02-11T13:20:00.001-08:00

by Ahmed E, Souaiaia*

Regardless of what happen in the next months, the year 2011 will enter the history books as the breakthrough year for Arab societies. On January 14, 2011, the Tunisian people ended the reign of a ruthless dictator and with it ended fear. The Tunisian revolution soon inspired peoples of other Arab countries to take charge of their own destiny. On January 23, thousands of Egyptians launched a similar revolt to bring an end to Hosni Mubarak’s reign. There are indications that Yemen, Algeria, Morocco, and Jordan will be transformed with or without protests. The Gulf states, too, will not remain unaffected by revolutions that are not only bringing about political change but also psychological transformation in the soul of Arab citizens; people taking charge of their own destiny and taking full ownership of their state of affairs.

The future of Arab societies is dependent on the transition from authoritarian rule to pluralism. There are many who are calling on the creation of civil society institutions starting with political parties, NGOs, and free press. In fact, just today, it was reported that a group of Saudis formally requested from the kind to allow them to form a political party. It is all positive change, but it may be placing emphasis on the wrong priorities. Establishing these entities immediately may have a long term negative impact on issues of social justice and rule of law. Replacing one-man Arab regimes by multi parties regimes can be just as oppressive and perhaps more suffocating. Instead, it is argued here that the transition to self-governance can be achieved when the separation of power takes precedence over partisan power sharing.

Not to suggest that power sharing among various political parties and representatives of interest groups is not a good thing, for it is. But the power sharing model is also susceptible to creating elite that could--and in most cases did--fence out marginalized minorities and the vulnerable groups and individuals.

What is proposed here is to focus the energy of change ushered in by these popular movements to create safeguards that shore up the rule of law, separate governing authorities, and empower watchdog organizations. The first step for establishing stable self-governing societies in the Arab world is to use the transitional period to draft constitutions, subject to popular referendum, that enshrine the independence of the judiciary, the sovereignty of the legislature, and the service-centered authority of the executive power.

To begin by establishing political parties and NGOs before securing the separation of powers is similar to placing the chariot before the horse. After all, one could ask, how effective can a human rights organization be in a paradigm where the judicial authority answers to the executive officer whose agents are generally the main culprits of committing human rights violations? The authoritarian Arab regimes were able to oppress with impunity because the legislature and the judiciary were tools in their hand. They used these branches of government to provide them with legal and legislative covers even as they arbitrarily arrested citizens, tortured political opponents, and misused public funds.

It will be utterly misguided if the new ruling elite that will emerge after these popular revolutions are allowed to create a new paradigm that would give the illusion of pluralistic governance but in reality preserve a power structure that marginalizes vulnerable social groups.

Civil society institutions are strongest when the legal and judicial mechanisms upon which they are founded are sound. Practically, this can be achieved by recognizing the various layers of civil society institutions.

First, constitutional and legal separation of powers must be guaranteed and established in reality. Moreover, leaders must find creative ways to evaluate and tenure judges. The less politics is involved in identifying, reviewing, and conferring tenure for judges the more empowered the judiciary will be in its application of the law and in preventing abuse of power.

The second important layer of civil society institutions consists of the presence of free and independent press. In most Arab countries, there are many news and media outlets that claim to be free and independent. A close examination of the structure of these institutions and the control over them reveal that they are not necessarily free and independent. Medial and press outlets in Arab countries are either state owned or privately controlled. The privately controlled outlets include newspapers and other media that are owned by political parties, unions, associations, and businesspersons. While the government controlled media are essentially propaganda tools, the privately held outlets promote the narrow interests of the shareholders and owners. Given that the press’ mission is to inform the public, one can hardly believe that an entity thus structured could indeed fulfill its mission with integrity. After all, how could such an institution faithfully serve two masters—the shareholders/owners and the public?

A free and independent press should have as primary mission the dissemination of critical information to citizens. It should exist to inform and to keep the governments’ dealings open and transparent. That goal cannot be achieved if the media or the press answers to shareholders or to political parties’ leaders. Creative and imaginative ways must be used to categorize and license free and independent press—perhaps relying on a combination of public funding, education, training, and legal regulations.

The last layer of civil society institutions would consist of any and all social groups representing all kinds of interests. This layer will be critical in providing services and empowering minorities, but as stated above, it cannot perform its functions if there is no rule of law or if the branches of government are not separate and sovereign.

Islamic societies are at a critical juncture. They could use this opportunity and build forward looking societies. They have a chance to learn from the mistakes of other societies: they can draft better constitutions, they can elect better leaders, and they can establish stronger foundations for the emergence of civil society institutions. They can turn the disadvantage of embracing pluralistic governance late by learning from the mistakes of those who preceded them. They could rely on hindsight to move beyond the shortcomings of older systems. They can reflect on the decades of hopelessness, marginalization, oppression, and denial of basic rights to create inclusive, civil, and proud peoples. They can give meaning to their existence in the clarity of collective wisdom, in the soberness of knowledge, and in the hopeful determination of dreamers.

* Professor Souaiaia, teaches classes in the department of Religious Studies, International Programs, and College of Law at the University of Iowa. Opinions expressed herein are the author’s, speaking as a citizen on matters of public interest; not speaking for the University or any other organization with which he is affiliated.

Diplomatic Hemorrhage: US administration’s need for forward-looking policy

2011-01-31T08:32:00.001-08:00

by A. E. SOUAIAIA

It was a mistake for President Obama to call Husni Mubarak on the fourth day of the Egyptian revolt, after nearly 100 people have died, to advise him for anything else but to step down and let a transitional leadership prepare for fair, transparent, and pluralistic elections. Instead, his reaching out to Mubarak to push him to reform was seen by many Egyptians as an act of support of a dictator. To ask Mubarak for reform now is to give him a second lease on political life. Mubarak has had 28 years to reform. He has not. In fact the last sham elections he held consolidated his party’s rule and produced a parliament less pluralistic than the previous one.

Every day that passes with Mubarak being president, the US administration loses its goodwill capital with the Egyptian and Arab peoples. US administrations have sided with authoritarians for the sake of predictability and short term stability. These authoritarians have fed US policy makers the idea that US interests are necessarily tied to their regimes remaining in power. These regimes have contended that if they were to go, Islamists will turn their countries into another post 1979 Iran. What was left out, however, was the fact that the Iranian people were not and are not inherently anti-American; they were turned to anti-Americanism when the US administrations sided with the Shah and ignored the demands of the Iranian people. This and future US administrations should not repeat the same mistake.

The US support of Mubarak’s regime is well established. Now, the US administration has a chance to show that its commitment to peoples’ rights to freedom and self-determination are not and cannot be compromised. One way of doing this is to take the side of the people now, not when Mubarak falls.

According to Secretary Clinton, who spoke on CNN’s State of the Union today, the people she "want to see stay in power are Mubarak and his newly appointed Vice President." She hinted that she prefers that the current timeline is preserved: wait until this autumn's presidential elections to make change. This position is misguided and clearly rejected by the Egyptian people. The Egyptian people want constitutional reform, judicial reform, economic reform, and political reform; not merely changing the president. This parliament is not legitimate in the eyes of many Egyptians.

The question is no longer whether or not Mubarak and his regime will stays in power. As far as the Egyptian people are concerned, Mubarak is history. Today, opposition leaders, including the Muslim Brethren, which had 88 members in the outgoing parliament have agreed to designate Mohammed ElBaradei spokesperson and authorized him to put together a coalition government that will oversee the transition into democratic rule. The Obama administration could and should support this initiative in order to mitigate previous missteps.

Oil and Infrastructure Expenditures in Saudi Arabia

2011-01-24T14:46:00.000-08:00

by Ahmad M. Khatib

The country of Saudi Arabia has been generating increasingly more revenue from sales of crude oil in recent years. The researcher tried to study the impact greater oil revenue has been having on the development of the country’s economy through measuring the impact of oil revenue on infrastructure as one of the most important sectors of the economy. The study explored the relationship between oil revenue and government expenditures on infrastructure during the period of 1983-2007.

The study tried, on one hand, to find out if the increase in oil revenue had been associated with a similar increase in government expenditures on infrastructure. On the other hand, the study tried to measure the improvements these expenditures made by testing the relationship between infrastructure expenditures and some of the improvements resulted from these expenditures during the same period of 1983 to 2007.

The findings of this study suggested that the increase in oil revenue caused only a limited increase in government expenditures on infrastructure and the improvements resulted from these expenditures had also been limited.

Introduction

Saudi Arabia as the largest oil exporter in the world has been collecting massive amounts of cash from oil revenue as prices of crude oil has been rapidly going up in the last few years. Many wonder how this oil revenue is helping the country of Saudi Arabia achieving economic development and prosperity. One way to answer this question is to measure the impact that oil revenue is having on the development of infrastructure. This study tests the correlation or the relationship between oil revenue and infrastructure development in Saudi Arabia during the period of 1983-2007 to see whether greater oil revenue was associated with a similar increase in these expenditures.

The study also looks at the relationship between these expenditures and some improvements achieved from these expenditures during the same time period. The importance of the study stems from the fact that no study had focused on the specific relationship between oil revenue and the Saudi government main budget expenditures in total or individually or on the effects of these expenditures on their related sectors of the Saudi economy. So, the importance of the study comes from the lack of a documented quantitative study on this topic.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Infrastructure is a broad term used by economists to refer to a group of capital assets in a certain country or locality. There is no clear definition of what is included under infrastructure. Nevertheless, Pollin (2009) divided infrastructure into three areas: transportation, energy, and water management. He further divided those areas into sub areas which includes, roads and bridges, airports, railroads, public transportation systems, drinking water, dams, electric grids, and pipelines moving oil and natural gas.

Other researchers like Similarly, Torrance (2009) divided infrastructure into three categories: transport infrastructure, regulated infrastructure such as water, electricity and gas distribution, and social infrastructure such as schools and hospitals.

No matter what the definition of infrastructure is or its components are, the fact is that infrastructure investment stimulates the economy by improving performance and productivity which, in turn, helps bring about economic growth. Smit and Trigeorgis

(2009) believed that infrastructure investment builds a platform and creates a base for the growth strategy and it is the starting point for any investment to follow.

The largely recognized positive impact infrastructure investments have on the economy as a direct cause for economic growth encourages different governments around the world to allocate sizable portions of their budgets to infrastructure to stimulate the economy, provide jobs, and of course improve their infrastructure.

Infrastructure in Saudi Arabia

Ever since oil was discovered in

Saudi Arabia

, the government has been spending enormous resources on building the country’s infrastructure almost from scratch. The country has achieved significant improvements in building its highways, airports, power generating plants, refineries, desalination plants, shopping centers, schools, and hospitals.

Most of this happened in the last half century as Clarke (2007) commented “Saudi Arabia has gone from a country of fractured tribes living in sand-swept villages, to a thriving, industrial nation dotted with skyscrapers, superhighways, airports and factories.” (Clarke,

2007, p. 32)

The huge growth in infrastructure was a direct result of the growing petroleum industry. Kronemer (1997) indicated that during this growth that took place in less than 50 years, more than 80,000 miles of paved roads were built, 4000 hospitals and health centers, hundreds of schools and several universities.

Despite the considerable spending on infrastructure development in Saudi Arabia some researchers still see a severe need for more infrastructure investment. “Investments in infrastructure, mainly water supply networks, power plants, telecommunications capacity, housing and transport systems, is highly needed because of a growing population.” (Quilliam and Kamel, 2003 p. 49)

Other researchers also stressed on the badly needed investment in the water supply sector. Mohorjy and Grigg (1995) noticed that despite the huge amounts Saudi Arabia has spent on water desalination, the country still faces severe water problems and doesn’t have the necessary comprehensive water management system.

This conflict of researchers’ opinions on the evaluation of the effect of expenditures on the different sectors of the economy and what kind of improvements result from these expenditures in relation to

Saudi Arabia

is one more reason behind this study.

Research Methodology

To determine if relationships do exist between oil revenue, expenditures, and improvements; and if they do, what kind of relationships they are, the researcher ran simple linear regression analyses of two folds. First, between oil revenue and government expenditures on infrastructure during the period of 1983-2007. Second, between expenditures on infrastructure and quantitative improvements achieved from these expenditures for the same time period. Also to discover any trend, same analyses were done after splitting the period of the study into three equal intervals of times: 1983-1991,

1992-1999, and 2000-2007.

Data Sources and Data Collection

To conduct this study the researcher used secondary data that he has access to from several sources including existing databases and websites. Data needed for this study consists of three types of data. First, Saudi oil revenue amounts for the period of the study 1983-2007. Second, Saudi main budget expenditure amounts on infrastructure and for the period of the study. Third, quantitative expenditure improvements resulting from the expenditures also for the same period of the study.

Annual oil revenue data for Saudi Arabia for the period 1983-2007 were collected from OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletins for the year 1983 and the year 2007.

Data about the Saudi budget expenditures for the period 1983-2007 were gathered from the Europe World Yearbooks 1983-2007; the Saudi Ministry of Finance website; and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) website.

Data on the population of Saudi Arabia for the period 1983-2007 were collected from the website of Population Division of the Department of Economics and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat and from Nationmaster.com.

Data on the Saudi infrastructure for the period 1983-2007 were collected from the Saudi Ministry of Economy and Planning; International Telecommunication Union Website, and also from the World Development Indicators (World Bank).

All data collected were then analyzed, sorted, and organized in tables using Microsoft Excel spreadsheets.

Limitation of the Study

Data for this study would have a few limitations that should be indicated. First, data for this study were collected from several sources rather than one source and this may cause inconsistency in the way different numbers have been calculated. Another limitation is the timeline of the study from 1983-2007 may not represent the real relationship between the different variables. Furthermore, there is a chance of bias with those numbers collected from the Saudi government official websites as governments sometimes tend to tweak numbers to fit their own purposes.

Findings

Oil Revenue and Infrastructure Expenditures

Findings of the study revealed that the increase in oil revenue had not resulted in a similar increase in infrastructure expenditures during the period of 1983-2007. Moreover, findings showed that this relationship is not getting any stronger over time. While between 1983 and 1990, each increase of one dollar in oil revenue was associated with a decrease of two cents (-.0216) in infrastructure expenditures, a one dollar increase in oil revenue between 1991 and 1998 was associated with less than one cent decrease (-.0069) in infrastructure expenditures. Moreover, between 1999 and 2007 the increase of one dollar in oil revenue was associated with almost less than one cent (.0047) increase in infrastructure expenditures. At the same time the findings of the study also showed that amount of expenditures allocated to infrastructure regardless of the increase in oil revenue was dropping sharply over time. This amount decreased from an average of $2,583.1 million per year in the period of (1983-1990) to an average of $796.98 million per year in the period of (1991-1998) and to an average of $287.49 million per year in the period of (1999-2007).

Conclusion

The findings of the study didn’t reveal any positive relationship between oil revenue and government expenditures on infrastructure in the country of Saudi Arabia during the period of 1983-2007 and the increase in oil revenue had not resulted in similar increases to infrastructure expenditures.

It is very hard to pinpoint the exact reason or reasons why the Saudi government expenditures on infrastructure didn’t increase with the increase in oil revenue. However, one important reason is that the Saudi government has already spent very large sums on building a new and advanced infrastructure in the last few decades since the oil was discovered and money started flowing into the country. This created less need for new large investments on infrastructure and more spending on maintenance and smaller projects. Other reasons may be traced to the general socio-economic and internal situation in the country and may include the following:

a) Bureaucratic government administration which controls the public expenditures.

b) Many expenditures occur off- budget such as military expenditures and others.

c) Large sums of oil money went to pay off government debt and obligations incurred by the Saudi Government from the Gulf War of 1991.

Expenditures and Improvements: Conclusion

As far as the relationships between infrastructure expenditures and the improvements resulted from these expenditures, the study concluded that there are no strong positive relationships between expenditures and improvements measured. The findings also didn’t reveal any relationship between infrastructure expenditures or transport and communications expenditures to improvements measured like road development or number of telephone lines per 1000 people between 1983 and 2007. Improvements in

Saudi infrastructures are considered very modest comparing with other countries around the world.

Dr. Ahmad M. Khatib teaches at Argosy University, Chicago.

_________________________________

References

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growth: Some empirical evidence from Saudi-Arabia. The Indian Journal,

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Clarke, K. (2007). A modernization paradox. Harvard International Review.

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2009 Retrieved March 27, 2009 from

http://www.itu.int/ITU-/ict/publications/world/world.html

Mohorjy, A. M., & Grigg, N. S. (1995). Water-resources management system for Saudi

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Delusions of Grandeur: Tunisian leaders and the loss of civil society institutions

2011-01-11T09:29:00.001-08:00

By A. E. SOUAIAIA•

On cold winter days, Mohamed al-Bouazizi, a resident of Sidi Bouzid, loads his cart with fruits and vegetables and pushes it along the dusty streets of the town hoping to make enough money for himself and his family. One day, like many other days, town officials harassed him and then confiscated his produce: he did not have the proper licenses to do business.

Many Tunisians his age graduate high school, earn a college education, and then sit in cafés playing cards and waiting for a job. Officially, about 15% of Tunisians are out of work. Unofficially, many economists put that figure at 40%. When the underemployed, the temporary workers, and homemakers are factored in, nearly 60% of Tunisians become affected by the global economic slowdown and the absence of sustainable economic development. Moreover, the uneven distribution of national resources and development programs created two Tunisias. The first Tunisia consists of the coastal cities whose economy thrives on tourism and government services, and the second

Tunisia

is made out of the interior states that rely on agriculture. The average citizen of the first Tunisia makes nearly $700.00 a month while the average inhabitant of the second Tunisia sustains himself on no more than $100.00 per month.

Al-Bouazizi is from the second Tunisia. He applied for work without success, and when he applied for government grants to start his own business his application was denied. That is very common, too. Government grants and business opportunities are given to individuals associated with the ruling party and those opportunities are generally found in the first

Tunisia

Like many Tunisians, al-Bouazizi wanted a job--any job that would preserve his dignity and that of his family. He figured that selling fruits would help him and that the government should be pleased with his efforts since he is relying on himself, not on it. He was sadly mistaken.

A government like Ben Ali’s does not like people taking initiative or doing anything without its permission. Al-Bouazizi’s entrepreneurship was deemed unauthorized and he was humiliated by the police. He decided to plead his case before the governor, and traveled to see him. When he announced his intention to meet with the governor he was laughed at, humiliated—again, beaten, and thrown out of the building. With the last door closing before him, al-Bouazizi poured gasoline over his body and set himself on fire. People rushed to save him, and he was taken to the hospital. The event triggered angry protests across the state which later spread to most interior states. At least four more youths attempted to burn themselves in protest as well. After two weeks of riots that were met by harsh police measures, President Ben Ali made a TV appearance to threaten rioters and to promise that he will do all it takes to restore order. He sacked several ministers and governors, visited the burn victims, and attacked foreign media (primarily Aljazeera) for inciting disorder.

As I write this piece, protesters continue to demonstrate in every major interior city, journalists and lawyers are arrested, and reportedly 50 people have been killed (officials claim only 14 had died). The government insists that the incident was merely a family, isolated dispute. Protesters, however, are threatening a revolution to overthrow a regime that is corrupt, brutal, and without legitimacy.

Despite the bloodshed, the resilience of protesters, and the brutality of the security forces, Western governments and media hardly reacted. In the U.S., major newspapers, such as the New York Time and the Washington Post, did not run any major story covering these events. It took the State Department nearly two weeks before issuing a statement of concern. The European Union and its major news outlets essentially ignored Tunisian unrest. Now, it seems that all of North Africa may experience violent riots to protest the same issues. This week alone, a number of people were killed and many more wounded and arrested in

Algeria

. Moroccan authorities seem to have launched a pre-emptive strike and arrested an indeterminate number of young people under the epithet “terrorist.” Is the U.S. ill informed about the state of affairs in Tunisia (and the Maghreb) or are there other reasons explaining this lax attitude?

The short answer is this: the US and the E.U. are well informed about the Maghreb because the regimes there, especially Tunisia’s, are Western-made and Western-approved. The silence is complicity not ignorance. In the end, complicity will only threaten the interests of governments that stand with regimes instead of democracy-yearning peoples, especially when such complicity is made obvious by the selective condemnations of certain regimes and implicit support of others. The public ought to know the facts about Tunisia in order to contextualize the recent and other uprisings.

On November 7, 1987, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali overthrew the first Tunisian president, Habib Bourguiba, under the pretext that the latter was no longer fit to govern because of his old age. Bourguiba was a self-declared mujahih akbar (the Great Struggler) whose work helped Tunisia earn its independence. In recognition of his achievements, he was anointed president for life; by whom, we don’t know.

In nearly one quarter of a century, instead of becoming an advanced nation as Ben Ali promised, Tunisia was on a path to social and economic collapse. In the first half of the 1980s, bread riots, labor strikes, and students’ protests brought the country to the brink of collapse. But instead of addressing the real issues, Bourguiba adopted the band-aid approach: he fired and hired one prime minister after another and imprisoned and executed opposition figures while holding sham elections that did very little to build strong civil society institutions. After all, the ruling party has been in charge since the country’s independence.

When Bourguiba appointed Ben Ali as Prime Minister and Interior Minister, he had made his last appointment. On an early Saturday morning in November 1987, the national radio announced the rise of Ben Ali to power. The new president refused to take the “mujahid akbar” label that the national media was willing to offer him. Instead he gave people the illusion that he would be different from his predecessor: he promised openness, democracy, development, and term-limited presidency. Tunisians thought that they would be able to see a new face in Carthage Palace by the end of the second term of any president; that is what the new constitution Ben Ali amended promised then.

Twenty-three years later, Ben Ali is still president. His supporters started a campaign to amend the constitution, for the second time, to allow him to run again. For many, this is a déjà-vu: another irreplaceable “leader” for whom the rules must be bent so that he continues to govern over subjects treated as immature and helpless. For the West, Ben Ali is a known quantity who can be trusted to keep his people in check; after all, his relations with CIA were well documented.

Through constitutional amendments, new election laws, and a strict code governing the press and the media, the regime reneged on all its promises: the term limit was effectively abolished, opposition figures were silenced, business leaders were co-opted, and civil society institutions were uprooted. This time, he did it all systematically and with the West’s tacit approval.

Illusions of Political Pluralism

Although Ben Ali allowed several political parties to contest elections, such parties lacked the social depth and the ideological platform to be able to compete. The real opposition remained banned under numerous pretexts. The performance of political parties in regional and national elections was so pathetic that the regime instituted in election law a kind of “affirmative action” when it reserved a set number of seats in the parliament for opposition parties. This was thought necessary because the authorized political parties failed repeatedly to win any significant votes. By doing so, the regime gave observers the illusion of political pluralism without opening the door to real opposition movements. Ben Ali learned from his predecessor that opening the door to groups such as al-Nahdah Movement could bring about the end of his party’s rule through democratic means. The regime, therefore, opted for political charity with the “affirmative action” election laws instead of open democratic contestation of elections.

Marginalization and Co-opting

In the 1970s and 1980s, the challenge to the single party rule came from labor movements, students, and members of professional associations. Almost every year students in high schools and universities launched paralyzing demonstrations, labor unions went on strikes, and leaders of professional associations provided support for protest movements.

Today, Ben Ali’s ruling party has absorbed many business leaders. Party activists took over student organizations, and universities were relocated to rural areas in order to isolate students from the rest of the populations. Even the large high schools were split into smaller ones to facilitate monitoring and crushing activists.

Regulation of Free Press and Freedom of Expression

The state of the press today is worse than it was during Bourguiba’s reign. Although a large number of news outlets are run by non-government entities, the rules governing the editorial practices are fine-tuned so that any newspaper veering from the official line of interpretation of event would risk being shut down. The only free voice to which Tunisians have access is Aljazeera Satellite channel and website and those are subjected to repeated de-authorization and shutdowns.

Uneven Development

For many visiting foreigners, Tunisia is safe, clean, and affluent especially when compared to other African nations with similar resources. Indeed, the capital Tunis (or part of it at least) and other coastal cities are built for Western tourists: luxurious hotels, clean beaches, and security forces in every intersection. The conditions of the people living in the interior cities, however, are wretched. It must be noted that the uneven development in

Tunisia

is not new, as it has been known as jihawiyyah since the reign of Bourguiba. However, the elite have excelled at marginalizing regions and peoples in the interior lands. Specifically, Ben Ali’s in-laws (the Traboulsi family) are seen by many Tunisians as a new mafia, not only controlling the means of production and resources, but using the government institutions to establish monopolies and crush competitors. In fact, the French authorities are believed to have pursued charges against one of Ben Ali’s relatives for illegal business activities.

Education and Religious Freedom

Ben Ali’s regime main threat is the youth and religious groups. He marginalized the youth by offering them a placebo. Before 1987, only 12-15% of high school students graduated. The low percentage was not due to students’ laziness, rather, due to government’s measured control of the job market: since most college graduates expected the government to place them in jobs, the government elevated the level of difficulty of the final comprehensive examinations to regulate the job market.

Ben Ali’s regime altered that practice: now, nearly 80% of high school students graduate and move on to college. The result is an increased number of college graduates being unemployed or underemployed, which frustrated the youth of the country.

In order to control the role of religion in the public sphere, the government “nationalized” religious institutions. In other words, individuals are not allowed to form associations, clubs, or attend religious events unless authorized and run by the government. The only orthodoxy is that identified as such by the regime and the only recognized religion is that of the state.

Global Implications

Tunisia is demographically and economically too small to have an impact on world affairs. It is important, however, given its location and memberships.

Geographically, Tunisia is just minutes away from Europe. From the Tunisian coastline, one could cross to Italy using a makeshift raft or inflated tube. In fact, dozens of African immigrants die every year trying to make the journey to Italy, and the European Union has developed strategies to help these “buffer states” keep African immigrants away. One such strategy is paying off North African leaders to act on their behalf. Another more ambitious strategy to combat illegal immigration is the creation of the so-called Union for the Mediterranean, an intergovernmental organization linking 43 countries. The French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, promoted this idea not only to deal with immigration but also to offer Turkey an alternative association given his opposition to Turkey’s bid for joining the EU.

Additionally, Tunisia is a member of the United Nations, the Organization of Islamic Conference, the Arab League, and the Union of Maghrebi States. In other words, Western concern with Tunisian politics is not premised on oil or military matters, but rather on influence. In this way, the West’s alliance with the Tunisian regime differs significantly from Western interest in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Bahrain, Qatar, or even Egypt.

Consequently, Tunisia, despite its relatively average demographic and economic weight within the Islamic world, remains central given its location and its memberships. The ten million citizens of

Tunisia

want to be respected as human beings, to be given the rights of human beings, and to be treated with dignity. When their government does not afford them these rights, and the West supports the regime and offers lip service to the people, their plight becomes another example of Western double standard and Europe’s willingness to sacrifice its commitment to the promotion of human rights to preserve “friendly” regimes.

For example, the West categorizes a number of Arab and Muslim countries as “moderate,” which is a euphemism for pro-Western. These countries include Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, and

Morocco

. It is a known fact that all these countries have a terrible record when it comes to human rights: They hold laughable elections, they incarcerate large number of political prisoners, they torture their citizens, they treat minorities with disdain, and they have no concept of peaceful transfer of power.

The credibility of the West is at stake because of this double standard, which diminishes its standing among the Muslim people when it goes after countries such as Iran, Syria and Sudan for violating human rights, but looks the other way when the rulers of whom it approves continue to abuse the rights of their citizens with impunity. This account is meant to make the public in Western societies aware of reality in places such as Tunisia since the media is effectively practicing self-censorship. It is not an invitation for the US and its allies to interfere in the affairs of sovereign nations, but it is an appeal for their leaders to stop dealing with tyrants, giving despots favored status, and/or shielding dictators from legal actions in international systems. It is a wake up call for the media to live up to its professional role as a neutral institution whose main mission is to inform objectively and without prejudice or favoritism.

• A.E. SOUAIAIA is an associate professor teaching for International Programs, Religious Studies, and College of Law at the University of Iowa.

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A brief reflection on the religious justification behind wearing of faceveils (burqa and niqab) and its assumptions

2010-11-23T23:45:00.000-08:00

by Adis Duderija

A number of heated debates throughout the western liberal democracies have emerged recently over the issue of wearing of burqas and niqabs by Muslim women. In this short piece I would like to offer a brief reflection on the religious justification behind the practice of wearing of burqas and niqabs and the interpretational and other assumptions that underlie the arguments of those who consider it religiously binding.
There is no doubt that those who advocate the wearning of face veil as mandatory base this on a number of ‘authentic’ ( sahih) hadith (reports repotedly going back to the Prophet Muhammad SAS) and the qur’anic verse ( 33:53- other verses such as 33;59 are also used as well but primarily to argue for the covering of the body,including the hair but not the face ) that , although addressing visitors to Prophet’s residence how to deal with the wives of the Prophet , is interpreted as to applying to all the Muslim women on the basis of examplary role of ‘mothers of all believers’.
In addition, those who argue for a religiously binding character of the face veil justify it on the basis of having a particular understading of male and female sexuality that is not Qur’anic but is present in some ‘sahih’ or ‘authentic ‘ hadith. They also adopt the religiously normative character of the burqa/niqab on the basis of a juristic maxim of ‘blocking the means’ that can be found in the Islamic legal theory and its principals literature which argues that anything can potentially lead to a ‘ morally undesirable’ outcome that is forbidded is initself also forbidded .
The question that is not often being asked in a plethora of analyses on the issue of face veil is how many women would choose to wear the face veil ( or how many men would ask/ force them to do so) if they did not think that it was religiously required/mandated or even desirable? This is especially so if an alternative and ‘authenic ‘ (and in my view convincing interpretation) that remains even within the classical methodological and epistemological framework , was to be offered along the following lines.
1. The ‘sahih’ hadith mentioned are isolated hadith ( ahad) and according even to the clasical Islamic legal theory scholarship cannot be used as sources of law.
2. The verse uses the word ‘hijab’ not niqab/burqa and is to be seen in the context of a Prophet who was very much a public figure and virtually had little or no private life-including his wives. Many people would come and go to his place of residence at will. His residence did not have anything like doors we have these days. In addition , his house and the rooms of his wives were in essence part of the larger ‘mosque’ complex. Thus, a very busy place. Perhaps an analogy would be apt here. For example, those parents who have children who have reached puberty surely would ask their kids to not open the parents’ room door when they are in the room UNLESS they were permitted to do so by the parents.
So the purport of the verse ought to be considered in this context. This is actually confirmed by the hadith that classical Islamic tradition has customary associated with the revelation of the verse in question. Namely, the context behind the revelation is the bedroom of the newly wedded pair ( i.e. Prophet Muhammad SAS and his wife Zainab)wishing to protect their intimacy and exclude a third person (a person called Anas ibn Malik –one of the Prophjet’s Companions). In short the occasion behind the revelation according to hadith accounts on the matter ( in a number of variant versions) is that on the wedding night the Prophet was not able to rid himself of several tactless guests who remained lost in conversation during and well after the wedding supper while he wanted to be alone with Zainab on their first wedding night. After several attempts to indirectly let the men know that it was time that they left by walking out of his house into his coutyard, according to the witness of the events Anas ibn malik, the Prophet recited the verse in question ( 33 :53 – O you who believe, do not enter the prophet’s homes unless you are given permission to eat, nor shall you force such an invitation in any manner. If you are invited, you may enter. When you finish eating, you shall leave; do not engage him in lengthy conversations. This used to hurt the prophet, and he was too shy to tell you. But GOD does not shy away from the truth. If you have to ask his wives for something, ask them from behind a barrier. This is purer for your hearts and their hearts. You are not to hurt the messenger of GOD. You shall not marry his wives after him, for this would be a gross offense in the sight of GOD.) Upon pronouncing the verse, the prophet drew a sitr (hadith uses this synonym of the qur’anic word hijab meaning curtin) between himself (and his wife zainab ) and Anas.
3. Classical understanding of male and female sexuality that are not found in the Qur’an were such that women’s body PER SE is seen as morally corrupting ( in contrast to being sexual) and that men are incapable of resisting women as sources of irressitable sexual temptation leading to social and moral chaos ( fitna). There is some evidence of this mindset in some hadith. However, this view of male/female sexuality is EMPIRICALLY UNTRUE and any hadith evidence that is empirically untrue , even according to clasical hadith sciences, cannot be valid even if it is deemed ‘sahih’. I think most of us would agree that is also morally ugly to suggest that women’s bodies are morally corrupting per se.

4. The juridical maxim found in Islamic legal methodology literature of ‘blocking the means’ is also problematic since it is not only the women that have to carry the burden, this method, if extended logically, is extremely draconian and one can justify just about anything on this basis ( e.g. as they do in S. Arabia in case of women drivers, talking over the phone to an unrelated member of the opposite sex or even exchanging letters ). Finally, the classical view of male/female sexuality renders human beinsg incapable of ethical and moral progress , in sense of training one’s moral /ethical compass and undergoing some moral discipline by suggesting that any ‘temptation’ wil inevitalbly lead to morally bad actions. Instead, men are portrayed to always succumb to the source of moral sexual evil that women embody. By subscribing to this view one inadvertedly objectifies women sexually- something that the proponents of this view so quickly accuse the western civilisation of doing. Isn’t this just plain morally ugly ?
In a way it remindes me of what I recently heard on BBC radio in relation to the introduction of sexual education in Malaysian schools. Namely those who opposed it (conservative traditional Muslims) use the arguent that the introduction of sexual education in schools will inevitably increase the sexual activity of the concerned. This is a twisted logic and at times serves as a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Intra-Muslim Dialogue –is it possible?

2010-11-03T22:48:00.000-07:00

By Adis Duderija

Having recently established an ‘e journal’ which solely aims to focus on intra Muslim dialogue ( www.intramuslimdialogue.org) the first comment sent to the website was , may I add unpredictably so, was “Is such a thing possible ?

This question prompted me to reflect more systematically on (and defend) the decision behind setting up the journal on intra Muslim dialogue.

The very question “Is intra Muslim dialogue possible?” it itself is quite telling the current circumstances surrounding those who consider themselves to be Muslim and belong the Islamic tradition however you define these two.

The numerous events of ‘sectarian’ or religiously inspired/justified violence and ongoing repression of many Muslim communities by other Muslims in many parts of Muslim majority world, especially in the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia- which have resulted in large number of lost lives- justify scepticism and lack of optimism reflected in the comment I received as an editor of the journal.

However, in my view, this rather grim picture ought not deter us from efforts to trying to improve things for the better. Put differently, the alternative status quo is for many a Muslim today no longer acceptable on both moral and religious/theological grounds.

Dialogue between various religious traditions (inter-religious ) and recognition of irreducible religious pluralism has come a long way recently, at least in theory. I say this as someone who has been active in inter-faith dialogue (predominantly between the Abrahamic religious) at grass roots level as well as someone who has an academic interest in the topic.

But dialogue within religious traditions, especially that of a Muslim kind, has not
kept pace with that of inter-religious dialogue. Why? This is a fascinating question that requires serious academic research and is of course beyond the pale of this short text. Nevertheless, in my view, many socio-political and economic challenges facing Muslim majority countries are at least in part rooted in failures of engaging in intra-religious dialogue. As such, I believe, currently there is a great need to first develop a scholarly discourse around this theme as the preliminary but absolutely necessary step towards fuller, better appreciation and recognition of vast diversity of Muslim experience based on principles of respect and dignity. Hence, the idea of the journal.

I also believe that now there is out there a critical mass of well intentioned and willing people to make greater intra Muslim dialogue based on mutual respect, dignity and celebration of differences and eschewing all forms of violence a reality!

This good will has, of course, exited before as well. To the best of my knowledge, however, most of the discussions on greater Muslim dialogue have been limited to either academic discussions found in institutionalised and commercialised journals very few non-academics have access to or have been ad hoc attempts by individuals.

Hence, this scholarly journal will be of ‘open access’ type and also have a non-peer reviewed section of ‘opinions, analysis and commentary’ open to all not just those who meet the rigorous standards of academic peer reviewing procedures which are so crucial and central to academic endeavour.
One one needs reminding that the global Muslim community is very diverse in terms of race, language, culture, theological denominations and interpretations of religious texts. A call for intra-Muslim dialogue is therefore not a call for imposition of any interpretational hegemony or a push for ‘orthodoxy’ and ‘orthopraxis’. On contrary a call for intra-Muslim dialogue is based upon the absolute need to facilitate dialogue between various contemporary Muslim schools of thought and build bridges of better understanding between them based on the universal values of mutual respect and dignity.
Of course, intra-religious differences and problems, including that of abuse and violence of various kinds, are not limited to the Islamic tradition. Progress that has been made in other religious traditions with respect to intra-religious dialogue and curbing of religiously inspired violence, abuse and rhetoric should give us hope and encouragement that we as Muslims are also capable of the same.

However what will happen in the future will to a large extent depend upon how we approach this very notion of intra-Muslim dialogue.

Where should Muslims build mosques?

2010-08-29T10:22:00.000-07:00

BY AHMED SOUAIAIA - GUEST OPINION | AUGUST 25, 2010 7:20 AM

The Muslim-American community is growing, and with growth comes the need for community centers, mosques, and a public presence. Every state in the United States contains at least one mosque, according to the multicultural marketing agency Allied Media. However, the plan to construct a large community center in Manhattan has started a heated debate about the "wisdom" of building a mosque two blocks from where the World Trade Center once stood.

Some of those who are protesting the plan claim that they are not against American Muslims' rights to worship, they are merely opposed to the erection of a mosque near Ground Zero.

Hence the obvious questions: Why can't Muslims build a mosque there? Where can they build mosques? And why do Muslims really want to build a mosque there?

While some of those opposed argue that building an Islamic center near Ground Zero is disrespectful to the victims of the 9/11 attacks, many are simply opposed to any public presence of Islam in America.

Representatives of American Muslims in Manhattan contend that they need the center because the current prayer hall is too small. They further add that blocking American Muslims from building a place of worship on private land and in accordance with city ordinances would (1) stoke fear domestically and further marginalize American Muslims and (2) give credence internationally to extremists' claim that America is at war with Islam.

Given these positions, the third position (that the center be built elsewhere) obviously makes no sense — Muslims have mosques elsewhere. And where exactly is "elsewhere?" Ten blocks away? Outside Manhattan? Outside New York City?

To suggest that a mosque should be built away from Ground Zero implies that Islam (all forms and expressions of it) is guilty of killing innocent people in the World Trade Center. If we opposed the building of a religious center near areas (or cities) where innocent people were killed, then there would be no place on Earth to build a synagogue, a church, or a mosque — throughout the history of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, self-described Jews, Christians, and Muslims (and in many cases, official representatives of these faiths) have committed, encouraged, and/or catalyzed acts that resulted in the killing of thousands of innocent people.

There is, without a doubt, an undercurrent of hate and total rejection of Islam in the West. There are many (beyond the usual fringe elements) who are opposed to building mosques anywhere. Indeed, there are organized groups around the world whose aim is to ban any public manifestation of Islam in the West. Europe's ban on minarets is one example; the bombing and vandalizing of mosques in numerous American cities is another.

Just recently, a self-proclaimed Christian group in Florida applied for a permit to inaugurate the so-called "International Burn a Koran Day," which would coincide with the remembrance of the 9/11 tragedy. Should the trend persists, 9/11 could turn into "International Bomb a Mosque Day" event.

Sadly, 9/11 is being used as a pretext to demonize Islam and Muslims. And that need to be addressed.

At the same time, Muslims should build their mosque if they need it for the community, not use its proximity to Ground Zero as a context for interfaith dialogue. I am of the view that using tragedies such as 9/11 and the loss of civilian lives anywhere for political or religious propaganda purposes is suspect.

And that applies to both sides.

UI Associate Professor Ahmed Souaiaia teaches courses in the College of Law, International Programs, and religious-studies department.

Gender Justice Jihad in Ramadan by Adis Duderija

2010-08-16T19:46:00.000-07:00

On a recent communal breaking of the fast event I witnessed several events that made me think about the real difficulties behind the changing of people’s behaviour in relation to gender justice in Islam.
Before I do the purpose of what I will write below is NOT meant to be an exercise in self-praise although it can come across as such. I am only too aware of my own shortcomings when it comes to gender justice issues in my own household. I am writing this to hopefully raise some awareness and levels of consciousness in Muslim men, including myself, in relation to just one instance of gender injustice.

Let me elaborate. Having arrived at the venue (a local musala ) with some time to spare I greeted and thanked the organiser of the event and asked him if any help was needed with setting up of the tables and the food. With a smile on his face he remarked that there were ‘many women’ around who can / are doing the job. Indeed apart form the man I spoke to (and another one who was setting up the speaker system and opening up toilets) it was indeed all women who were getting things ready while men were happily chatting away .
Few minutes later when it was time to break the fast I realised that ,upon breaking my fast , all the drinks and the dates were on the side of the musala where the men were.

While the men were breaking their fasts women were waiting in the other part of the musala. When I approached one of them that I knew and asked her to come over where the drinks were she was very reluctant like the rest of the other women. I pointed to her and others (including some men who were around) that it was indeed them who not only cooked the food but also prepared setting it all up. I also remarked that it was more just for them to have broken the fast first. Some of the women , younger ones in particular, acknowledged this reasoning, however, none of them were willing to break their fast with drinks and dates whilst men were still at it. However no men seemed to have noticed this despite the fact that the musala is rather small and that several women were also elderly and looked weak.
Don’t get me wrong this congregation that I know reasonably well is by no means conservative and very few of the women (or men for that matter) conform to traditional let also strict puritan norms and standards of behaviour in their ordinary lives.

The same applied later on with the food. While I was trying to protest by telling one of the women ( in the vicinity of other men) that I will not eat the food until at least one or few of the women had taken some first , one of the male leaders of the community who heard what I had said not only remained silent but without being given permission pushed in front of all of the other women who were lined up. The (self-appointed) prayer leader who was symbolically heavily ‘Muslim’ with the turban and all the other paraphiliacs ( whose qur’anic reading, knowledge of Islam, smoking habit as well as personality make him anything but an obvious choice for the function of the prayer leader that he so willingly assumed) was also oblivious to this injustice and insensivity towards women.

Based on anecdotal evidence I am sure that what I briefly described above has happened in many other mosques/musalas.
Why is it that so many Muslim men are so insensitive to gender justice to the extent of branding those few Muslim men and many women who are as agents of “western culture” ? Could this insensitivity in more extreme cases also explain the presence of misogynist thinking among some Muslim men and acts of abuse may that be in the context of marriage or parent- child relationship?
What good does the fasting during the month of Ramadan serve if we are not even sensitive (or choose to be insensitive) to the needs of our sisters in faith? Why do we easily fall for and unquestioningly accept facades and masquerades over essence and what really matters?

My personal goal and wish is to spend the rest of this fasting month improving my own sensitivity to the other gender. I hope you will too.

Adis Duderija has a Ph.D. in Islamic Studies from the University of Western Australia

Interpreting the Qur’an –Towards a Contemporary Approach -Book Review

2010-03-15T21:10:00.000-07:00

BOOK RE-VIEW/ESSAY

By Adis Duderija, School of Social and Cultural Studies, University of Western Australia

Abdullah Saeed, ‘Interpreting the Qur’an –Towards a Contemporary Approach’, Routledge, 2006, p.192.

The book ‘Interpreting the Qur’an –Towards a Contemporary Approach’ by Abdullah Saeed is concerned with outlining of a systematic and coherent model for evaluating some of the traditional concepts in the realm of interpretation of the ethico-legal aspect of the Qur’anic Revelation and advocating for an alternative, what the author terms ‘Contextualist’, approach to Qur’anic interpretation which would provide a more suitable Qur’anic hermeneutic for meeting the contemporary ‘needs of Muslims’ living in both Islamicate and non-Islamicate societies.

Indeed, professor Saeed’s book is to be seen in the broader context of the multifold and perplexing challenges that the present and (post)- modernity pose to the what professor Moosa terms pre-modern intellectual Muslim discourses including the spheres of law, theology, ethics, culture and politics.

All religious traditions based on the notion of Divine scriptures, as professor El-Fadl astutely points out, inevitably need to come to terms with the conundrum of reconciling seemingly paradoxical claims of historicity of Revelation with its claims to universality.

Qur’anic historicity and its ‘Deutungsbeduerftigkeit’ stemming from the actual nature of its content and its genesis have never been denied by the Muslim tradition. This is well attested by vast bodies of literature written by Muslims over the last 14 or so centuries on the Qur’an may that literature be exegetical, jurisprudential, ideological/sectarian or mystical in its orientation. A number of interpretive strategies and methodological tools have been developed in order to deal with the Qur’an’s need for interpretation /meaning. Professor Saeed ‘s aim is in this regard two –fold. Firstly, he aims to outline the attempts of previous generations of Muslims in this process of interpreting and giving meaning to the Qur’anic content, their epistemological and methodological assumptions, strengths and short-comings as they apply to the Qur’anic ethico-legal content. Secondly, based on the identified limits of the medieval epistemology of Qur’anic hermeneutics characterised by what he refers to as Textualist and/or Semi-textualist approaches to Qur’anic interpretation, Saeed proposes and presents a number of new heuristical methods, broadly termed the ‘Contextualist approach’, necessary for a contemporary approach to Qur’anic interpretation.

In order to overcome the what Kamali terms the absence of time-space factor in the fabric of traditional usul-ul fiqh methodology, Saeed discusses a number of methodological tools, some of which have been applied by previous Muslim scholars from various phases of Islamic intellectual heritage, along with their hermeneutical relevance and utility in the contemporary context. In several instances the author emphasises that his approach highlights the methodological and epistemological continuity with the established tradition wherever such is possible as his method should be seen as being firmly based, inspired by and stemming forth from the tradition itself.
After the introductory chapter, the second chapter provides a context on the contemporary debates relating to the issue of Qur’anic interpretation by revisiting the issues which have shaped these discussions from the very genesis of Islamic thought up to the leading contemporary scholars dealing with the issue of Qur’anic interpretation. Additionally, it brings to the fore several issues, which are considered helpful in understanding the context behind the contemporary interpretational debates on the ethico-moral dimensions of the Qur’an.

The third chapter outlines the traditional Muslim understanding of the concept of Revelation as it pertains to the ethico-legal dimension of the Qur’anic text and outlines several new features of a new theory of Revelation based on the earlier identified ‘Contextualist’ approach. This includes a ‘broader understanding of Revelation’ based on a four level system in which “the socio-historical context of revelation is a fundamental element of revelation…[and] is not divorced from the human instrument including the Prophet, and all of the subsequent Muslim communities to this day” all of whom are entitled to expanding upon its understanding.

The fourth chapter examines the traditional textually based interpretation of the Qur’an (tafsir bi al-ma’thur/ bi al- riwayah), its development and the factors responsible for its entrenchment and subsequent elevation to the level of normativeness at the expense of other approaches (such as tafsir bi al-ra’y or reason –based interpretation).

Reason based interpretation is the theme of the fifth chapter. The revelation –reason dynamic has a long history in Islamic thought whose exact relationship is yet to be systematically formulated. In it the author advocates a view of the important role reason-based approach to Qur’anic interpretation can play in contemporary approaches. Author also points to the traditional rooted ness of the practice and discusses its legitimacy and scope.
Chapter six focuses on the issue of flexibility of reading the Qur’anic texts (based on the traditional understanding of the seven ahruf ) and the possibility that out of this practice a support for the notion of flexibility of interpretation can be deduced.

Chapter seven explores the relevance of the traditional discipline of abrogation (naskh) in the ‘Contextualist’ approach to Qur’anic interpretation and identifies it as one of the most powerful arguments and tools for relating Qur’anic ethico-legal rulings to changing needs and circumstances of the Muslims. Here Saeed echoes the view of Kamali who, in the context of the role and nature of naskh in usul ul-fiqh, asserts that:
[A] borgation which was originally meant to maintain harmony between the law and social reality began to be used contrary to its original purpose. The classical jurists advocated abrogation as a juridical doctrine in its own right rather than seeking it as an aid to the role of the time-space factor in the development of law.

In the eight and the ninth chapters, expanding upon the work of El-Fadl and Barlas , Saeed analyses and critiques the ‘Textualist’ approach to the theory of meaning as it applies to the Qur’anic ethico-legal content and argues for the recognition of the approximation, polysemicity and indeterminacy of meaning as a result of the interpretational tension between the author, text and the reader. In line with Arkoun’s theories , a crucial distinction between Qur’an as discourse (text & context – ‘Contextualist’ understanding of the nature of the Qur’an) and Qur’an as merely a text (‘Textualist’ understanding of the nature of the Qur’an) is made. Saeed argues that Qur’an should be seen both as a text and a discourse if Muslims are to understand it’s true character and develop an adequate hermeneutical model of its interpretation.

The socio-historical embeddedness of Qur’anic revelation is the theme of the tenth chapter although the call for the recognition of this dimension of the Qur’anic content is highlighted throughout the book along with the interpretational implications of such recognition, especially on the ethico-legal aspect of Qur’anic revelation. In this context Saeed astutely points out the limitations of the ‘Textualist’ approach to Qur’anic interpretation which was largely restricted to philological considerations reducing Qur’anic language to “purely legal language [which] has, in my [his] view, been one of the most unfortunate events in the history of Qur’anic exegesis . Additionally he asserts that Qur’anic language is primarily ‘ethico-theological’ in nature and that inherent weaknesses pertaining to the methodological and epistemological considerations relating to the asbab al-nuzul and maslaha sciences as espoused by traditional Muslim scholars are unable to lead to the uncovering of higher purposes and objectives (maqasid) of Shari’ah as embodied by the Qur’an and Sunnah. As such, and in line with Arkoun’s works , Saeed prudently advocates for an anthropological approach to Qur’anic interpretation as a part of the overall emphasis for a more meaningful and hermeneutically more prominent role of the socio-historical approach to Qur’anic interpretation.

The major strength behind the socio-historical approach to Qur’anic hermeneutics is based on the premise that this heuristic would allow for a development of a systematic, coherent and hierarchical model of general and universal Qur’anic values which, hermeneutically, would be its most powerful interpretational tools. This is the subject matter of the eleventh chapter. Here Saeed, as in many previous instances, refers to the works of late Fazrul Rahman and his “double movement theory.” In this regard Saeed presents a particularly useful hierarchy/typology of values and a methodology that would help determine whether Qur’anic values are socio-culturally contingent /specific or universal in nature.

In the epilogue major arguments of the book are revisited. Additionally a systematic, multifaceted and hierarchical hermeneutical model of Qur’anic interpretation is presented incorporating all of methods the author outlined were necessary for a contemporary approach to Qur’anic interpretation dispersed throughout the book.

Arguments put by Saeed are based on a very perceptive analysis of traditional usul ul fiqh and tafsir sciences and several features of Saeed’s hermeneutical model are highly original, systematic and coherent in nature. They present a major contribution to the field of Islamic hermeneutics, especially as they relate to what Na’eem terms the much-needed reform of the ‘historical shari’ah’. Saeed’s conscious attempt to remain within the traditional epistemological framework as much as possible will certainly find more sympathy among usually very suspicious and sensitive Muslim masses when it comes to the issues of their religious heritage, especially the Qur’an.

The reviewer has one major reservation with Saeed’s conceptual approach to this study. It pertains to the larger notion of the nature of the relationship and the interplay between the Qur’an, Sunnah and hadith as widely recognised primary sources of Islamic Weltanschauung.

Given the above mentioned ‘Deutungsbedurftigkeit” of the Qur’an and the symbiotic, organic relationship between Qur’an and Sunnah during the pre-classical era of Islamic thought, as the reviewer has argued elsewhere, a systematic and coherent Qur’anic hermeneutical model ought to include and address the issues of the definition, nature and scope of the concept of Sunnah vis a vis- the Qur’an as well as the that of the Sunnah (and thus indirectly the Qur’an) vis-a- vis ahadith body of texts. This is entirely absent from Saeed’s analysis although the implications of this on the development of a systematic and coherent, what a reviewer would refer to as Qur’ano-Sunnahic hermeneutical model (rather then just Qur’anic), are very significant as I’ll attempt to demonstrate below.

During the pre-classical period, contrary to the classical era in which the “canonised” hadith body of literature was considered the sole vehicle of Sunnah’s depository, its deduction and perpetuation, the concept of Sunnah underwent several semantico-contextual changes and was deduced on the basis of variant epistemologico-methodological tools to that of hadith. A significant body of evidence suggests that during the first four generations of Muslims the concept of Sunnah was independent (conceived primarily but not exclusively in form of ‘amal or practice-based Sunnah) both methodologically and epistemologically from that of hadith , thus was conceptually and qualitatively different from it. In other words the nature and the scope of Sunnah was distinct from that of the nature and scope of hadith. Upon Sunnah’s complete conceptual identification with hadith, Sunnah’s organic link and the symbiotic relationship with the Qur’an were severed. A new Hadith –based Sunnah was seen as something additional to, a necessary exegetical supplement to, and explicator of the Qur’an rather than the other side of the same coin. The traditional post-Shafi’i function of Sunnah was based exactly on this reasoning and was expressed in the well-known maxim in Islamic jurisprudence affirming that the Qur’an’s interpretational need of Sunnah (in form of its sole vehicle, the hadith) is greater then the Sunnah’s interpretational need of the Qur’an. Thus, Qur’an was, as Saeed astutely alludes to on several occasions and especially in chapter four, increasingly hermeneutically dependent upon hadith. Since a qualitative distinction between the nature, scope and character of pre-classical and classical concept of Sunnah as the most widely accepted or solely normative sources of Qur’anic interpretation existed, this affected the epistemologico-methodological parameters within which Qur’anic interpretation was possible to be developed. Since pre-classical concept of Sunnah, apart from its ‘amal component, was primarily conceived in form of abstract ethico-moral and/or theological terms, was reason inclusive and was conceptualised in terms of the broader Qur’anic objectives and purposes (maqasid), it permitted a wider interpretational playfield /framework than that based on hadith-dependent Sunnah.

Thus, the definition, nature and scope of Sunnah and its relationship vis –a- vis ahadith body of texts, will inevitably affect how the question of Qur’anic interpretation is going to be approached. Therefore, it is essential that any systematic and coherent Qur’anic interpretational model incorporate a dimension relating to the role and function of Sunnahic and Hadith elements in it. In order to do so addressing the broader question of the definition, nature and scope of Sunnah vis-à-vis the Qur’an and hadith is of paramount importance.
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The nuclear age has been bad news for Muslim world

2010-02-16T06:18:00.000-08:00

By Prof. Ali A. Mazrui

Two territorial partitions of the Twentieth Century have profoundly affected the Muslim world. One was the partition of India that gave the Muslim world the miracle of a major new member.

The other was the partition of Palestine, which gave the Muslim world the challenge of a new adversary. Those two momentous events occurred within two consecutive years of each other - 1947 saw the birth of the Muslim state of Pakistan. In 1948 we witnessed the birth of the Jewish state of Israel. Islam in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries was never to be the same.

But where does the nuclear factor fit into this complex equation? The Muslims of South Asia lived to witness the nuclearisation of their much larger and powerful neighbour, India. The Muslims of the Middle East lived to witness the nuclearisation of their small but powerful neighbour, Israel. Over time, the question even arose whether India and Israel would conspire to prevent the nuclearisation of Pakistan.

In the Middle East, meanwhile, Israel on her own was exercising a veto over the nuclearisation of Iraq and the rest of the Arab world while, simultaneously, facilitating in the 1980s the nuclearisation of the apartheid regime in South Africa. Israel has also campaigned vigorously for international sanctions against Iran’s current nuclear programme.

This means that the coming of the nuclear age has been bad news for the Muslim world, at least for the time being. This has been compounded by the attitude of the United States. Washington turned the other way, if not actually helped, the nuclearisation of Israel. Yet Washington has been strongly opposed to ‘nuclear proliferation’ in the Muslim world. This was well before Saddam Hussein became America’s alleged possessor of ‘weapons of mass destruction,’ and Iran was accused of seeking nuclear weapons.

The nuclear shadow over the Muslim world probably began in the Middle East rather than in South Asia. The two partitions of 1947 and 1948 created conditions of military rivalry and technological competition in both South Asia and the Middle East, respectively. But technological change occurred much faster in Israel than in any other country in the two regions. To that extent, the nuclear specter began in Israel with consequences not only for the Muslim world but also for Africa.

Ancient Israel died two thousand years ago, only to be re-born in the full scientific glare of the nuclear age. Modern Israel was born within three years of the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. A Jewish political entity that had died two millennia previously in Biblical times was suddenly re-born and started blinking at the brightness of a ‘nuclear dawn.’

Within a single generation, the youthful Jewish state itself became a nuclear power. That was bad news for the Arabs and for their supporters. Without nuclear power, Israel’s conventional superiority could one day have been neutralised by Arab numerical preponderance.

But acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel has helped to create a potentially permanent military stalemate. Even when the Arabs eventually become the equals of the Israelis in nuclear capacity, the principle of nuclear deterrence will work with even greater certainty than it did in the East-West conflict.

It just so happened that the state of Israel was created when a nuclear stalemate could conceivably ensure its survival. That is good for world Jewry, but it is not necessarily good news for the Muslim world if Jerusalem is forever lost to Muslim sovereignty. The USA and the USSR nearly went to war over Cuba in 1962. Will Israel and the Arabs in the future go to war over Jerusalem?

Mazrui teaches political science and African studies at State University, New York

Salient Features of Progressive Muslim Thought –Social Justice, Gender Justice and Irreducible Religious pluralism

2009-12-20T18:28:00.000-08:00

by Adis Duderija

(Paper presented at the World Parliament of Religions Conference, Melbourne,3-9 December 2009)

___________________________________

ADIS DUDERIJA

In my presentation I use the term Progressive Muslims (PM) as that developed and employed by the contributors to the book titled “Progressive Muslims” edited by O.Safi. The book “Progressive Muslims” was:

a result of almost an entire year of conversation, dialogue, and debate among the fifteen contributors. It had its real genesis in the aftermath of September 11,2001 in what we [the contributors] saw as the urgent need to raise the level of conversation, and to get away from the standard apologetic presentations of Islam.

The progressive Muslims’ cosmovision’, to use the words of F. Esack one of its leading proponents, is best characterised by its commitments and fidelity to certain ideals, values, practices and objectives that are expressed and take form in a number of different themes.
One of the most prominent of these ideals and practices is the commitment and the engagement of its adherents to what Esack terms ‘principled or prophetic solidarity’ with the marginalized and the oppressed communities of the world which are confronted with the actual context of injustice . This principled solidarity ought not be confused with and must be distinguished from what Esack labels the ‘expedient or situational ethics’ that ‘dominate current Muslim public discourses’ which are strategic, utilitarian, and accommodationist in character. In the words of Esack the primary concerns of Progressive Muslims

[r]elate [far more directly] to global structures of oppression whether economic, gender ,sexual etc., and ensuring that the oppressed are once again active agents of history. This fight for us[ Progressive Muslims] involves the centrality of God , the imagining of mankind as al-nas – a carrier of the spirit of God and an appreciation of Islam as a liberatory discourse.

In this context the hegemony of the modern free market–based economics and political and social structures, institutions and powers (“The Empire”)that either support, maintain or are not critical of the (unjust) status quo are strongly resisted and are seen by PM as antithetical to their overall Weltanschauung including their understanding of Islam. This is so because “The Empire” is considered to have brought about the transformation and the reduction of a human (al-insan) ,a carrier of God’s spirit, into a primarily economic consumer ( homo aeconomicus) producing great economic disparities between the majority world of the poor South and the minority world of the rich North. According to Safi this “Empire’ consists of a multitude of forces “among them the oppressive and environmentally destructive forces of multi-national corporations whose interests are now linked to those of neo-imperial, unilateral governments…..that put profit before human rights and ‘strategic interest’ before the dignity of every human being.”
Furthermore, PM wish to bring about the centrality, the uniqueness and inherent worthiness of each and every human being as the recipient and carrier of God’s spirit. This view is perhaps best illustrated with the following statements of Safi

[A]t the heart of a progressive Muslim interpretation is a simple yet radical idea: every human life, female or male, Muslim and non-Muslim, rich or poor, “Northern” or “Southern” has exactly the same intrinsic worth.

and
A progressive Muslim agenda is concerned with the ramifications of the premise that all members of humanity have this same intrinsic worth because, as the Qur’an reminds us, each of us has the breath of God breathed into our being.

The discourse on democracy and human rights stemming from the geographical regions of the Empire’s centre is viewed with great deal of suspicion bacause it is considered often functioning as a “Trojan Horse of Recolonisation”. It is viewed with suspicion also because it is considered not to be living up to its own ethico-moral standards, especially (but not only) in relation to issues directly affecting Muslims.
In this connection one important aspect and objective of being a PM ,argues Esack, is the “speaking truth to power” by engaging : i.) “in relentless self-critique that enables the adherent of PM thought to be true to the ideals of a just society in a way that also prevents his or her co-optation by those who have their own agendas or the expansion of the Empire as their primary reason for wanting to engage Islam”; ii.) engaging the Empire in the light of i.) without jeopardizing the inherent humanity of those comprising it; and iii.) engaging the ummah by confronting those within it who in the guise of protecting Muslim societies from the Empire violate Muslims’ basic human rights.
This means that PM are engaged in a ‘multiple critique’ that “entails a multi-headed approach based on a simultaneous critique of the many communities and discourses Progressive Muslims are positioned in”. It means to challenge, resist and seek to overthrow the structures of injustice regardless of the ideational origins and phylogeny.

In conjunction with the emphasis on the inherent dignity of every human being the values of social and gender justice , and irreducible religious pluralism are the main driving forces behind the PM ethico-religious outlook. As such PM are characterized by their

striv[ing] to realize a just and pluralistic society through critically engaging Islam, a relentless pursuit of social justice, an emphasis on gender equality as a foundation of human rights, a vision of religious and ethnic pluralism, and a methodology of nonviolent resistance.

Gender justice and equality in particular, play a very important part in the overall PM thought because they are seen as “ a measuring stick for the broader concerns of social justice and pluralism.” Gender justice and equality are ,therefore, regarded as an essential and fundamental feature of progressive Muslim thought. In the words of Safi
…the Muslim community as a whole cannot achieve justice unless justice is guaranteed for Muslim women. In short there can be no progressive interpretation of Islam without gender justice. Gender justice is crucial, indispensable and essential. In the long run any progressive Muslim interpretation will be judged based on the amount of change in gender justice it is able to produce in small and large communities.

As such PM strive for a legitimately recognized Islamic feminism.

At the core of this CPM ‘cosmovision’ is also a very strong emphasis on spirituality and interpersonal relationships based on the teachings of some of the “romantic or idealistic” Sufi ethics of dealing with fellow human beings in a way that “always recall[s] and remember[s] the reflection of Divine Presence and qualities in one another. PM thought can indeed be seen as an intellectualized form of Sufism.
Another important facet of PM thought is its emphasis on grass-roots activism that reflect its ideals and values. In the words of Safi,
A progressive commitment implies by necessity the willingness to remain engaged with the issues of social justice as they unfold at the ground level in the realities of Muslim and non-Muslim communities. Vision and activism are both necessary. Action without vision is doomed from the start/vision without activism quickly becomes irrelevant.

The proponents of PM thought are to be found spread throughout the Muslim and non –Muslim world. Many of the leading PM intellectuals live in the West and teach at western universities. Some of them obtained their graduate and post-graduate qualifications from these institutions and, in some cases, have also received traditional training in the Islamic sciences. In the words of Safi:
unlike their liberal Muslim forefathers, progressive Muslims represent a broad coalition of female and male Muslim activists and intellectuals. One of the distinguishing features of the progressive Muslim movement as the vanguard of Islamic (post)modernism has been the high level of female participation as well as the move to highlight women’s rights as part of a broader engagement with human rights.

Another prominent aspect of PM thought is that besides awarding a vital role to the concept of the socio-cultural embeddedness of certain aspects of the Islamic tradition and its primary sources, ethico-religious considerations are the highest hermeneutical tool in the PM approach to interpretation of the fountainheads of the Islamic teachings, the Qur’an and Sunnah.. As such PM thought is characterized by a “search for moral and humane aspects of Islamic intellectual heritage and is a force against moral lethargy that has crept into it.” Indeed one of its central guiding principles argues El Fadl, another one of the most important proponents of PM thought is “ to reclaim the beautiful in the vast and rich moral tradition of Islam and to discover its moral imperatives.” As part of this approach PM call for a “careful analysis of some of the more complex and foundational presumptions in Muslim legal and ethical philosophy” and the necessary epistemological and paradigm shift in, what Moosa terms, the post-Empire Islam context. In this respect PM thought strongly opposes , accounts for and challenges the “great impoverishment of thought and spirit brought forward by all Muslim literalist-exclusivist groups such as (but not only) Wahhabism.”
Lastly, PM thought places a strong emphasis on irreducible religious and ethnic pluralism where plurality of interpretations of religious texts and religious experiences is considered a norm and the Will of the Creator of all humanity. Each religion is therefore considered to be sui generis and a self-sufficient complete whole operating within its own broader weltanschauung.

O.Safi, Progressive Muslims, op.cit.
Safi, Progressive Muslims, p.18.
See F. Esack, ‘Contemporary Democracy and Human Rights Project for Muslim Societies’, in ed. Abdul Aziz Said, M. Abu Nimer and M. Sharify-Fumk, Contemporary Islam-Dynamic not Static, Routledge, London and New York, 2006, pp. 117-129.
Esack, ‘Contemporary Democracy’, op.cit, pp. 125-126
Ibid, p. 127
O.Safi, Progressive Muslims, op.cit., p. 3.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Esack, ‘Contemporary Democracy’, op.cit, pp. 120-121.
S.Mahmood, ‘Secularism, Hermeneutics, Empire: The Politics of Islamic Reformation’, Public Culture,Vol.18, No.2, pp.323-347.
F.Esack, ‘Contemporary Democracy’,op.cit., pp.125-126.
O.Safi, Progressive Muslims, op.cit., p.2.
O.Safi,’Challenges and Opportunities for the Progressive Muslim in North America’,op.cit.
O.Safi, ‘What is Progressive Islam?, International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World, December 2003, pp. 48-49, p.49.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Safi, Progressive Muslims,op.cit.p.7
Safi,’Challenges and Opportunities for the Progressive Muslim in North America’.
See A.Duderija, The Interpretational Implications of Progressive Muslims’ Qur’an and Sunnah Manhaj in relation to Construction of a Normative Muslimah Representation, Journal of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 19,4,2008,409-427.
El-Fadl,’The Ugly’, pp.33-78.
ibid.
Moosa, ‘The Poetics’, p.3.
Safi, Progressive Muslims,p.8.

Debates Among Muslims About the Nature of Prophetic Authority –Implications for the Role Of Islam in the World Today

2009-12-18T00:41:00.001-08:00

By : Adis Duderija

The contemporary inter-muslim disputes on the nature, character and scope of Prophetic authority centre around the central notion in Islamic thought that of nature of Sunnah and by extension the nature of the Revelation revealed to Prophet Muhammad, namely the Qur'an. These questions in turn are so fundamental that an enormous body of literature has been/ and is still being written in the fields of "Islamic" law, theology, mysticism, politics, philosophy and ethics. It is outside the scope of this written discourse to offer even a brief account of any of these. As such the essay will be selective in nature and try to address issues that are more "pragmatically oriented" or in other words which are more directly relevant to the global political dynamics and the role Muslim societies play in them.

Concept of Sunnah ,or what has been commonly coined as Prophet's example , existed in pre-Qur'anic Arabia . Over time the concept itself underwent several semantical changes during the development of Muslim creed, as Ansari pointed out lucidly. Sunnah's initial vagueness and generality in terms of its semantics was increasingly linked to its usage in Islamic Jurisprudence. However it always contained and carried , according to Ansari, a meaning of normativeness in itself. This inherent normativeness of Sunnah as applied to the Prophet confirmed by the Qur'an was to give rise to, inter alia, a multitude of views as to what the actual function of Prophetic figure was along with debates on the sphere of influence prophet was to exert on the believer . Was Prophet a lawgiver,a politician and a statesman or a mere spiritual reformer and an ethico-moral guide ( by the way the same questions can be asked with regards to the nature and aims of Qur'anic revelation) ? In other words to what extent did the concrete socio-historical situation on ground faced by the Prophet dictate /influence his universalist message and vice-versa? The mainstream view of the Muslim creed downplayed the importance of socially contingent elements of Prophetic activity/authority in the development of subsequent "catholic" version of the dogma and elaborated an extensive , largely literalist doctrine of Prophetic authority not restricted to ethico-moral guidance only. The epistemological sources and methodological tools applied to the process of derivation of normative values based on this concept of Sunnah (and thus to the nature of Prophetic authority) saw the Prophetic authority as being all comprehensive, thus not just exerting influence over the fields of ethics and morality ( which one might add has been largely neglected in terms of its systematic elaboration and definition as Prof. F. Rahman argued) but also in the socio-political sense , especially in the area of law.
What are the implications of such a view on nature and scope of Prophetic authority for the role of Islam in the arena of contemporary international politics? Questions such as whether Islam is compatible with democracy, human rights and gender equality ,(post)- modernity and values underlying its worldview ;its views on the nature of the relationship between predominantly Muslim societies and western liberal societies; issues pertaining to non-Muslim minorities in Muslim societies and Muslim minorities in Non-Muslim societies ; institutions of secular nation/state-hood , validity and viability of global governance and other international bodies are some of the most important questions in the international political realm concerning Islam and Muslims today.
Let us briefly explore some of them.

DEMOCRACY AND ISLAM :

The mainstream Muslim political governance model throughout its history, as embodied by the early Muslim community just after the Prophet's death, was based on the notion of caliphate ( a qur'anic term pertaining to the role of human beings on earth as viceroys /representatives of God ) which from the very beginning translated itself into a hereditary and dynastical rule of the caliph belonging to a particular tribe or family related to the Prophet in one way or another . There was , in theory, no separation between the religious and the non-religious spheres of governance. The caliph was not only a ruler but also "a shadow of God"( as the tradition puts it) on earth, custodian of revealed knowledge and ensurer of its implementation . In reality, however,the caliph largely assumed a political and military position while the 'ulama, being under the discretion and the mercy of the caliph, were entrusted the extrapolation and application of what was seen to be as The Divine Law( Shari'ah). The masses, did not take any significant part in the matters of governance and running of the Empire and were not consulted on political or societal issues. The literalist exclusivist interpretation of Prophetic authority as taking place in a spatio-temporal vacuum and it being completely divorced from the reality/historical context in which it unfolded,( during the time of the prophet and the first four "rightly guided" caliphs) , sees the re-establishment of pan-Islamic caliphate as the only form of "Islamic " government that is in accordance with the concept of Sunnah.

The evidence of caliphate as a the only legitimate form of Muslim government , cannot not be found neither in the Qur'an nor in Sunnah as the Prophet himself , according to the majority view( excluding the Shi'a) did not leave any explicit instructions on what form of government/governance the post-Prophetic Muslim community is to adopt. If anything, the Qur'anic principles of shura ( consultation) and its partial adaptation in early Muslim community ( restricted to a particular tribe or family) in the election of caliphs along with the socio-historical context of its development (e.g. low literacy rates, socially and culturally accepted gender norms) can be seen as valid historical antecedents for the viability of parliamentary democracy , under the aegis of Shari'ah- in a sense of a Divine Law inherently subject to human interpretation-, as a legitimate model of governance in Muslim societies. This view of Islam being essentially compatible with democratic institutions and democratic form of government is of course of immense importance in today's society if we consider the current debates in Muslim countries , especially in Iraq and Afghanistan where efforts to democratise societies , internally and externally, are currently taking place. The democratising tendencies and the idea of democratisation of a society are slowly gaining ground in other Muslim countries such as S. Arabia but due to the socio-political realities of the world today are they are often forced to take a back-seat given the immediate appeal and simplicity of Salafo-jihadi politics. Additionally, another main obstacle democracy is facing in Muslim societies is that the democracy is largely seen as foreign , western concept that is being imposed on and is at odds with traditional Islamic values. This view is further consolidated by at times direct and explicit involvement of Western countries, such as the USA and Britain, in stipulating and guiding Muslim societies towards democratic -like models of government (such as Iraq and Afghanistan) without taking the will and readiness of the native population into consideration.

ISLAMIC EMPIRE AND ENTITIES UNDER NON-MUSLIM CONTROL:

During the time of the Prophet apart from the Arab pagans Muslims in Medina were in contact with its large Jewish and smaller Christian communities. Prophet's attitude towards mom Muslims was largely context dependent . The Qur'an itself bears witness to this in many places. The signing of the peace treaty between various faith communities in Medina soon after the Prophet's arrival indicated his willingness and readiness for peaceful co-existence. A number of incidents that happened during Prophet's time in Medina , such as his order to execute the male members of a particular Jewish tribe in Medina after their repeated breaking of an agreement, along with Qur'anic injunctions which often , if taken literal and decontextually, could be seen as ambivalent , even contradictory towards ahl-Kitab ( recipients of previous revelations) resulted in a certain uncertainty and lack of definition as to how the subsequent generations are to approach people belonging to non-Muslim faiths.
It is only after the Prophet's demise the expanding Muslim Empire was confronted and exposed to the realities beyond the Arab peninsula. The concept of Ahl-Kitab was largely applied to majority of people who, over time, were brought under the rule of the caliph. They did not have same rights and responsibilities as Muslim citizens ( this distinction was also applied to Muslim men and women not just as citizens but also as spouses ) and they enjoyed (limited) religious freedom and protection by the Muslim government as al-dhimmi .
The traditional doctrine developed, among others, specific terminology such as dar-ul-harb ( realm of war) and dar-ul-islam (realm of Islam) designated to particular geographical areas in its relation to the Muslim empire and Muslim populace . These , binary concepts of the world developed a millennium ago, are being coined by certain contemporary Muslim movements in Muslim societies as well as those living in western-democracies as being eternally valid and part of the Prophet's Sunnah. Thus the west is the dar-ul- harb and inherently antagonistic to Islam as embodied by the Prophet. Muslims duty, according to this dialectic, is either to "convert" the dar-ul harb into dar-ul-islam through missionary ( da'wa) activity or to isolate and distance itself form it (with the exception of in some cases of the sphere of economics) or even engage in military conflict until it itself becomes dar-ul Islam( a rather rare opinion ).

Theories, concepts , policies and views elaborated and accumulated during medieval times pertaining to the Muslim non -Muslim dynamics are largely socio-historically contingent and cannot be applied in the current context and the state of affairs in which the humanity is in. The medieval worldview cannot longer be considered as being faithful to the Prophetic model and action. Prof. Ramadan brings in another concept, namely that of dar-ul-shahada (abode of testimony) to say that Muslims in vast majority of cases , especially but not exclusively in the context of Muslim minorities living in liberal democracies, enjoy constitutional rights as citizens allowing them to remain faithful to their faith and be witness bearers of God .This, in turn ,enables them not only to remain faithful to their religious principles but also to meaningfully engage in the betterment of their societies in accordance with Islamic values that are universalist and socially non-contingent such as social justice, freedom of belief and thought etc.
Thus depending upon the approach and interpretational models of Qur'an and Sunnah the Muslim -Non-Muslim dynamics can take two diametrically opposed pathways, a pathway of peaceful co-existence based on commonly shared values or that of animosity and oppositional dialectics that can seriously affect the future course of international affairs/politics .

CONCLUSION:
The concept of Prophetic authority , its underlying epistemological parameters and methodological tools have occupied a central place among the debates between Muslims ever since the conception of Muslim Ummah. Often the conclusions have been quite diametrically opposed with enormous consequences for not only individuals but also societies at large may they be Muslim or non-Muslim. Author has just scratched the surface by choosing the examples of democracy and Muslim-non-Muslim dynamics as just two of many issues that are of great importance for understanding the role of Islam and Muslims in contemporary international politics ands the future nature of that dynamics.

Only “Them” Can Commit Acts of Violence?

2009-12-01T13:26:00.000-08:00

By A. E. SOUAIAIA*

Linking Islam to violence is not new trend any longer. However, after the tragic Fort Hood shooting, many people are making the connection unabashedly. I am not about to write a rebuttal. I would state, instead, that Islam—as practiced by many self-proclaimed Muslims—does have a violent side. In fact, it has some indoctrinated notion of violence manifested in the institutions governing war and peace and social order. As a religion that developed in the arms of political entity (Madinah), Islam could not have escaped the use of violence because that is what state/government does: monopolize the institutions and the uses of violence. What is also true is this: the use of violence in Islam is governed by the rules put forth by the founder of Islam, Muhammad.

But I am also absolutely sure that other religions have some indoctrinated notion of violence, too. But, the rules in the use of violence were not even put in place by the founders (or first leaders) of these religions. This is particularly true for Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism. These facts, coupled with other historical facts, ought to make the case for the propensity of all humans to engage in violent acts, not just “them, Muslims.”
Here is an observation: People who single out one religion as violence-prone are narcissistically masking their own faith’s propensity to embrace violence. Moreover, the accusatory tone is generally indicative of a fractured self torn between the manufactured image of a faith’s pacifism and the naked reality of blatant reversion to violent means. Overcompensation for failure to follow-through with one’s faith-based teachings and the demands of reality may lead one to embark on a mission to demonize others in hopes of winning arguments by default rather than by merit.

Supportive evidence for this observation can be found in numerous specious arguments presented by many politicians, pundits, and commentators. The common link between these otherwise persons of different backgrounds is the shared commitment to supremacist ideology although most of them avoid making it the issue of discussion at any cost. It suffices to examine three figures: a Hindu commentator, a Jewish politician, and a Zionist ideologue. The first argues that Islam is inherently violent, the second claims that extremism is inherently Islamic, and the third contends that Islam is pure evil—no matter what shade of Islam; all of Islam is dangerous.

Recently, the commentator, Tunku Varadarajan, recycled the phrase “Going Postal” to suggest that, because of the violent nature of Islam, one must be wary of someone next to them “Going Muslim.” By reading his other commentaries, one would easily discover that Varadarajan sees the world as a static mosaic of good people—Hindus—and bad people—Muslims. In his mind, Muslims are violent the same way Hindus are tolerant. Let us consider what he thinks of his own faith to see the failure of his logic.
In an article entitled A Democratic Inclination, Varadarajan declared that “there is a strong correlation between electoral democracy and Hinduism.” To be sure, he added, “Hinduism, more than any other religion—with the possible exception of mainstream Protestant Christianity—has an intensely tolerant core, one that encourages religious and intellectual plurality in society… Indian society is predominantly Hindu, and mainstream Hinduism tends to be big-hearted, broad-minded, easygoing, indulgent... in my estimation, preponderantly Hindu societies will always be predisposed toward democracy.”

Of course, he is talking about the same Hinduism that enshrined the lovely cast system whose dehumanizing effects were only mitigated through secular institution; the same Hinduism whose adherents destroy mosques in India; the same Hinduism that produced Hindus who gleefully cut and murdered pregnant Muslim women alive in Gujarat; the same Hinduism that he himself described in a piece written for The New York Times, on January 11, 1999 by saying, "What we are witnessing in India is the growth of a sort of Hindu Taliban movement.” Of course, he needed to use “Taliban” just like he used “postal” to indicate the foreignness of violence in “true” Hinduism.
*****
The politician is Sen. Joe Lieberman who took advantage of the Fort Hood tragedy to push his political agenda of making connection between Islam and murder. Speaking to Fox News Sunday, Lieberman declared, "If Hasan was showing signs, saying to people that he had become an Islamist extremist, the U.S. Army has to have zero tolerance, he should have been gone.”

Every word spoken by Sen. Lieberman is problematic and it is, I believe, deliberately worded to suggest to his listeners that Islam is a disease, an illness that has “signs” (symptoms). Then by suggesting that the army should have fired “Hasan,” he leaves no doubt that being Islamic extremist is bona fide criminal. I am not sure which part of the phrase denotes a crime, being Muslim, being extremist, or being extremist Muslim?

Given Sen. Lieberman’s political savvy, it would not surprise anyone if he responds that he is not anti-Muslim; which leaves us with him being against extremism. If this were to be the case, then why would Sen. Lieberman attach the adjective “Islamic “to “extremism”? In other words, is Sen. Lieberman ambivalent to extremism linked to Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism, nationalism, and all other forms of isms that have been historically linked to acts of violence?
Since Sen. Lieberman is a self-described Jew, let me remind him that it was a self-declared Jew who assassinated Yitzhak Rabin (Prime Minister of Israel); it was in the fold of Judaism that the Stern Gangs, Meir Kahanes, and Baruch Goldsteins were born and raised… Judaism, Senator, has its extremists, too.

Here are the facts: in a democracy, neither being a Muslim nor being an extremist is a crime. There are extremists in every society and no civilized community ought to criminalize extremism. Doing so will take humanity back to the dark ages of absolutism. To put things in context, many Americans think that Rev. Wright, Minister Louis Farrakhan, David Duke are extremists. Many Americans, especially Democrats, think that Senator Lieberman is an extremist and that is why they fired him during the primaries last time he ran. Another Lieberman, Avigdor Lieberman, is by most accounts an extremist Jew who is now the Foreign Minister of Israel. Every Jewish prophet was dubbed extremist when he first arrived. The right to hold extreme views (as long as they do not break the law) is what separates a nation of laws from a nation of tyrants.

Christianity, too, has had its share of violence and extremism. Christianity nurtured the crusades and Spanish conquistadors who burned native Americans alive in bundles of 13 in honor of the Twelve Apostles and Jesus Christ. Not just in the past, but also in the present, Christianity continues to justify—in the mind of many—the murder of those who violate some Christian dogma: in the last two decades alone, 24 murders or attempted murders, 179 bombing and arson or attempted bombing or arson, 2795 of other acts of violence (invasion, assault & battery, death threats, etc…) were undertaken by self-proclaimed Christian activists against doctors who worked in clinics that provided abortion.
*****
The most outrageous thesis is authored by Daniel Pipes who is in favor of interning all American Muslims during times of war because, in his mind, they cannot be trusted. In a piece written for The Jerusalem Post (Nov. 14, 2009), not only did Pipes compare Recep Tayyip Erdogan (the Prime Minister of Turkey) and Keith Ellison (US Congressman) to Osama bin Laden, but he actually declared them to “pose a greater threat to Western civilization.” Pipes dislike of Muslims extends to elected leaders, suggesting that Muslims should be shut down even if they come to govern through democratic means.

Unlike these representative demagogues, I am not suggesting that only religious people commit acts of violence; violent individuals are as diverse as American society. After all, it is American society that produced Seung-Hui Cho who killed 32 students at Virginia Tech, John Wayne Gacy, Jr., who raped and murdered 33 young men and boys in Chicago, Illinois, in the 1970s; Robert Lee Yates and Gary Ridgway of Washington who murdered 61 women, and more than 125 serial killers who killed hundreds of innocent men, women, and children.

The idea of linking all of Islam to extremism is absurd given that there are 1.57 billion Muslims who did not “go Muslim” or “go extremist.” In the U.S. military alone, there are more than 5000 American-Muslim service men and women who served, continued to serve, and gave their lives in the most heroic fashion to save the lives of their fellow soldiers.

The Liebermans, the Pipes, and the Varadarajans will always continue to look for imperfections in an imperfect world, for faults in faulty religious views, for reasons to hate others. Yes, there is a propensity to violence in any religious and secular ideology. They are human discourses and as such, they are shaped by all that is human. If one feels the urge to condemn violence, one should have the courage to condemn it for what it is not for where it came from. In the end, we may all be complicit in fomenting hate and violence by preaching our own supremacy and by looking for foreignness to explain away instances that make one’s faith look like any other: to some extent, violent. There is nothing foreign about violence in human societies. There will always be criminals, psychotics, lunatics, murders, and rapists amongst us, especially among those who insist that none are amongst them.
____________

*Dr. Ahmed E. Souaiaia teaches course in International Studies, Islamic studies, and law at the University of Iowa; he is the author of the book, Contesting Justice.

"Speaking in God's Name"- Book Review

2009-11-26T18:49:00.001-08:00

Khaled Abou El Fadl : "Speaking in God's Name". Oneworld. Oxford. 2001
By Adis Duderija

In his perpetual, compassionate search for and revival of the lost legacy of beauty (husn), the humane, the just and the moral in Islam (Islamic jurisprudence in particular) Abou El Fadl, an Egyptian born expert in Islamic jurisprudence residing and working in US (UCLA), writes this timely and much needed book. The book is calling for the return to the archetype ethico-moral premises governing early traditional Islamic juristic practice and resistance to and deconstruction of the dominant contemporary Wahhabi authoritarian approach towards interpreting God's signs/indicators ('adilla) .This search for the Beautiful and Ethical in Islam faithfully reflects El Fald's overall personal philosophy and approach to Islamic heritage as evident in his other works which ,among numerous others, include "Islamic Law of Rebellion " (1999) , "The Conference of the Books" ( 2001) , " Place of Tolerance in Islam" (2001) and his latest book "The great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists'( 2005).

"The Authoritative and Authoritarian in Islamic Discourses : A Case Study", a book that was translated into Arabic but was subsequently banned in some "influential Muslim countries" and never published in the Arab world due to its wide-spread "demonisation" , was conceptually and content-wise the precursor of the book under review ( one fears that this effort might suffer similar response ).

As self -identified "intellectual refugee" working from within the Islamic tradition , often given epithets by the mainstream Sunni community in US of a CIA protégé , instrument of the Judeo-Christian propaganda "the big devil" and alike , a fate shared by other contemporary academics and intellectuals such as Farid Esack and Mohamed Arkoun, Abou El Fadl 's " Speaking in God's Name " aims to bring back the rich , complex and inherently moral dimensions of Islamic intellectual heritage into the foreground of contemporary Islamic discourses, especially to that of Islamic jurisprudence .

El Fadl is a strong critic of contemporary authoritarian , superficial, arrogant and intellectually dishonest juristic practices which "have corrupted the integrity of Islamic legal heritage " and which "threaten to disintegrate and abandon the traditional premises on which Islamic law was constructed".

Having defined the nature of and critically analysed primary textual sources of Islamic jurisprudence ( i.e. Qur'an and Sunnah) , El Fadl concludes that for numerous reasons ( which will be discussed subsequently) , a current authoritarian reading ( vs. authoritative-deeemed necessary for pragmatic reasons) of the sources is not warranted. To substantiate this claim El Fadl cites Qur'anic verses upholding the principle of God's Souverenity and Omnipotence and the ontological relationship between The Creator and the created, namely that of the Lord and His vicegerent. He claims that due to this very hierarchy in the natural order , the human representatives of God on Earth can never self-identify themselves with God's intent or profess to have grasped His Knowledge beyond any shadow of doubt or ambiguity, a practice that has, in his opinion, become quite wide-spread among present-day authorities on religious issues.

Their "authoritarian hermeneutics", oblivious to the intricate and subtle relationships existing between the author, text and the reader regulating "the determinacy of meaning" of God's indicators equates Author's intent with that of the reader , violating the principles inherent to the Qur'anic Weltanschauung and its ethico -moral foundation. . So instead of speaking FOR God they speak IN God's Name.

El Fadl, on the other hand, proposes a more balanced approach when engaging in the task of interpreting texts such as the Qur'an in which neither the Author's intent, nor the language nor the reader have the upper hand in determining its meaning. It is the balance between these three, which upholds the "inherent ambiguity", embedded in the textual sources, thus acting as an anti-authoritarian interpretative measure. Thus, El Fadl is an advocate of what Umero Eco terms as "an open " (versus closed) interpretation which is capable of sustaining "multiple interpretative strategies

Another element in his conceptual framework aiming to analyse " the theory of authority within Islamic tradition and its misinterpretation/misuse in contemporary setting" pertains to the notion of what El Fadl terms as "multiple authorship" and "authorial enterprise " inherent in the second most important source of Islamic jurisprudence, that of Ahadith literature (the word Hadith is used and not the word Sunnah as it is my belief that these two concepts are qualitatively and quantitatively different). The unsuitability of an authoritarian approach to Ahadith interpretation des not only rest on the premises established by the traditional ulum-ul-hadith (sciences pertaining to hadith interpretation such as isnad/ chain of transmitters criticism) but also on the notion that sayings attributed to the Prophet are result of "what a number of Companions have seen/heard, recollected, selected, transmitted and authenticated in a non-objective medium (multiple authorship) ". Thus, in each report a "personality of the transmitter is indelibly imprinted upon the report (authorial enterprise) ". To disregard the importance of socio-historical circumstances in which the genesis of many Prophetic reports took place, without scrutinizing the validity and reliability of processes pertaining to mechanisms inherent in evolution, shaping and forming of ahadith literature and in addition to lack of moral insight to guide this process when interpreting the same, the practice El Fadl accuses many contemporary ulama of , leads , in El Fadl's opinion, to a distorted picture of Prophetic message/intention.

Another way in which present-day authorities on Islam assert their authoritarianism is, argues El Fadl, by adopting methodologies and principles which are selective, are guilty of suppression or non-disclosure of evidence as well as basic underlying assumptions guiding their legal determinations, practices which clearly contradict practices of early Muslim jurists.

By ignoring and turning their backs to above mentioned anti -authoritarian measures which are, in El Fadl's view, at the heart of Islamic heritage and by adopting an unjustified "paralysing dogmatism" reflected in a literal, ahistorical and unethical interpretation and reading of ahadith literature , the present -day ulama, asserts El Fadl, are not only eroding the rich and complex intellectual legacy of Islamic jurisprudence but severely curtailing freedoms and rights of Muslim citizens in certain "Muslim "countries , who in vast majority of cases happen to be women.

Perhaps the most alarming characteristic of contemporary practices of some of the self-proclaimed custodians of Islamic knowledge, the traditional 'ulama, according to El Fadl, is the lack of their consideration to the moral and the ethical in Islam. El Fadl argues further that this "ugliness " and distorted picture of the Qur'anic God is particularly evident in fatawas (legal opinions) concerning women whose mere presence in public spaces /forums is to be considered a moral threat to their male counterparts. Here, El Fadl follows closely the views of and arguments put forward by Muslim female intellectuals/ scholars such as Prof. Mernissi (see her works " The Veil and the Male Elite " or " The Male-Female Dynamics in Traditional Muslim Societies") and Prof. Leila Ahmed (see her work "Women and Gender in Islam").

El Fadl's coherent and analytical conceptual framework does tremendously well to expose the "unislamicity" (in a normative sense of the word) of the authoritarian, unethical approach to interpretation of Islamic heritage but it does lack, as he himself concedes, a systematic ethico -moral theory which would give more credence to his philosophy of reviving the concepts of Beauty and Moral in Islam. One fears that his call for the use of reason and atextually or textually-based moral principles guiding interpretation of primary sources of Islamic jurisprudence, tools that have not always found acceptance among authorities on Islam in the past especially among conservative circles which dominate current Islamic discourses, will fall on deaf ears where they are needed most and be limited to more educated, academic spheres where they are needed less.

Axis of… Power: Emerging Alliances in the Islamic World

2009-10-23T10:16:00.000-07:00

By Ahmed E. Souaiaia*

October 19, 2009

War is very destructive. However, despite the human and economic costs, war also creates new opportunities and ends oppressive political and administrative stagnation. The human cost of the

Iraq war could be mitigated by the economic and political return of the reshuffling of the cards in the Middle East. There are ample indications that a new alliance is emerging that will change the balance of power in the Islamic world (and the world over) for a very long time.

When the Bush Administration officials failed to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, which was originally the stated pretext for war, they argued that the war practically removed a tyrant and that should legitimatize the war. Many members of the Administration further contended that a new era of democracy is ushered in. They promised an era of freedom and peace that will marginalize the extremists and empower the moderates of the region. Six years later, Iraq is still a war zone, Iran (an element of the axis of evil (or the exemplar of extremism)) is still getting stronger, Saudi Arabia and Egypt (the moderates) are still abusing the rights of their citizens, the Israelis and the Palestinians stopped talking peace, and certainly no emerging

democracies in the Middle East are taking their cues from the Iraqi model.

Here is what is happening and what will be happening in the next 25 years and beyond.

Turkey is realigning itself to play a major role in the politics of the Middle East. Turkish leaders

mediated a series of indirect negotiations between the Syrians and the Israelis, they criticized Egypt and Israel for their treatment of Gazans before and after the Gaza War, they mediated and resolved an extradition conflict between Syria and Iraq in September, and they offered to help the West deal with Iran (they even offered to host the first direct talks between Iran and the G-5+1).

Moreover, during the last three weeks alone, Turkey held a high profile meeting with the Syrian leadership and signed a plethora of security, economic, and cultural agreements. Just last week the first fruits of these agreements were cultivated: Passport-holding Turkish citizens no longer need an entry visa to visit Syria and vice versa, Syrian citizens who carry valid passports of any kind can travel to Turkey without an entry visa. Days later, the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, visited Baghdad and signed no less than 50 agreements with the Iraqi government. The most significant development is yet to take place (as this piece is being written). Upon his return from New York where he spoke on behalf of the Islamic world in the UN general Assembly, the Turkish leader announced that he "will make a trip to Iran towards the end of October... We will discuss regional problems, including this (nuclear) one," Turkey's Anatolia news agency quoted him as saying.

It seems that neither the extremists nor the moderates (as defined by the Bush Administration) have fulfilled the expectations of the West. Instead, pragmatism is about to transform the region and create a new axis of power right in the heart of the Islamic world. This new axis will consist of Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq (and possibly Lebanon). This alliance makes sense: Iran needs Turkey to ease Western pressure and to provide it with a path to European markets where it will sell its natural gas and petroleum. Syria and Iraq need Turkey to secure the flow of water. Turkey needs Syria, Iraq, and Iran to secure its borders and defeat the Kurdish separatists. Moreover, Turkey needs Iran and Iraq to power its emerging economy with reliable and inexpensive energy.

For Turkey, this new alliance is either a Plan B that is a good substitute should its bid to join the European Union fails or a trump card that Turkey will use to goad the Europeans vis-à-vis its membership in the EU.

Even if Turkey were to join the EU, this alliance could only offer it more leverage over other members of the EU. First, Turkey will be a reliable gateway between Europe and Asia. Second, Turkey will be the “middleman” (or shall we say middle state) between the EU and the Islamic world. Third, Turkey will be a reliable conduit of Middle Eastern energy to starving European markets.

The natural gas shortage that threatened some EU states when Russia shut off gas supplies in 2008, has convinced the EU to consider alternatives to Russia’s energy. Iran, who has the second largest natural gas reserve in the world, is a very reasonable option that will supply Europe and enrich Turkey in the process.

In addition to the economic benefits, this emerging axis makes sense socially and culturally.

Although the form of Islam practiced in Turkey is Sunni Islam, Turkey is not appreciative of the conservative Islam that Saudi Arabia and its allies espouse. Iran, being a Shi`ite country, will be willing to ease sectarian tension by embracing the Sunni Islam that is practiced in Turkey rather than that of Saudi Arabia.

In terms of demographics, should this new alliance materialize, the center of gravity of the Islamic world will shift to this axis. After all, when considering that the population of Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and Syria combined will approach or exceed 200 million people, the economic benefits—given the concentration of natural resources—are positively significant.

The Iraq-Iran relations are not good; they are spectacular when considering that these two neighbors had fought a war that lasted eight years and that killed nearly two million people on both sides. If the U.S. did not invade and remove Saddam from power and replace him with a Shi`ite-run government, it would have taken the two countries generations before normalizing relations. This war, however, instantaneously made strong allies out of bitter foes.

The blueprint for this axis of power is further enhanced by existing warm relationships. Ties between Iran and Turkey are very strong. For instance, the most recent figures show that the total volume of mutual commercial relations surpasses 10 billion dollars, of which Iran's share of exports is six billion dollars. Additionally, Iran is the second largest exporter of oil and gas to Turkey. Turkey enjoys utmost importance as a transit route for Iran and Europe. Iran and Turkey can act as complimentary economies. Turkey can import raw material from Iran and export industrial goods to the country. Iran and Turkey are important members of two regional cooperation organizations, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and the Developing Eight (D-8), comprising the eight most populous Muslim countries of the world. If Turkey joins the European Union, it can work as a bridge between the Union, the ECO and D-8, a step that will further enhance Turkey's status among its neighboring countries, including Iran.

There is no need to highlight the reliable and strong relationship between Iran and Syria given that Syria was the single Arab state most supportive of Iran during its war with Iraq. The Syrian-Iranian bilateral relations are in fact the strongest when compared to the ties between any combinations of the other three states.

Should these predictions materialize, how should the world consider and characterize this new axis?

Despite the drum-beating for war against Iran under the pretext of world peace and security, the records of these countries do not raise serious alarm, especially the current Turkish regime. Together, they are the most stable countries in the region. They are, to some degree, nationalists and are eager to preserve their borders as they are (no expansion). The ruling regimes are fairly vested in the welfare of their people and each of these countries realize that it will be in its best interest to preserve these ties. Moreover, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are more popular in the eyes of the Arab and Muslim public than any other Arab or Muslim leader.

Turkey’s vibrant democracy and temperate social conservatism will interact with Iran’s ordered social conservatism and muffled democracy to produce a new model for Islamic governance. Together, they will influence the Syrians and Iraqis to produce a pluralistic, stable, and powerful block that can be emulated by their neighbors. The axis has huge potential and can be harnessed to produce stability and peace in a very volatile region.

The elements needed for stability and growth are nearly immeasurable (compared to their Arab neighbors): the members states together constitute a highly educated population that is 2/3 the size of the U.S. population with direct access to 2/3 of the world’s most sought after natural resources, like oil (oil reserve estimates for 2009 is 745.998 bb in the Middle East vs. 275.657 bb in the rest of the world).

Given the ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity within and without each of these countries (Arab, Kurd, Turk, Turkic, Persian; Sunni, Shi`ite, Zoroastrian, Christian…), only a pluralistic democracy that emphasizes and promotes responsible citizenry instead of zealous nationalism and civility instead of exclusion can emerge should this alliance actually materialize.

This axis is, indeed, an axis of power. But it is a constructive and stabilizing power given the level of self-reliance and pride these peoples take in developing their respective countries. In short, this axis is the needed one to stabilize the region and stimulate positive political change in the region without Western direct interference; a region that has seen enough war, enough bloodshed, and enough abuse of human rights. President Obama should find in these Turkish leaders reliable allies to advance his agenda of peace and mutual respect with the Islamic world.

*Dr. Ahmed E. Souaiaia teaches course in International Studies, Islamic studies, and law at the University of Iowa; he is the author of the book, Contesting Justice.

Assimilation; Seriously?

2009-10-02T08:04:00.000-07:00

by Ahmed E. Souaiaia

President Nicolas Sarkozy of France has become the most vocal supporter of the ban on religious symbols worn by people in public (government) institutions; specifically, the ban on the headscarf worn by Muslim women. His foundation for this argument is this: France is for French and anyone wishing to live in France must be fully integrated and assimilated. At one point, he used the following analogy: If I am in a Muslim country visiting a mosque, I would remove my shoes. I respect others’ cultures and I would want others to respect France’s.

The shoes’ analogy, besides the fact that it is a false analogy, speaks also to the double standard and hypocrisy of Western elite who privilege their own way of life as the “standard” that must be emulated by everyone else.

It is utterly disingenuous for Mr. Sarkozy to make use of the cliché, when in Rome act like the Romans. For, if that were his position, then he would not have an issue with women being forced to wear some form of Islamic dress while in Saudi Arabia or in Iran. Western nationalists such as President Sarkozy are not supportive of a culture that forces women to dress according to an Islamic code because it violates women rights. If the aim is to protect women and individual rights, then the universal argument is that no culture is above the standards that protect human rights and personal autonomy.

The real issue is that universal standards for the protection of human dignity and individual rights are a double-edged sword: legal and social restrictions on women (and men in many cases) necessarily and universally infringe on individual rights. The fact is, the ban on Islamic dress, like the prescription of an Islamic dress, equally infringes on personal autonomy and personal choice.

Choice, as the expression of free will and the prerequisite of responsibility, must be available and protected in all societies that recognize personal autonomy. It is counterproductive to legalize limits on women’s right to dress in France and other European countries while condemning prescription of Islamic dress in some Muslim countries. To argue that a woman in Europe should not wear an Islamic dress, is not different from arguing that a woman must wear Western clothes. After all, the same argument has been made by some repressive regimes in some Muslim countries: women in Muslim societies must wear Islamic attire.

Here is the important point: Mr. Sarkozy, in the name of integration thinks that Muslim women should dress the way the French women dress. Would he accept the argument by his counterparts in Saudi Arabia who also say that in the name of integration, all women must dress like Saudi women? Or is assimilation a good thing only when it leads to Western lifestyles being preserved and privileged? For these reason, President Sarkozy earned to be highlighted in What the &%@#!?

Right to Say ‘No’ to Vaccine

2009-09-29T06:59:00.000-07:00

Neerja Singh

I am feeling confused and stupid, not normal states of mind for me. The world is making elaborate preparations to protect itself against a disease that has killed 3,500 people and nobody is batting an eyelid? In a world where many more routinely die from a lack of clean drinking water, we are prepared to roll out a global vaccination drive for a disease that mostly presents with mild symptoms and nobody thinks it’s odd?

I wonder why nobody is questioning the numbers being bandied about and why we are all accepting the lies that are being dished out in the name of saving humanity from H1N1. Happily, seeing as I am not employed by a newspaper and free to share my views, I would like to shine some light on things that have been bothering me.

On April 4, the World Health Organisation started reporting on a new form of influenza that had probably come from pigs and infected several hundred people. Subsequently, daily updates tracked how quickly the H1N1 infection was travelling through the world and killing hundreds. The term ‘swine flu’ was retracted after a while because the virus was found to be an odd ‘cocktail’ of viruses, containing six genes from the swine flu virus H1N1, but also some from various strains of influenza virus seen in birds and humans.

Researchers now claim the strange mix of virus strains could only have occurred in a research laboratory, and there is even a public litigation suit filed by a Jane Burgermeister who has proof that 72 kilos of this ‘virus’ was actually shipped to various ports by Baxter to start this entire hullabaloo. Getting back to the story, the hysteria whipped up by alarming new numbers on a daily basis has scared several governments into ordering millions of H1N1 vaccines and the FDA into bypassing crucial testing checkpoints to approve new vaccinations in a matter of months.

Again, Burgermeister claims to have proof that the vaccine was patented by Baxter in 2007, much before the virus was known. Also, the efficacy of any vaccine against a virus is dubious because the organism keeps mutating. In the UAE, 3.2 million vials have been ordered and mandatory vaccinations are set to be rolled out for schoolchildren when shipments are received some time in October.

Fortunately, His Highness Shaikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum’s Facebook page gives the average Joe a platform to reach out to powers that be, and a discussion board has been created asking him to give us the choice to refuse vaccinations for our children. There are enough links out there to several independent studies and Youtube videos. Anybody who wants to educate himself/herself can see the overwhelming evidence that the H1N1 scare is a ruse, and that the vaccinations may in fact be more dangerous than the virus.

First of all, let’s get some perspective on the actual damage being done by the disease. Since the WHO started reporting on H1N1 deaths on April 4, about 3,500 people had died across the world as on September 18. According to the Canadian Medical Association, seasonal influenza routinely kills an average of 36,000 Americans and 2,500 Canadians each year in North  America alone.

Australia’s minister of health for Queensland Paul Lucas has also called for a rational media response, saying regular flu kills about 1,000 to 3,000 Australians each year, where 200 have succumbed to H1N1 this year.

Yet the WHO Director General Margaret Chan declared it a pandemic level 5 – level 6 being the highest – claiming that ‘large-scale disease’ was imminent. This was on April 29, when 129 people had died from H1N1. On the same day, Prof Paul Ferguson, leading the WHO task force on H1N1, predicted that ultimately 40 per cent of global population would contract the disease. Really? Three billion people would fall sick with a disease that 129 had succumbed to? On what basis were these dramatic predictions made?

Whatever their motivations for these dire warnings, I believe we owe it to ourselves to educate ourselves and find ways of protecting our loved ones and countrymen. For one, several studies have directly linked vaccinations to the outbreak of diseases like AIDS, autism and all kinds of cancer.

For those who’d like to delve, there are papers to this effect that have been ignored by the medical fraternity for obvious reasons. If that is too heavy a read, Youtube also has several interviews with guilt-ridden vaccine researchers who’ve resigned from their jobs to give media interviews confirming that pharmaceutical companies are aware of vaccinations’ connection with autoimmune diseases, but keep touting these money-spinning ‘essential drugs’ to Third world countries in the name of aid. In some cases — like small pox — doctors admit they recommend vaccinations despite their inherent risks because not taking a vaccine could result in death. However, in the case of H1N1, this is not the case because the largest majority of people who contract it suffer mild symptoms.

There are some truths to the nature of H1N1, sure. It is highly contagious, for one. The Communicable Diseases Centre (CDC) in Atlanta estimates that H1N1 must have touched about two million Americans by now. However, of the several hundred thousand who fell sick, only about 2,000 died of the disease. If only one in every thousand people who get the disease will die from it, why not focus on finding what is protecting the balance 999?

The fact is the human body has been designed to fight infections, it does so on a routine basis. We have all fretted over our children when they were young and got a cold every second week. But we’ve also seen that as they grow older and their immune system matures, they don’t fall sick as often because their bodies have developed antibodies to the germs in their environment along the way.

As long as we eat nourishing fresh foods, get plenty of rest and moderate amounts of exercise, we could — as I have — spend an entire lifetime away from hospitals. And this is what I believe governments must support individuals on. Vaccines, I believe, are invasive procedures; they bypass the body’s natural defence mechanisms and introduce bacteria straight into the blood stream: a bit like breaching a fortress and tunnelling under its wall to bomb the castle directly.

For any government to take away the right for people to participate in a decision affecting their bodies is wrong, and I hope all countries including the UAE will make the humane choice in  this matter.

Neerja Singh is a Dubai-based writer and can be reached at singh.neerja@gmail.com

Ramadan in September-Forever !?

2009-09-12T21:34:00.000-07:00

By Adis Duderija

First a disclaimer. What follows below is not meant to be an exhaustive or academic treatment of the issue at hand but more or less haphazard reflections and “thinking aloud’ on behalf of the author.

Islam , not unlike other universalist-claiming faiths, face a number of challenges in the contemporary world ranging from bioethics ( eg. Human cloning) to that of politics (relationship between religion, state and society) , socio-economic development and education.

Much has been and will be written about these issues, including by this author.This piece of writing will tackle a question that is not as ‘grande’ as those mentioned above which ,however, has been just as much debated and contested. The question relates to the issue of fasting , in particular, finding a solution to the question of fasting in geographical areas very close to the earth’s two poles. While this at first, might be considered a very marginal issue ,especially compared to those mentioned above, hopefully the merit of discussing this issue and the author’s proposal will be disclosed as the reader reads on. This is so because some of the reasons why this issue is worthy of examination opens the door to other bigger questions pertaining to the Islamic tradition and the shaping of its future contours

Some years ago in the late 1990s I followed some of the discussions of this issue on a number of Muslim forums and websites and to the best of my knowledge two solutions were proposed in relation to the dilemma posed above in relation to fasting:

1. Following the fasting times in Makkah.

2. Having breakfast and dinner as one would normally have if it was not a fasting month.

While I personally do not have problems with any of the two solutions offered above and believe that the question of fasting is a personal matter a following idea ( that some other people might have though of before but I am not aware of ) : Why not fix the fasting month to that of the month of September when the autumn equinox takes place ? Before I address possible objections to this let me elaborate first on , from my point of view , proposal’s benefits.

1.) Unlike the other two solutions this proposal would be closer to the spirit and the letter of the Qur’anic beginning and ending the fasting day cycle because one would be able to commence and end the fast in accordance with the actual sun setting and sun-rising(or dawn braking) times.

2.) The fluctuations in the duration of night and day all around the world is minimised.

3.) The temperatures in both hemispheres are as similar as they can possibly be

4.) More people would be willing top take up the fast

5.) Just like in the lunar calendar the month of fasting would fall be in the same month as it is in the lunar calendar ( the ninth month –Ramadan)

Points two and three are particularly important because as all of us who have fasted understand that fasting can be a very demanding task both spiritually and physically often impacting considerably on one’s ability to fulfil one’s responsibilities and duties on a daily basis . (I remember several years ago fasting in Australia’s summer with temperatures constantly in the high thirties to low forties and the daily fasting period exceeding 16 hours’ –fortunately I was a student at the time so was able to complete the fast without major problems but think about the less fortunate people who are exposed to and at the mercy of the weather elements !) . This has important implications in terms of one’s productivity at work and in the case of Muslim majority nations economic performance. ( Now ,please don’t think that I am writing this as an ‘excuse’ for myself for not to fast or to make it easier for me to fast - As a university researcher I am effected much, much less by the harshness of climate than most other people-although I must admit that my productivity does go down somewhat ). It could also potentially have implications for one’s health and well being. Namely, many devout and conscientious Muslims would often fast in conditions under which their health and well-being is put at risk based on their strong desire to please their Lord.

Now , my proposal would to a large extent mitigate the effects of extra long daylight cycles and the harsh climate which would impact upon both the collective and individual productivity and well-being of the people.

Again I would like to stress that this proposal should not be seen as a means of ‘coping out’ because even fasting in the month of September can certainly be demanding in a number of real-life contexts.

I also am not suggesting that fasting , as we are being constantly reminded in khutbas and bayans, is all about refraining from drinking and eating but ,nevertheless, a major component of it is!

Now to possible objections.

Probably the first one would relate to switching from the lunar to that of the solar calendar. Now if one considers that many pre-Qur’anic Hijazi practices and customs were incorporated into the budding Qur’anic worldview and the prophet’s Sunnah ranging from cultural mores and norms pertaining to gender relations, modesty and virtues to that of law ( e.g. unilateral right of divorce for males only ,talaq) , war ( women and children taken as war bounty, the prohibited months of fighting) and societal practices ( such as slavery and day of communal weekly day congregation jawm al juma’ah falling on day when people were gathering traditionally in the markets or even the Arabic names of the lunar months themselves) that are often ( mistakenly) considered as an integral part of Islam as an ethico-religious and law system , the proposed new change , I hope , would be seen in a different light and thus more acceptable.

Perhaps the coming about of the institution of the lunar based Hijri calendar is also a pertinent consideration . Hijri calendar was introduced and instituted by the second caliph ‘Umar and thus ought not to be seen as an Qur’ano-Sunnahic practice per se. As such adhering to it is not a question of doctrine or faith.

The second objection would probably relate to the issue of loss of identity and imitating the ‘West’ . Now while this certainly has some merit it ought to be evaluated in the broader context . Firstly, regardless whether we like it or not the common era solar Gregorian calendar is, based on the ‘west’s economic ,cultural and political dominance, the internationally accepted civil calendar by which most Muslim conduct their lives in any case. It would have the benefit of non-Muslims (as well as Muslims) knowing exactly when the fasting month starts and ends (like Christmas) in order to foster and facilitate inter-faith sensitivities with the exchange of greeting cards etc . In respect to this I would add that Muslims could also make it a custom to celebrate a life of Jesus Christ ( as some of them already do) in theologically acceptable ways with their Christian friends and neighbors (or the New Year with their humanist secular friends and neighbors-New Year Eve celebrations have lost their religious significance in most places ) in order to foster inter-religious harmony ( here a possible objection would become from a series of isolated ahad and therefore not legally or culturally binding ahadith which stress the importance of distinctiveness of Muslims in relation to customs, festivals and dress that have been abused by many a narrow –minded and semi-informed Muslim and mistakenly interpreted in a decontextualist, ahistorical and universalist manner . As I have shown elsewhere in a more academic treatment of this subject these and similar ahadith have no place in a holistic and systematic methodology of interpretation of Qur’ano-Sunnahic teachings)

Lasly, related to the last point, the proposal would , even in a small but significant way, move us away from the history of mutual antagonistic identity construction that has been prevalent and in some cases still exists between the ‘Muslim’ and “Western civilisations’( which in actual fact are mere constructions of the Self and the other rather then reflecting actual historical circumstances which point strongly in direction of hybridism and inter-connectivity).

That is it. I am rather pessimistic about this proposal of mine ever taking effect but my aim would have been achieved if I have persuaded the reader to at least consider my proposal seriously and the broader questions relating to the Islamic tradition mentioned above.

Capitalism – From the Standpoint of Its Victims

2009-08-28T10:00:00.000-07:00

by M. Shahid Alam

It has never been easy offering a critique of capitalism or markets to my undergraduate students. Most have never heard an unkind word about these bedrock institutions, which they know to be the foundations of American power and prosperity.

These are hallowed institutions. The power of private capital to produce jobs, wealth and freedom is one of the central dogmas that many Americans absorb with their mother’s milk. To hear this dogma challenged – in any context – is unsettling. I sometimes suspect that this bitter pill is harder to swallow because it emanates from someone who, so transparently, is not a native-born American.

As the weeks pass, however, my students appear to settle down. In the past, they have been reassured to learn that markets have done a good job at delivering prosperity to a few centers of global capitalism. They do work for us, even if they have not worked for most Asians, Africans and Latin Americans.

Nevertheless, the thesis that ‘free’ markets have rarely worked for economies lagging far behind the economic leaders, does not quite take root. The fault could not lie with markets. For too long, the West has believed that Asians, Africans and Latin Americans failed because they were lazy, spendthrift, venal and unimaginative.

My students – like most Americans – have been conditioned to look at capitalism from the standpoint of the winners in global capitalism. Because of the accident of birth, they have been the beneficiaries of the wealth and power that global capitalism concentrates at the nodes of the system. They cannot conceive how a system that has worked so well for them could produce misery for others in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

I have been away from my teaching duties as the United States has led the world into a deepening recession. Within a few months, the titans of Wall Street have been laid low, rescued from extinction by tax-financed bailouts. Teetering on the edge of bankruptcy, the auto giants have been placed on life-support also by taxpayers, their future still uncertain. In this maelstrom, there steps forward Bernard L. Madoff, the Einstein of Ponzi schemes, who operated his colossal con for twenty years without notice from regulators.

Millions of Americans have lost their jobs; millions are threatened with loss of their homes; millions have seen their retirement funds melt before their eyes; millions are threatened with loss of health care. As Americans on Main Street were being devastated, executives of bailed out banks continued to receive millions in bonuses. That straw now threatens to break the back of the fabled American tolerance for the foibles of the capitalist system.

Ordinarily, American democracy directs its venom against writers and activists on the left, foolish enough to want to defend the underprivileged. For a change, Americans are threatening captains of finance, venerable bankers, with dire consequences – even death threats.

I was on sabbatical when Al-Qaida brought down the Twin Towers on September 11. Then, I was relieved to be away from my students, afraid that some of them might want to lump me with those who had perpetrated these attacks.

I am on sabbatical, again, as the towers on Wall Street were being toppled by greed, recklessness and fraud; by a free-market ideology that has no regard for human life; by capitalist elites and their partners in the White House and Congress, who had turned the financial sector into a giant Ponzi scheme.

Americans have been subjected to acts of ‘terrorism’ whose final human toll will make September 11 look like a tea party. The perpetrators of this terror are all homegrown; they were trained not in the mountains of Afghanistan but at Harvard, Yale and Stanford; the bankers, executives and legislators who preyed on Americans are the crème de la crème of American society.

When I return to teach in Fall of this year, I expect to meet students chastened by their experience. Nothing undermines capitalist ideologies faster and more effectively than capitalist crises. No critique of capitalism can be more penetrating than the depredations of unemployment, immiseration, homelessness that it inflicts on its victims. So recently victimized – at the very center of global capitalism – perhaps, Americans might learn to empathize with victims elsewhere – in Africa, Asia and Latin America – who have been ravaged by this system for centuries.

Capitalist ideologues will be working overtime to deflect American anger away from the system to a few villains, to a few rotten apples. Congressional hearings will identify scapegoats; they will hang a few ‘witches.’ A few capitalist barons will be sacrificed. As public anger subsides, attempts will be made to shift the blame to feckless homebuyers and compulsive consumers. At all costs, the system must be saved. The capitalist show must go on, with as little change as possible.

Quite apart from this crisis, however, new technologies, in combination with the irreversible shift of sovereignty to some segments of the capitalist periphery, have been changing the dynamics of unequal development. The high-wage workers – the so-called middle classes in the developed countries – have been losing the protection they have long enjoyed against competition from low-wage workers in China and India.

More and more global capitalism will enrich some workers in the ‘periphery’ at the cost of workers in the ‘centers’ of capitalism. In the years ahead, the great alliance that was forged between capitalists and workers in the centers of capitalism will come under greater strain. More and more, the interests of these two classes will diverge.

Powerful corporations will still insist on openness, while growing ranks of workers will press for protectionism. This revival of class conflict in the old capitalist centers will strain existing political arrangements. After a co-optation that has lasted for more than a century, the demos will begin to threaten the corporate elites. New demands will be placed on intellectual mercenaries in the media and academia to use new, more effective tools to dumb down the demos.

As growing segments of high-wage workers in the rich countries become the new victims of capitalism, will they slowly learn to see capitalism from the standpoint of its victims? In this new emerging reality, will orthodox economics migrate from its old centers in London, Cambridge and Chicago to new centers in Bangalore and Beijing?

A curious world this will be when seen from the old centers. In truth, this will only be a long-delayed correction to two centuries of unequal development, dominated by Western centers. Sadly, the correction will not go far enough: it will leave much of the world mired in poverty and disease.

_______________

M. Shahid Alam is professor of economics at Northeastern University.

Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Fighting the War of Ideas: Myth and Reality

2009-07-31T13:56:00.000-07:00

by Dr. Mohammad Malkawi, Argosy University-Chicago

Introduction

Research papers on Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) have become recently more frequent. Interest in the activities of HT worldwide has also increased. Some major research institutes have published papers on the issue. In 2003 the Heritage Foundation published a paper by Ariel Cohen [9] and in 2004 the Nixon Center did the same for Zeyno Baran [11, 12]. The Khilafah Conference organized by HT-America in Chicago (on July 19, 2009) has promoted several articles and interviews in different media platforms, including the CBS News report (July 17), the Southtown-Star article on July 17, 2009, and many others. Several Blogs and online articles continue to label HT as a radical supremacist group, although they admit that the group does not engage in violent militant activities. The most significant among these publications is "Fighting the War of Ideas" by Zeyno Baran, published in the Foreign Affairs in its 2005 November/December edition [10]. In that article, Baran argues that HT is a radical organization which poses a real and potent threat. She states:

“HT is not itself a terrorist organization, but it can usefully be thought of as a conveyor belt for terrorists. It indoctrinates individuals with radical ideology, priming them for recruitment by more extreme organizations where they can take part in actual operations. By combining fascist rhetoric, Leninist strategy, and Western sloganeering with Wahhabi theology, HT has made itself into a very real and potent threat that is extremely difficult for liberal societies to counter.”

In this article, I discuss the claims made by Baran from the perspective of a student of both HT literature and the Marxist-Leninist culture. I would like to stress the academic nature of this article, maintaining the integrity of my profession as a professor of business and information technology. My knowledge of Marxism-Leninism goes back to my undergraduate studies in the former Soviet Union, where Marxism-Leninism studies were part of the degree curriculum. My knowledge of HT literature is attributed to extensive study of Taqiuddin An-Nabhani's (the founder of HT in 1953) publications.

HT: The Conveyor Belt

Baran claims that HT acts as a conveyor belt for terrorists. She first made this claim in the extensive report "HIZB UT-TAHRIR: Islam's Political Insurgency" published by The Nixon Center in December 2004, where she wrote:

“It [HT] is in fact more of a conveyor belt, whereby people who have for several years been indoctrinated with HT ideology are produced and who then move to more radical platforms on which they can carry out a common mission.”

In the report published by the Nixon Center, Baran does not provide a proof for this concept; although she cites examples of some groups whose members or founders were once members of HT. The nature of the Nixon Center report may allow a claim to be made without formal and thorough investigation of its accuracy and integrity. However, once the claim is made in a well respected journal such as Foreign Affairs, the proof and evidence requires more scrutiny and elaboration. I read the Nixon Center report and spotted the inadequacy of justification. I only decided to write and question the claims when the article appeared in Foreign Affairs.

The core claim is that HT serves as a conveyor belt for radicals and terrorists "… whereby people who have for several years been indoctrinated with HT ideology are produced and who then move to more radical platforms on which they can carry out a common mission." If one were to prove such a claim, one would investigate the ideology of HT and search for that type of indoctrination which, once undertaken, enables a member to graduate and move into violence. Given that the publications of HT are open to the public since it was established in 1953, the task of verification becomes possible. It is to be noted that the publications of HT were banned only by governments and regimes in the Muslim world, rather than by HT's administration. With the advent of the Internet, the publications of HT have become more accessible to all interested groups.

Having said that, I would like to provide a detailed and structured account of HT ideology and doctrines on the issue of using violence for achieving political goals. Before doing so, I would like to explain the method of HT for adopting ideas, means, rules, methods, strategies, tactics and styles.

HT's Ideological Framework

The ideology of HT is based on the principle that man, life and universe are created by God, and that the relationship between people and God is that of complete obedience and servitude to God's orders and that the people will be held accountable for their behavior in front of God in the hereafter. HT maintains that this principle is the foundation of the creed of its ideology upon which it established all its rules, thoughts, regulations, etc. HT states that this creed serves as its ideological foundation as well as its ideological leadership [1]. The doctrines of the creed are collectively compiled and found in two main sources according to HT: the Qur'an and the Sunnah (statements and acts of Prophet Muhammad). In addition to these two sources, HT believes that the unanimous agreement of the companions of Prophet Muhammad on a certain issue comprises another source of Islamic jurisprudence. A fourth source, Qiyas, or analogical deduction from the texts of the Qur'an and the Sunnah is also admissible by HT as a means of deriving rules and regulations [2].

HT defined two objectives to be undertaken by the party following its establishment in 1953. These objectives are firstly to carry the call for Islam and secondly to revive the Islamic way of life through the re-establishment of the Caliphate (Khilafah).[3]

HT also defined the method by which it will achieve its objectives. In 1954, HT published an internal memorandum, entitled "The Starting Point". In this memorandum, HT clearly defined the objectives it wants to achieve as well as the method it would use to achieve these objectives. I will cite some sections of this publication, which clearly defines the doctrine with which HT 'indoctrinates' its followers. Article 9 says [4]:

“Preparing the Ummah (i.e. Islamic Nation) to carry the Islamic Call means exactly to prepare the Ummah for the political work on the basis of Islam. This task cannot be accomplished unless the Islamic ideas become the dominant ones and unless the political method in the Islamic context becomes clear and dominates all other ideas.”

In this article, HT clearly states that the political process is the only process that it will use.

In article 10, HT states:

“Since the Hizb (i.e. Party) carries the Islamic Call in its form as an intellectual leadership from which the systems of life emerge, and it uses the political process as the only method for this Call…”

HT clearly states here that the political method is the only method it will use in its endeavor to accomplish its objectives. In this context, HT argues that the imperialist foreign powers will try to create rock solid obstacles to prevent the party from achieving its objectives. Nevertheless, HT warns that it must always avoid getting in verbal or physical conflict with these powers, which create these obstacles [5]. In article 12, HT states:

The only weapon in the hand of the Hizb is Islam. It must not use anything else; and the intellectual aspect is what the party as a whole should be equipped with.

In article 20, HT reasserts the concept of only using the thought process and the political method in its work:

“And therefore, the intellectual aspect must always be the foundation, and its connection to the political work only shall be the corner stone of the party's work.”

HT argues that the intellectual and political processes are in complete compliance with the objectives and activities it will carry:

“The mission of HT is to carry the Islamic Call. This makes amongst its main activities the following:

1. To change the way of thinking of the world to that of the Islamic way of thinking.
2. To change the intellectual foundation upon which people base their opinions and ideas to the Islamic intellectual foundation.
3. To replace the thoughts carried by people with Islamic ones.
4. To connect all the thoughts to the Islamic intellectual foundation”

It is important to note that all activities that the HT defined for itself are purely ideological, intellectual and thought related. None of these activities require nor warrant the use of force or violence. In article 33, HT states that this mission requires thinkers, rather than militants.

Article 34 states:

“The method (of HT) in carrying its ideas to the people in the society is to invite them using the method of wisdom, excellent invitation, and the best of argument. Allah says ‘Call to the path of your Lord with wisdom, excellent invitation, and argue with the best of the arguments’ [Qur'an 16:126].”

This method is completely based on the intellectual and political process.

Since 1953, HT has continued to be committed to its ideological framework and to the political and intellectual processes that it sketched out as its only method. In the 1980s the militant Islamic groups gained significant attention in the Muslim world, especially in Afghanistan and Egypt. The militant approach had a great appeal to a significant portion of the Muslims, particularly the youth. Furthermore, the militant Islamic work was, by and large, supported by the USA due to the cold war relationship with the former Soviet Union. Within that atmosphere, HT confirmed its continued belief in the political and intellectual processes and rejected the militant approach. It is important to observe that the pressure against the party to clarify its position related to militancy did not come from regional or international powers. Rather, it was pressed upon the party by peer pressure from Islamic movements and the Muslim masses. The party chose to declare its commitment to the political process at a major conference in December 1989, in St Louis, Missouri, USA [6]. HT presented at the conference "The Method of HT for Change". In page 8, HT restates its objectives:

“Accordingly, HT defined its objective to be the revival of the Islamic life and carrying the Islamic Call, and it mobilized in the Ummah to achieve this objective”

HT also defined the method by which it will achieve its objectives:

“He (i.e. the party) also arrived at the method which he must follow to achieve his objective. The method is based on the method used by the Messenger of Allah since he was chosen by God as a Messenger until he established the Islamic State in Medinah.”

HT believes that the method it has to follow must be based on the method and steps taken by Prophet Muhammad, which led him to create the first Islamic State in Medinah, thirteen years after his mission had begun. HT outlines the reason why its method should be political (page 9):

“And this group work must be a political work, and cannot be anything but political. That is because the establishment of the Caliphate, and the appointment of a Caliph is a political work, and because the ruling according to Allah's revelation is political as well, and cannot be anything but political.”

HT goes further in its argument to claim that any group that assumes any work besides the political work will not be able to achieve the objective of re-establishing the Caliphate. The party goes further to examine all the other differing methodologies which HT thinks should not be followed. Those include the charity oriented groups, the spiritual groups, educational groups, the militant groups that engage in preventing evil by force and groups calling for moral behavior. HT explains how these differing methodologies are not suitable for achieving the objective of re-establishing the Caliphate.

In its literature and teachings, HT discusses at length the issue of violence and carrying arms against regimes which are not ruling according to the Shari'ah (laws) of Islam. The militant Islamic groups use a statement (Hadith) of Prophet Muhammad to justify the use of violence to create the necessary change. The statement was in response to a question posed by one of the companions of the Prophet, called Obadah Bin Samit, who asked "Shall we fight them (the rulers) with our swords?" The Prophet replied "No, unless you see them ruling you with laws other than those revealed by Allah". HT maintains that this Hadith does not apply to the current situation in the Muslim world. That is because the Hadith talks about an already existing Islamic State in which the ruling regime diverts the state from its Islamic status to a non-Islamic one. In other words, the Hadith talks about the potential use of force to preserve the Islamic ruling in an Islamic State. However, the current situation in the Muslim world is one in which the Islamic rulings are absent altogether. As such, the issue at hand is not to preserve an Islamic code, but rather to establish one from scratch. This case is more similar, in HT's opinion, to the case when Prophet Muhammad was in Mekkah and was working to build an Islamic State. HT states (page 18):

“The Hizb is committed to the ruling of Shari'ah and to the steps taken by the Messenger to establish the state.”

The Prophet is known to have established the first Islamic State without using any form of violence or military action. When he was urged by some of his companions to use force against the infidels of Mekkah, his response was “we are not ordered to fight back”. This case is depicted in the Qur'an (Chapter 4, Verse 77):

“Have you not turned your vision to those who were told to hold back their hands (from fight) but establish regular prayers and spend in regular Charity? When (at length) the order for fighting was issued to them, behold! a section of them feared men as - or even more than - they should have feared Allah”

To make the point absolutely clear, and to assert beyond a shadow of doubt that HT will not resort to the military option no matter what the conditions are, it states (page 23)

“Even though the Hizb is committed to his open, frank and challenging approach; he will constrain his activities to the political ones only. He will not resort to material actions against the rulers, or against anyone who stands in the face of its mission, or against anyone who seeks to harm the Hizb. This commitment is in line with the acts of the Messenger of Allah in Mekkah being constrained only to verbal acts without using any material means during his struggle until he migrated to Medinah. When the people who pledged the allegiance to support him in Medinah asked his permission to fight his enemies in Mekkah, he replied to them ‘We have not been permitted to fight yet"’ Allah also asked him to be as patient as the Messengers before him when he is harmed; ‘Messengers before you were rejected, and they remained patient when rejected and harmed until our victory came to them’ [Qur'an 6:34].”

The permission to fight and use military actions was revealed later in Medinah after the establishment of the state. Hence, the rules of fighting in Islam (Jihad) are associated with the state (the Caliphate) rather than with the method of establishing the Caliphate. HT believes that the Caliphate will define the rules of war and peace in light of the Islamic rulings of the political system and the foreign policies of the state. But that will be within the scope of the state rather than the scope of the Hizb and its methodology.

What should be noted here is that HT requires every one of its members to adopt all the ideas and thoughts that HT as a group believes in. Adopting the methodology of HT is a core requirement as much as adopting the basic beliefs of the Hizb. It is reported in the history of the Hizb that in the early 1960s when the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was on the rise, several members of HT were let go because of their inclination towards the militancy of the PLO. Similarly, HT expelled others who sought to follow the militant examples in Afghanistan or Egypt in the 1980s. So the truth of the matter is that some of those who fail to comply with HT's strict political nature leave the Hizb or the Hizb removes them, and they find their way to other groups. In other words, it is not the indoctrination of HT that makes some members more militant. It is the other way around. It is the failure of certain members to be indoctrinated with the ideas of HT that takes them to rather violent and non-political groups.

Therefore, the theory of HT being a "conveyor belt" for militant groups does not hold at all. The contrary is true. The main case that Baran cites as an example of the conveyor belt phenomenon is Omar Bakri Fostoq [aka Omar Bakri Mohammed], the leader of the Muhajiroon group (now dissolved). Fostoq was removed from HT in the mid 1990s because of his disagreement with HT on the basics of the methodology of HT. The doctrines he learned at HT were those outlined in this article, i.e., the political and intellectual struggle. In other words, he was not taught or indoctrinated with militant ideas and was in fact asked to leave the party.

The other case brought by Baran is the case of Sheikh Asad Tamimi who founded the Islamic Jihad Organization in Jerusalem. Sheikh Tamimi was dismissed from HT in 1956 due to conflicts with HT on issues related to parliamentary elections in Jordan. He came back into political action after the revolution led by Khomeini in Iran in 1979.This case should not be brought in connection to HT. A more interesting case, in my opinion, could have been the case of Mr. Hani Al-Hasan, who left HT to become one of the founding members of the Al-Fatah Palestinian organization. He later became a committee member of the PLO. Al-Hasan believed that the military struggle is the only means for liberating Palestine and that HT's approach is not sufficient. Had the relationship between HT and PLO been on the positive side, one would be tempted to assume that Al-Hasan was HT's link into the PLO. The truth of the matter is that HT had a very strong stand against the PLO since it was initially established on January 1st 1964. Only a few days after it was formed, HT declared that the PLO was an illegitimate organization from the Islamic perspective. HT declared that it was prohibited in Islam (Haram) to join the PLO or to support it by money or by any other means.

The conveyor belt theory implies that HT graduates people who are prepared within the Hizb to be militant and ready to pursue violent means of change. The facts, based on HT literature and behavior, clearly show that HT indoctrinates its members only with the political means for change. In fact the arguments that HT brings to the table are far more convincing than all the arguments that argue in favor of the military approach. Lastly, it remains a fact that the number of people who left HT or were removed by HT to join or to form groups with a more militant agenda are far less than those who join HT for the opposite reason. In Uzbekistan, the IMU (a militant Islamic group) witnessed a large turnover from its ranks to HT.

It is also interesting to note that Baran, in her testimony in front of the House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia on June 15, 2004 stated that “Unlike many others, however, HT hopes to achieve this goal (the Caliphate) peacefully.” This testimony is based on Baran’s analysis of HT work.

Does HT have a Leninist Strategy?

Baran claims that HT adopts a Leninist strategy, among other things which make HT a real threat:

“By combining fascist rhetoric, Leninist strategy, and Western sloganeering with Wahhabi theology…”

I believe that the mere labeling of HT with a communist flavor is sufficient to discredit the Hizb and to place it on the black list of many, including the Western governments, public opinion, and other organizations. I personally have not seen a study, credible or otherwise, that compares HT with Lenin's communist party or any other communist party for that matter. Certainly, Baran has not drawn any comparison and has not made a reference to any such study. She simply made the claim in her article. From a purely academic perspective, this claim is sufficient to render the article defective. I do not intend to carry a thorough comparative study in this article (though I may do that later). However, I will use my recollection of my studies of the history of the communist party in the former Soviet Union to make some clarifications. My recollection goes back to my undergraduate studies in the old Soviet Union, where the study of communist doctrines was part of the official university curricula.

One of Lenin's strategy articles was under the title "We Shall Not Take This Road". This statement was a declaration of strategy change. Lenin's brother was executed by the Russian government after he was accused of blowing up bridges in Moscow. Lenin decided that the violent approach is not the right approach for the revolution. He made the change in favor of the political revolutionary approach.

In contrast, HT never used the violent approach. Also, HT believes that the approach it follows is derived from divine rules and thus is not subject to change due to harsh conditions or hardships encountered. HT has not made any change in its strategy since it was formed in 1953. HT believes that the tactics and means can change, but not the main approach.

Lenin derived the rules of his revolution from his philosophy of dialectic and historical materialism. This philosophy suggests that the revolution takes place based on the natural struggle between the classes of society. On the revolutionary side is the class of workers and farmers. On the other side is the class of landlords and owners of the means of production. Lenin grew his party and supporters among the two classes of the proletariat.

In contrast, HT derives the rules of political change from the divine revelation as found in the Qur'an and Sunnah. The grassroots of the movement of HT includes all types of people such as farmers, workers, employees, landlords, merchants, teachers, doctors, engineers, professors and others. Lenin propagated the conflicts between the classes of the society in an attempt to create a big rift between the classes as a pretext for the revolutionary change. HT, on the other hand, believes that all the people in the society should be the base for the change, and no antagonism is propagated. HT states [7]:

“The three groups which stand in the face of HT's mission are the rulers, the dark forces, and the ones obsessed with the foreign culture. The plan of the imperialists is to place these forces as rocks in the face of the Call to delay its progress towards achieving the objective. The imperialists know that these rocks do not prevent the Hizb from achieving the objective, although it causes delays. Therefore, the Hizb must avoid the clash with these groups (rocks) and any other rock to be placed in front of him. These rocks must become building blocks of the castles rather than obstacles. In other words, these groups must be won towards the Call. At least it must be understood by them and by all that they are only tools in the hands of the imperialists. If it is not possible to win them over, at least avoid their impact.”

This philosophical argument of HT is fundamentally distinct from the Leninist strategy, which is based on the struggle and conflicts between classes. As I said in the beginning of this section, I do not intend to carry a thorough comparative analysis in this article. However, there is clear evidence that there is no resemblance between HT's strategy and the Leninist one. In the mean time, I think that a thorough analysis is worth pursuing. It is worth mentioning though, that HT published a book entirely devoted to the disproof of the Marxist-Leninist theory [8]. HT provided a thorough criticism of the communist ideology in the book "System of Islam", which is considered the foundation of HT doctrines. The communist economic system is heavily criticized in the book "The Economic System in Islam" published by HT in 1953.

Does HT have a Wahhabi Theology?

Baran claims that HT has a Wahhabi theology, among other things which make HT a real threat:

“By combining fascist rhetoric, Leninist strategy, and Western sloganeering with Wahhabi theology …”

Here again, Baran does not provide any reference for such a claim and nor does she highlight any aspects of similarity between HT doctrines and those of Wahhabism. The purpose of associating HT with Wahhabism is to build an indirect link between HT and terrorism. The western media has already built a case that many of those who are accused of terrorism belong to the Saudi Wahhabi theological school. When Baran says that HT adopts the Wahhabi school of thought, she immediately builds a case against HT. The irony is that she provides no evidence to substantiate this claim, even though it should not be difficult to prove or disprove it. The Wahhabi school of thought is well known in the Muslim world, and the scholars who belong to this school are many and accessible via their websites and official status in Saudi Arabia. It suffices to quote any of the Wahhabi scholars and seek a professional opinion. This is only a shortcut which leads to fair conclusions. A more thorough analysis is warranted if this claim were to bear any credibility.

My quick thought on this issue is that, historically, the Wahhabi movement has been closely associated with Saudi Arabia. Its propagation outside Saudi Arabia has always been enabled by scholars who studied in Saudi schools of Shari'ah. The founder of HT (An-Nabhani) was educated in Al-Azhar in Egypt, which is known not to be on friendly terms with the Wahhabi school of thought. The successor of the first leader of HT (Abdul Qadeem Zalloum) was also educated in Al-Azhar. HT has been heavily criticized by Wahhabi scholars for some of its basic ideas that are related to the foundation of belief. Again, it takes a quick search on pro-Wahhabi websites to find out how much HT is criticized by this school of thought. The claim that HT is a Wahhabi faction is not founded on any evidence. Such a claim will be looked at with surprise by a great majority of Muslims who know HT and Wahhabism. I do not intend to comment on the Wahhabi school of thought in this article. I only want to emphasize that there is no correlation between HT and Wahhabism.

Conclusions

The conclusions of this research paper are clear: HT's methodology and approach have not and will not deviate from the political and intellectual path. The commitment of HT not to be involved in any violent activity is based on its faith and understanding of the revelation of God, which makes its involvement in any terrorist or violent activity impossible, either in theory and practice. No person can integrate into the body of HT until he or she adopts this political and intellectual methodology and approach. Thus, the claim that HT acts as a conveyor belt of terrorism is baseless and lacks any credible evidence. It contradicts 53 years of HT's activities and HT's documented literature that is accessible by the public at large. Any research paper that claims otherwise is defective and does not adhere to the norms of academic research that necessitate approaching any topic with the intention to get correct conclusions, not holding the conclusions in mind and framing the research to justify them. The claims of any resemblance between the strategy of HT and that of Leninism-Marxism, and between HT ideas and those of Wahhabism are contradictory to everything HT stood for since it was established in 1953. Leninism-Marxism stands for the total denial of the existence of God and its strategy is based on the conflicts between society classes, while HT is totally opposite to that. Wahhabism, on the other hand, gained credit among its followers during the times of the Ottoman Caliphate due to its denial of the legitimacy of that Caliphate, while HT stands firmly on the opposite of that. Recent papers by Baran of the Nixon Center and by Cohen of the Heritage Foundation concerning HT were conducted in contravention of standard academic research norms and approached the issue in an entirely subjective manner. Understanding HT must go through the total understanding of its well-documented literature, available to the public. In case any questions are not answered by the literature, HT has official spokesmen in Sudan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Turkey and Indonesia. HT also has official media representatives in the UK, Netherlands and Denmark. Also, HT has media offices in Lebanon, Turkey, Yemen, Iraq, and Jordan. Any of these officials or offices can be approached with questions to be answered. In addition, such questions could be conveyed to HT's global leadership through these officials. Research based on such an approach and dependent on such official answers would gain significant credit and would be able to stand its ground when cross-examined against standard academic research norms and measures.

__________________________________

References

1. An-Nabhani, Nidhaam Al-Islam (The System of Islam), 1953
2. An-Nabhani, Shakhsiyyah Islamiah (The Islamic Personality) 3rd volume, 1959
3. Hizb ut-Tahrir, The Starting Point, 1954
4. Previous source, article 9
5. Previous source, article 10
6. "The Method of Hizb ut-Tahrir for Change", Muslim Arab Youth Association Conference, Dec. 1989, St. Louis, Missouri, USA
7. The Starting Point, pg. 3
8. Hizb ut-Tahrir, "Refutation of Socialist Marxism", 1962
9. Ariel Cohen, “Hizb ut-Tahrir: An Emerging Threat to U.S. Interests in Central Asia”, Heritage Foundation:

http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1656es.cfm; May 30, 2003

10. Zeyno Baran, “Fighting the War of Ideas”, Journal of Foreign Affairs,

http://www.foreignaffairs.org/2005/6.html, November/December 2005

11. Zeyno Baran, “The Challenge of Hizb ut Tahrir: Deciphering and Combating Radical Islamist Ideology”, edited by Zeyno Baran, Washington, D.C., The Nixon Center, 2004
12. Zeyno Baran, “HIZB UT – TAHRIR, Islam's Political Insurgency” The Nixon Center, December 2004

Muslims approaches to Interfaith Dialogue : The Authentic and the Apologetic

2009-07-12T17:07:00.000-07:00

Muslims approaches to Interfaith Dialogue : The Authentic and the Apologetic

Adis Duderija

This piece of writing was prompted by the author’s attendance of a recently organised inter-faith dialogue in his place of residence, Perth, W.Australia. As a committee member of one of the inter-faith organisations myself which ever since its inception some 4 years ago I found it a welcome development that the local group of Imams have been involved in organising an inter-faith event ,especially given the fact that their attendance at events organised by ‘my’ interfaith group ,apart from one notable exception (an imam who probably is not the member of the council of imams in question), was virtually non-existent. Nevertheless, ,according to one of the ‘traditional’imams , whose talk I will utilise to discuss some broader issues pertaining to Muslim approaches to inter-faith dialogue, inter-faith dialogue was ‘ a burning issue’ of huge socio-political and religious significance.

I would like to analyse the imam’s ( who has a significant following and is seen as ‘progressive’ by many young people) speech in relation to the question of an authentic vs. apologetic approach to inter-faith dialogue. An authentic approach I define as one that deals with the reality of the complex nature ,diversity and at times mutually exclusive strands of what constitutes a religious tradition with the attendant issue of who has the power and authority to ‘canonise’ and interpret that very tradition. An approach which evaluates religious tradition holistically, contextually and in a historically sensitive manner. An apologetic approach, on the other hand, strives to score an ideological point in most cases but importantly it is also a one dimensional approach and an understanding of the religious tradition based on selective utilisation of tradition that suppresses certain aspects of it and privileges others, an approach which is at best semi-contextualist and not attune to the historical circumstances in which the tradition unfolded.

Islam, according to the imam in question, by the virtue of its very doctrine (‘aqidah) has a very ‘inclusivist’ approach to inter-faith, although God recognises one din by which the imam implicitly assumes that that din is the historical religion of prophet Muhammad ( here he neglects explicit Qur’anic verses that do recognise the multiplicity of manahij (paths) towards shari’ah ( pathway to God) and not din as well as his reification of Islam and confluence with the historical Islam of prophet Muhammad . According to the imam this inclusivism is attested by the Islam’s doctrinal principles of unity of God’s Message, the very meaning of Islam/Muslims, the unity of Prophet hood and the historical truth of Islam’s ‘tolerance’ of non-Muslim religions based on the Qur’anically founded principle bestowing upon non-Muslims the right to worship in freedom.

Now this all sounds nice and ‘beautiful’ in the world of late modernity ( or post-modernity) but it is no so much what the imam did say that I am critical of but of the things he did not say that I find problematic.

Firstly, he did not mention that one part of the ‘mainstream’ Sunni Islamic doctrine is the notion of successive nature of Prophethood which was fulfilled and completed by prophet Muhammad which renders all other existing traditions apriori as ‘incomplete’ ,’corrupted’ or ‘deviant’ . Hence, as Muslims, there is nothing we can learn from “Them” ( in this respect let me mention that before he was to speak a Christian representative was speaking on the issue of inter-faith dialogue from a Catholic perspective and based on the behaviour of another younger imam (engaging in talk with someone else) as well as the imam in question (coming late and leaving the room a number of times) - one could clearly see this attitude of ‘ “you have nothing of importance to say’ manifesting itself by their poor listening and inattention as to what the Christian speaker had to say).

Secondly , the way Islamic historical experience of dealing with the other was presented gave an impression that it represented the pinnacle of ‘tolerance’ ( based use of terminology-used in toxicology as to how much ‘medicine’ one can ‘tolerate’ before it starts having adverse effects ). This brushes aside more problematic evidence, for example in contemporary S.Arabia or other countries (e.g. Afghanistan but also some more ‘secular’ Maghrebi countries) , in relation to issues of non-permissibility of restoration of existing churches and the erecting of new ones or the ban on public practise of non-Muslim faiths ,including proselytising , and the non-existing option of choosing to opt out of Muslim faith ( or if you do it would attract capital punishment, albeit as a last resort not often put into practice ). All of these practices and laws are an organic and mainstream component of pre-modern Islamic law, however, none of it was mentioned by the imam and I have significant doubts that he was not aware of this facet of the Islamic tradition.

Thirdly, the imam did not mention other problematic components of the Islamic tradition on the question of the religious other ,especially the hadith literature. Given his external appearance with the emphasis on the fist long beared and trimmed moustache he must be aware of it. Namely, according to several hadith the Prophet had commanded Muslims to ‘distinguish ‘ themselves from the ‘Jews’ (and Christians) by adopting the above and other practices (which I examined in a paper elsewhere ) . This commandment , if authentic, is not interpreted in a context of the political animosity between the 7^th century Medinian Muslims whose very existence was under threat and some Jewish tribes at a particular pointing history but is interpreted as a universal principle of a ‘devout’ and ‘pious’ Muslim who keeps the Prophet’s Sunna ( I have also dealt with the issue of what sunah is in a number of academic papers).

Here I am reproducing one part of a discussion from one of my papers on an exclusivist approach to inter-faith by an Islamic group I term Neo-Traditional Salafis (NTS) which encompasses both ‘traditional’ and neo-fundamentalist approaches :

.Qur’ano-Hadithic texts on the view of the religious “other’ based upon NTS approach to interpretation of Qur’an and Sunnah

a.) Qur’anic verses

2:120

Never will the Jews or the Christians be satisfied with thee unless thou follow their form of religion. Say: "The guidance of Allah that is the (only) guidance." Wert thou to follow their desires after the knowledge which hath reached thee then wouldst thou find neither protector nor helper against Allah.

3:118

O ye who believe! Take not into your intimacy those outside your ranks; they will not fail to corrupt you. They only desire your ruin: rank hatred has already appeared from their mouths; what their hearts conceal is far worse. We have made plain to you the Signs if ye have wisdom.

5:51

O ye who believe! Take not the Jews and the Christians for your friends and protectors: they are but friends and protectors to each other. And he amongst you that turns to them (for friendship) is of them. Verily Allah guideth not a people unjust.

9: 5

But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the Pagans wherever ye find them, an seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war); but if they repent, and establish regular prayers and practise regular charity, then open the way for them: for Allah is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful.

3:85

If anyone desires a religion other than Islam (submission to Allah., never will it be accepted of him; and in the Hereafter He will be in the ranks of those who have lost (All spiritual good).

Qur’anic exegesis has documented the context behind these verses and surahs ( chapters).[1] Broadly speaking at the time of revelation of these verses, and the larger chapters ( surah) they are embedded in, the small Muslim population residing in Medina was under constant threat for sheer survival. The threat was both internal and external. The internal threat came from those that the Qur’an on numerous occasions addresses as munafiqun or religious hypocrites who cooperated with the external sources of threat and attempted to sabotage the Muslim community from within. The external threat, apart from the Makkan tribe of Quraysh, was also ,in particular, increasingly felt from the side of Jewish tribes living in the outskirts of Medina. These tribes at first signed a joint peace treaty ,known as “The Constitution of Medina” ,with and swore allegiance to Muhammad. According to this document all of the inhabitants of the city where considered as one community ( ummah) whose religious difference was respected[2]as attested and endorsed by the Qur’an.[3] Furthermore, this document stipulated that between Muslims and Jews there is to be “sincere friendship, and honorable dealing, not treachery”. All the signatories of the document were also to “ help against whoever suddenly attacks[ed] Yathrib[City of Medina]”.[4] However, as Muslim community grew in numbers and strength and became more “self- reliant” and “self-conscious” these Jewish tribes withdrew their support and started to openly cooperate and conspire with the Makkans against the Muslim community.[5]As such they broke the constitutional agreement outlined in the “Constitution of Medina” document by committing treason. This inevitably prompted responses on behalf of the Qur’an and Prophet as to how Muslims ought to deal with these tribes/individuals. In this context the execution of one Jewish tribe and that of the expulsion of another are often used as examples of exlusivist orientation of Muhammad’s policies and that of the Qur’an. That above quoted verses are ,indeed, contextually embedded, and are not universal in nature is born out of the fact that the Qur’anic discourse pertaining to Jews and Christinas not only contains a large number of conciliatory verses that that will be discussed subsequently but as Miraly argues that the Muhammad’s actions against the Jewish tribes from Medina “was[were] not motivated by any sense of religious exclusivism “ but “were result of irresolvable civic tensions that had no bearing on the Qur’an’s position on religious pluralism”.[6] Furthermore, Armstorng , a non-Muslim catholic nun, asserts in this context asserts that after the events of expulsion and execution of two Jewish tribes in question, “Qur’an continued to revere Jewish prophet’s and to urge Muslims to respect the people of the Book .Smaller Jewish groups continued to live in Medina, and later Jews ,like Christians, enjoyed full religious liberty in Islamic empires.”[7]

In relation to the 3:85 verse , analogous what was said in relation to the changes in the semantical meanings of the words such as mu’min and muslim[8] Esack argues that while the verse in the pre-classical or early stages of Islamic thought was considered to afford salvation to groups outside the Muslim community it was much later when the exegetes had recourse to more sophisticated exegetical devices such as that of theory of abrogation (naskh) were used to “secure exclusion from salvation for the Other”.[9]

Furthermore, in the case of 9:5 its specific rather then general nature is not only based upon the contextual considerations but also grammatical ones. Namely the use of the definite article in the verse limits the content of the verse to specific tribes addressed is not to be understood as universally prescriptive and normative.[10]

b.) Ahadith

The reflection of the above context is also found many ahadith reportedly going back to the Prophet in which the emphasis on the difference between Muslims on the one side and Jews and Christians and thus the creation of a reactionary ,diachotomical identity is noticeable. Here are several examples:

Narrated Abu Hurraira, The Prophet said, "Jews and Christians do not dye their hair so you should do the opposite of what they do."[11] (Bukhari, Sahih, 7.786)

Narrated Abdullah ibn Amr ibn al-‘As : Allah's Messenger (peace be upon him) said, "He does not belong to us who imitates other people. Do not imitate the Jews or the Christians, for the Jews' salutation is to make a gesture with the fingers and the Christians' salutation is to make a gesture with the palms of the hands.( Tirmidhi , 4648, classified as weak).

Narrated Abu Hurraira : Suhayl ibn Abu Salih said: I went out with my father to Syria. The people passed by the cloisters in which there were Christians and began to salute them. My father said: Do not give them salutation first, for Abu Hurayrah reported the Apostle of Allah (peace be upon him) as saying: Do not salute them (Jews and Christians) first, and when you meet them on the road, force them to go to the narrowest part of it. ( Abu Dawood, 5186)[12]

Narrated Abu Hurraira: The Prophet (peace be upon him) said: Religion will continue to prevail as long as people hasten to break the fast, because the Jews and the Christians delay doing so.(Abu Dawood, 2346)

Ibn 'Abbas reported: "The Messenger of Allah fasted on the day of 'Ashurah and ordered the people to fast on it. The people said: 'O Messenger of Allah, it is a day that the Jews and Christians honor.' The Prophet said, 'When the following year comes--Allah willing--we shall fast on the ninth.' The death of the Prophet came before the following year." This is recorded by Muslim and Abu Dawud. In one version the wording is: "If I remain until next year, we shall fast the ninth," meaning, the tenth. This is related by Muslim and Abu Dawud.[13]

It is not difficult to understand that , the above given verses and narrations, reportedly going back to the Prophet, if taken prima fasciae and without taking into account the above sketched historical circumstances and the background behind the Revelation would result in construction of a very negative view of the religious other which would be considered as normative. This is exactly so in the eyes of those Muslims who follow NTS interpretational model of Qur’ano-Sunnahic teachings characterised by marginalisation of contextual background on the nature , content, understanding, interpretation and objective of the above Qur’anic injunctions and hadithic texts. Additionally, the interpretational proclivity to generalise/universalise these contextually –based injunctions , which is another feature of NTS approach to interpretation of Qur’ano-Sunnahic teachings, would result in application of these verses to all Muslim ,Christian and Jewish communities living during and after the Prophet’s death. NTS atomistic or segmentalist approach to textual evidence which does not systematically consider all the textual evidence[14] on a particular theme in order to develop a coherent and holistic view alongside the taking of recourse to the principal of abrogation (naskh) as espoused by classical Islamic legal theory are also responsible for the development of this view. Additionally, the NTS hadith dependent Sunnah hermeneutic and their ahl-hadith manhaj in relation to hadith criticism render the above quoted ahadith as normative ,thus religiously binding. Thus, based on the delineating features of NTS manhaj “verses that appear to inspire intolerance and cohersion were[are] willfully misrepresented , in an attempt to overpower the essential and overarching message of the Qur’an : one of toleration.”[15]

In addition to the above there are several Qur’anic verses and a number of ahadith which , when taken out of their original context described above and applied decontextually , impact upon the view of the religious other and thus impact upon a particular type of religious identity construction vis-à-vis the religious other as they emphasise the tension and enmity that existed between Muslims and Jews and Christians during the time of the Prophet’s early Medinian community for example by invoking God’s curses on them. Here we consider several of those.

c.) Qur’anic verses:[16]

5:82

Strongest among men in enmity to the believers wilt thou fined the Jews and Pagans…

9: 29

Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allah and His apostle nor acknowledge the religion of truth (even if they are) of the People of the Book until they pay the Jizya with willing submission and feel themselves subdued.

d.)Ahadith:

Narrated Abdullah ibn Umar: Allah's Apostle said, "You (i.e. Muslims) will fight with the Jews till some of them will hide behind stones. The stones will (betray them) saying, 'O 'Abdullah (i.e. slave of Allah)! There is a Jew hiding behind me; so kill him.(Bukhari, 4. 176)[17]

Narrated by Abdullah ibn Mulaika Aisha said that the Jews came to the Prophet and said, "As-Samu 'Alaikum" (death be on you)." 'Aisha said (to them), "(Death) be on you, and may Allah curse you and shower His wrath upon you!" The Prophet said, "Be calm, O 'Aisha! You should be kind and lenient, and beware of harshness and Fuhsh (i.e. bad words)." She said (to the Prophet), "Haven't you heard what they (Jews) have said?" He said, "Haven't you heard what I have said (to them)? I said the same to them, and my invocation against them will be accepted while theirs against me will be rejected (by Allah).( Bukhari, 8.57)

The conflictive nature of these verses and ahadith texts, again if considered from the NTS interpretational perspective[18], can have very grim implications and provide a religious foundation for a purely oppositional, conflictive Muslim identity construction vis –a-vis the religious Other. This is particularly evident in the following statement by El-Fadl who , in this context asserts,

The puritan[19] worldview is bipolar- on the one end there is Islam which represents the unadulterated good, and on the other end are non-Muslims ,who represent evil. Relying on the writings of some classical jurists ,the puritans advocate a theology known as al-wala’ wa al-bara’ ( the doctrine of loyalty and disassociation) which states it is imperative that Muslims care for ,ally them with , and befriend only Muslims. Accordingly , Muslims may ally themselves with or seek the assistance of non-Muslims only for limited and identifiable purposes. Muslims should do so only if they are weak and in need, but as soon as Muslims are able to regain their power, they must regain their superior status…The fact that non-Muslims are not Muslim is seen as a moral fault …[20]

This type of mentality and approach to Jews and Christians, for example, is promoted by a NTS scholar Albani(d.1999) who considers that Prophet forbade to initiate greetings with Jews and Christians and that Muslims should not develop genuine, human -based relationships with non-Muslims .He basis his decisions upon a complete decontextualist approach to a couple of isolated hadith including the one cited above on the authority of ‘Aisha.[21]

As such this NTS manhaj engenders a construction of a religiously exclusivist Self vis-a-vis the Religious Other.

(end of reproduced section)

This begs the question as the why the imam did not mention this aspect of the Islamic tradition that we as Muslims need to acknowledge and deal with in a methodologically sound and historically sensitive and honest manner, especially if we want to promote inter-religious understanding. Sweeping things under the carpet and pretend that they are not there is not only apologetic but also ‘politically ‘ and ‘morally incorrect. So much for the imam’s own strong criticism of and the contention that the recent efforts in inter-faith dialogue and ‘recognition and appreciation of diversity’ stemming from the ‘West’ was an exercise of ‘political correctness’ whereas in the case of Islam it was from the very beginning indigenous and inherent in the tradition itself.

In what follows I am reproducing some parts of my other writings on this issue of the “Islamic’ perspectives on religious diversity and inclusion highlighting the importance of context :

The Religious Self and the Other in the Qur’an and Sunnah: The Importance of Context

Before examining the question of the Religious Self and the Religious Other in the Qur’an and Sunnah , more needs to be said about the revelatory environment in which the revelation and the Prophet’s embodiment of revelation took place as–revelatory environment relates to the question of the identity of the Self and that of the Other, especially in the Medinan period. Not only was it primarily in Medina that Muhammad’s message—and, therefore, the Muslim identity—became more “Self-conscious,” but also the Medinan model of the Prophetic and early Muslim community is considered by many Muslims worthy of emulation in many respects, including that of the relationship with the (religious) Other. Furthermore, even a cursory examination of the Qur’anic content (and, therefore, of the Prophet’s legacy) was organically linked to this context, especially the dimension of the Qur’anic content bearing on the relationship between Muslims and the religious “Other”.[22]

Several general points need to be considered in attempting to understand, from a religious perspective, the concept of the identity of Self and Other as understood during the Prophet’s time in light of the Qur’an and the Prophet’s embodiment of it.

First, the context behind the emergence of the Prophet Muhammad’s message in 7^th century Hijaz was such that it took place alongside already well-established religious communities, most important of which were, apart from the pre-Qur’anic paganism, Judaism, Christianity, and Hanifiyyah.[23] The Qur’an describes several instances of the Muslim community’s attitude toward the non-Muslim Other[24] and vice-versa.

Second, the Qur’anic attitude (and Muhammad’s conduct) toward the non-Muslim Other is highly contextual in nature and, therefore, possibly ambivalent.[25]Also, during much of the Muslim community’s “formative period” in Medina, a climate of friction and hostility between the Muslims, on the one hand, and the mushrikun, large Jewish tribes, Christians,[26] and hypocrites (munafiqun), [27] on the other, prevailed, under which Muslims were constantly concerned about the survival of their community, which often took a reactionary, antagonistic stance vis-à-vis the religious Other. Watt describes the circumstances and motives behind the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims, especially between the Prophet of Islam and the Medinan Jews:

In Muhammad’s first two years at Medina the Jews were the most dangerous critics of his claim to be a prophet, and the religious fervour of his followers, on which so much depended, was liable to be greatly reduced unless Jewish criticisms could be silenced or rendered impotent . . . . In so far as the Jews changed their attitude and ceased to be actively hostile, they were unmolested. . . .[28]

This is attested to by the Qur’an itself. The context-dependency of the scriptures toward the view of the (religious) Other (and, by implication, the religious Self) lead Waardenburg to assert that “Looking back at the interaction of the new Islamic religious movement with the existing religious communities, we are struck by the importance of socio-political factors.”[29]

Besides the sociopolitical factors, religious ideas were also significant, since the Qur’anic progressive consolidation of Islamic religious identity is inextricably linked with the religious identity of the Other, notably of Jews and Christians.[30] The aspects of religious identity’s continuity and commonality with other faiths [31] in the Qur’an are intertwined with those of the emergence of, and the emphasis on, the Muslim identity’s originality and distinctiveness.”[32] Thus, the religious aspects of, and interactions between, various religious communities in the Qur’anic milieu led to the genesis of the construction of religious identity of Muslims and played a very important role in its construction.[33]

In his study of the extent of the Prophet Muhammad’s and the Qur’an’s emphasis on confessional distinctiveness, Donner has demonstrated that, in the Islamic scripture and in early Islam, “ the community of Believers was originally conceptualized independently of confessional identities,” and that

It was only late—apparently during the third quarter of the first century A.H., a full generation of or more after the founding of Muhammad’s community—that membership in the community of Believers came to be seen as confessional identity in itself- [check punctuation mark here; hyphen, dash, comma?] when, to use a somewhat later formulation of religious terminology, being a Believer and Muslim meant that one could not also be a Christian, say, or a Jew.[34]

Donner adduces a substantial amount of evidence to support the argument that. Qur’anically, (some) Jews and Christians would qualify as mu’minun (believers) besides the muslimun (those who submit to God).[35]

Another significant trend in the “historicity” of the development of the Muslim religious Self was the gradual but ever-growing religious self-consciousness of the Prophet of Islam and his early community. Whilst attempts to find common ground and syncretism featured more frequently during the earlier periods of Muhammad’s life,[36]later periods stressed “features constituting specific identity and what distinguished one [i.e. Muslims] fundamentally from others.”[37] Miraly asserts that “Whereas pluralism was an essential foundation of Islam, exclusivism was a later addition. In the centuries following the Revelation, the original pluralist impulse that prompted the Constitution of Medina was usurped by politically motivated factions who propounded exclusivist interpretations of the Qur’an in order to justify warfare and territorial expansion.”[38] Similarly, writing about the context of the early Muslim view of the Byzantines in the days of Prophet Muhammad,Shboul echoes this observation by saying that the attitudes of the Muslims developed from sympathy and affinity, reflected in the early Qur’anic verses, to awe and apprehension of Byzantium’s military power, scorn of Byzantine wealth and luxury, and, finally, anticipation of open antagonism and prolonged warfare.[39]

Jews and Christians were eventually recognized by Islam as recipients of previous revelations (Ahl-Kitab) and were awarded by it the status of protected/secured minorities (dhimmis).

Another point to be considered in relation to the question under examination is the Qur’anic concept of a hanif/millat Ibrahim.[40] Qur’anically, this notion may be called the primordial, monotheistic Urreligion based on the belief in the One, True God as embodied in Abraham’s message (Arabic millat Ibrahim) considered as the universal belief system and as potentially the final evolution in Muhammad’s attitude towards the religious Self and the Other.][41]It is, however, unclear, whether the Prophet of Islam himself identified “historical Islam” “as the only or merely one possible realisation of the primordial religion, the Hanifiyyah, on earth.”[42]

Lastly, an “Islamocentric view” of Muslim perceptions of the religious Other stems from a certain interpretation of the Qur’ano-Sunnatic teachings. This view is based upon the premise that the Qur’an is a source of empirical knowledge of the religious Other that is to be applied universally, ahistorically and without regard to context.[43]

(end of second reproduced section)

It is important to keep in mind that this apologetic approach is not restricted to issues of inter-faithonly but is particularly evident in relation to the question of the role and the status of women in Islam.

Namely, based on this very apologetic approach that champions the rights pre-modern ‘Islam’ (it is worthwhile pointing in this respect that early as well as pre-modern Muslim scholarship, unlike the bulk of contemporary Islamic thought did not frame the issues within the framework of whether s.th. is “Islamic’ or not but to what extent and on what methodology could one argue that s.th. is Qur’anic and the Sunnaic -and later referred it to the opinions of early Muslim authorities such as the eponyms of the various madhahib) ‘gave’ to women 1400 years ago, Muslim women are denied a number of political ( eg. Voting, being elected to highest political office, being a judge ) , legal ( eg. Custody over children, unfair –to the detriment of the female- divorce and marriage laws) as well as the basic freedom such as freedom of movement ( e.g. husband can prevent his wife from even visiting her parents or attending their funeral prayer!). Now there is no doubt that the laws the Qur’an and Sunnah ,and to some extent that of the pre-modern Islamic jurisprudence ushered were ‘progressive’ given the historical era and the historical background within which they operated, these rights ‘islam’ gave to women , were not seen as embedded in and inextricably linked to the moral universe and ‘logic’ of what I refer to as extreme gender role differentiation in a pre-modern androcentric and patriarchal society. This ‘logic’ of extreme gender role differentiation permanently fixes and universalises the socio-culturally, legally and politically contingent conceptions of gender and gender difference clearly evident in pre-modern Islamic jurisprudence and their attendant socio-cultural and legal implications. According to one aspect of this ‘logic’ women have certain ‘character traits’ and ‘emotional predispositions’ which are used to curtail their above mentioned rights.

If we as Muslims ( people of other religious traditions are also not immune to this) wish to engage in inter-faith dialogue in an authentic way rather then in an apologetic manner , we have a moral responsibility to deal with all of the aspects of our inherited tradition ,the good ,the bad and the ugly if we are to enhance and appreciate our understanding of our own tradition as well as that of the other. Only and only in this way are we going to be meaningfully engaged and ready to be transformed through and by the Other for the better.

[1] See for example, K.Armstrong,Islam: A Short History.New York,Modern library,2002.Also Her , Muhammad: A Western Attempt to Understand Islam.London,Victor Gollancz,1991.;or Watt, Muhammad in Madina,op.cit.

[2] Miraly, Ethic of Pluralism,p.47.

[3] Verily, this brotherhood of yours is a single brotherhood, and I am your Lord and Cherisher: therefore serve Me (and no other).(21:92)

[4] Miraly,Ethic of Pluralism,p.59.

[5] Armstrong,Muhammad,pp.183-184.

[6] Miraly, Ethic of Pluralism,p.62.

[7] Armstrong,Muhammad,p.207.

[8] see footnote 15.

[9] Esack,Qur’an,Liberation and pluralism, p.163.

[10] Miraly,The Ethic of Pluralism,p.39.

[11] ‘Alim for Windows , M. Bukhari, Sahih, volume 7, no.786.

[12] Ibid. Abu Dawud, cf. Muslim-Sahih, 5389- Narrated Abu Hurraira -Allah's Messenger (peace be upon him) said: Do not greet the Jews and the Christians before they greet you and when you meet any one of them on the roads force him to go to the narrowest part of it.

[13] There are several more hadith of this genre for example found in Abu Dawood, hadith number 652 and 4185.

[14] Such as religiously inclusivist Qur

[15] Miraly,The Ethic of Pluralism,p.35.

[16] In this part of the analysis we have not included verses (such as 4:76, 9:5;9:73, 47:4 ,48:29) which address the kafirun not ahl-Kitab, however, as we shall see, in several instances ahl-Kitab are also linked to the root of K-F-R and according to the methodology of NTS could be and are bring applied to Ahl-Kitab including those of today.

[17] cf. Bukhari, 4.791, same narrator - heard Allah's Apostle saying, "The Jews will fight with you, and you will be given victory over them so that a stone will say, 'O Muslim! There is a Jew behind me; kill him!' “; cf. Muslim, Sahih, 6985 –Narrated Abu Hurraira -Allah's Apostle (peace be upon him) said: The Last Hour would not come unless the Muslims will fight against the Jews and the Muslims would kill them until the Jews would hide themselves behind a stone or a tree and a stone or a tree would say: Muslim, or the servant of Allah, there is a Jew behind me; come and kill him; but the tree Gharqad would not say, for it is the tree of the Jews.

[18] For an interpretation of these and similar hadith from a PM perspective see A.Noth, ‘Problems of Differentiation between Muslim and Non-Muslims :Re-reading the “Ordinances of Umar” ( Al-Shurut Al’Umariyya), in R. Hoyland (ed.) Muslims and Others in Early Islamic Society, Ashgate Variorum,2004,pp.103-125.

[19] Using our terminology NTS, for definition of puritans, see El- Fadl, The Great Theft- Wrestling Islam from the Extremists, Harper Collins, 2005, pp.16-25.

[20] El-Fadl, The Great Theft, p.206.

[21] N.Albani, ‘Responding to Salaams of the Jews and the Christians’, at www.bakkah.net, accessed on 15^th of October,2007.

[22]For more on this in relation to the concept of “the ethic of pluralism” in the Qur’an see Miraly.

[23]Explained later in this section.

[24]I.e., the mushrikun (“polytheists”), the munafiqun (“hypocrites”), and Ahl-Kitab (“the People of the Book”—primarily, Jews and Christians). For a lucid discussion of this issue, see Donner; also, Maghen. Donner writes (267-268): “Islam’s relationship with the People of the Book has had its ups and downs. The growing familiarity of the inhabitants of the Arabian Penninsula with the ideas, institutions and the communities of the surrounding monotheisms followed by the initial and increasingly intense encounters of the nascent Muslim umma with the same, bred the complex mixture of attitudes to Judaism, Christianity and Zoroastrianism discernable through the classical literature of the faith. The seminal texts and genres—the Qur’an, Hadith, Tafsir, Sharh and fiqh—evince a multifaceted and pendulating posture vis-à-vis the religio-cultural “other” that partakes more of dialectic than dogma.”

[25]Ambivalence and contextuality are also found in non-Qur’anic elements of the tradition as embodied in various Hadith corpora. On Qur’anic ambivalence in relation to the “Other,” see Maghen, 268.

[26]The Christians had a much smaller numerical presence in Medina. Furthermore, they had much less economic influence. Thus, the Qur’an’s “complaints” about Christians pertain primarily to the domain of dogma. For details, see McAuliffe.

[27]A group of people in Medina who only superficially became Muslims in order to procure certain benefits, but, in reality, supported the enemies of Muslims.

[28]Watt, Muhammad at Medina, 217.

[29]Waardenburg, Muslims and Others, 99.; cf. Waardenburg, “World Religions as Seen in the light of Islam,” 245-276.

[30]Zebiri, chapter 1. Also, Donner, “From Believers to Muslims.”

[31]Such as belief in Allah (One, True God), the previous prophets, the Hereafter, the Day of Judgment.

[32]The latter trend being more prominent in the context of Medinan Muslim community.

[33]Zebiri, chapter 1.

[34]Donner, “From Believers to Muslims,” 12; cf.Maghen, 268-269.

[35]Donner, “From Believers to Muslims,” 17-24, 28-34; cf. Miraly.

[36]Such as the importance of Jerusalem and the Muslim practice of turning to it in prayer.

[37]Waardenburg, Muslims and Others, 44. A case in point is that of the change of direction in prayer from Jerusalem to Mecca. Traditions reportedly going back to the Prophet, such as those found in Sahih Bukhari, stress largely the distinctiveness and uniqueness of the Islamic religious identity.

[38]Miraly, 33.

[39]Shboul, 242.

[40]For more details, see Beck.

[41]Waardenburg, Muslims and Others, 87-94.

[42]Ibid., 106-107; also, Qur’anic verses, such as 5:48, seem to present the existence of religious plurality as a manifestation of God’s Will.

[43]In other words, Qur’anic criticisms of certain practices of Jewish and Christian communities living in 7th-century Hijaz apply to all previous and subsequent Jewish and Christian communities in an ahistorical, uncontextualized manner.

ANALYZING OBAMA'S CAIRO SPEECH

2009-06-15T08:01:00.000-07:00

By Dr. Mahathir Mohamad*

1. Finally Obama, the black President of the United States has made his much awaited speech outlining his views and policies on Islam, the Muslims and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is a carefully crafted speech and certainly it is different from those of George W. Bush or even other US Presidents.

2. The arrogance and the preachings are out but two things American still stand out, and that is the United States is a world super power and that American loyalty to Israel is undiminished. Other things can change but not these two.

3. Hamas is asked to give up terrorism because like the struggles of the blacks of America and South Africa, violence achieves nothing. This is not quite true, at least with other national struggles for freedom and justice. The white Americans themselves fought a war against the British and another war to prevent the break-up of the United States.

4. Elsewhere the struggles for freedom and justice e.g. the French Revolution and the Russian Revolution just to name two, all involve violence.

5. It is not the Palestinians who choose violence. It was the Jews who violently seized Palestinian land, massacred the Arabs and expelled them from their country. With no one prepared to restrain the Jews, the beleaguered Palestinians had to resort to violence. The world, the United Nations, even fellow Muslims have deserted them.

6. I am against violence but when Israel seized more Palestinian land, build settlements, impose military rule, divide the Palestinians with high walls, barred the Palestinians from using roads built by the Israelis on Palestinian territory, denied the Palestinian right to a homeland, denied the right of return of the expelled Palestinian while upholding the rights of return of Jews who for centuries had been citizens of other countries, labelled Palestinians as terrorists while exonerating the Israelis for the massive attacks on Gaza and other places, left the Palestinians helpless when attacked by the Western-armed Israeli Military Forces, incarcerated thousands of Palestinians in Israeli jails, unnecessarily provoke the Palestinians by Sharon's visit to Jerusalem and many, many more assaults and provocations, is it any wonder that the Palestinians resorted to violence?

7. And now they are asked to stop violence to respect agreements. But what about the Israelis? Shouldn't they be told to stop their massive violence; shouldn't they be told to respect agreements and all the UN resolutions, such as those against their setting up settements on Palestinian soil, the occupation of land beyond the UN set boundaries for Israel?

8. Obama stresses America's strong bond with Israel. It is unbreakable. He recognises the aspiration for a Jewish homeland "rooted in a tragic history that cannot be denied".

9. But what is the tragic history? It is that of European persecution of the Jews, of the regular pogroms culminating in the Holocaust? It is not the doings of the Muslims. Certainly not the doings of the Palestinians.The tragedy was caused by the Europeans through the ages.

10. Obama must know that before there was the United States, the Jews invariably fled to Muslim countries to seek refuge from European persecution. The Muslims did not turn them back. Before Israel there were millions of Jews in Muslim land. Even today quite a few are still there.

11. The Muslims have never been part of the tragic history of the Jews.. Why then must they pay the price for the tragedy caused by the Europeans? Had the Europeans offered part of Europe or America for a Jewish state, there would not be the sustained violence that we see in West Asia. But the Europeans expropriated Arab Palestinian land to give to the Jews. Can an injustice in West Asia atone for injustice in Europe? The Muslim Arabs have to pay for the asylum they provided the Jews by having their land taken away to give to the Jews.

12. To make matters worse the Palestinian Arabs, Christians and Muslims, were violently expelled from Palestine. Israel is to be a racist state for Jews only.

13. America accepts people of different races and religious affiliations. But it supports the exclusivity of Israel as a Jewish state.

14. The Palestinians had tried conventional ways of getting back their land. But conventional ways had failed. They have been forsaken by Arab and Muslim countries. Everytime they try on their own they lose more land because the Europeans and Americans gave military support to Israel.

15. It is only after the failure of conventional wars of liberation that they resorted to unconventional attacks. Can they be blamed? Even the tiny mouse when driven into a corner will fight literally with tooth and nail.

16. We can label the methods of the cornered Palestinians terrorism. But they are themselves terrified and those who inflict terror on them cannot be less of a terrorist than them. State terrorism is no less terrifying than terrorism by irregulars. Indeed State terrorism is more terrifying as we witnessed in Nazi Germany and in Cambodia.

17. I will admit that Obama has brought change. It is a relief after eight years of Bush. But there is an area that he cannot change and that is the blind support for Israel. He has no choice. He will become a one-term President of the United States if he does not.

18. For all the talk about democracy in America, the American majority have no power to choose their President or their Government. That power lies with Israel. They can deny this. But that is the truth. The Americans have become the proxy of the Jews. The Americans will pay a heavy price for this.

____________________

* Mahathir became the Prime Minister of Malaysia on 16 July 1981 when Tun Hussein Onn stepped down due to health reasons. He was the nation's first Prime Minister that came from a modest social background, whereas the first three prime ministers were members of the royal or elite families. After 22 years in office, Mahathir retired on 31 October 2003, making him one of Asia's longest-serving political leaders. Upon his retirement on 31 October 2003, Mahathir was awarded a "Tun"-ship, Malaysia's highest civilian honour.

Musulmanes en Medellín: un margen de la identidad

2009-06-10T08:30:00.000-07:00

Ari Iaccarino

El titulo del artículo parece muy claro, pero el impacto que tiene el Islam sobre los colombianos es menos obvio. De hecho, mucha gente no sabe de la vida en Colombia aparte de la reputación y relación que tiene con cocaína, secuestros, y Gabriel García Márquez. Este ensayo, por otro lado, incluye las observaciones y comparaciones personales entre colombianos convencionales y algunos aspectos de la cultura Islam o musulmán que ha influido en un país tradicionalmente católico. Lo que viene continuación, es mi viaje personal como un “gringo” que intenta aprender sobre Islam en Colombia; mientras conoce más sobre dicho país a través de la comunidad musulmana.

Abdullah ben Sadiq

En septiembre de 2008, un amigo que es profesor en la Universidad de Iowa, Ahmed Souaiaia, me preguntó si yo sabía de algunas comunidades musulmanas en Colombia, porque yo planeaba estudiar en el país. Busqué en Google para ver, y encontré el Centro Cultural Islámico Medellín, Mezquita de Medellín. No miré el sitio por mucho tiempo, hasta cinco meses después en febrero cuando estuve en la ciudad. Mi novia envió un correo electrónico al director, Julio César Cárdenas Arenas (o Abdullah ben Sadiq, su nombre islámico), a quien conocí en un centro comercial.

Abdullah se veía diferente que la mayoría de los colombianos porque tenía una barba, y él podía distinguirme porque yo estaba llevando shorts (muchos colombianos no tienen una barba sin un bigote, y solamente los gringos llevan shorts en Medellín). Él nació como paisa (una persona que vive en el interior del departamento de Antioquia), y creció en una familia católica. Durante su educación en la Universidad de Antioquia, ganó una beca para viajar a Sevilla – España, porque estaba estudiando lenguajes semíticos, y en el proceso formó una conexión con unos miembros de la comunidad musulmana. Abdullah se graduó con un título en Filosofía, y está estudiando una maestría en Teología en la Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana.

Abdullah y Yo hablamos por dos horas sobre una plétora de temas relacionados a Islam, religión, política, y su propia transición a Islam. Le pregunté por qué optó por el Islam. Él sonrió y dijo: “Lo sientes en tu corazón. Lo sentí, y supe que era cierto, y por eso me convertí en musulmán”. También le pregunté sobre su posición sobre el conflicto israelí – palestino. No me dijo explícitamente su opinión, pero mencionó “Si tú ves que algo malo pasa, eres responsable para ponerle fin a esto con tus manos. Si no puedes hacerlo con tus manos, usa tu lengua y habla. Si no puedes hacer eso, usa todo de tu corazón y reza. Me preocupo sobre mis hermanos y hermanas en Palestina, pero tenemos nuestros problemas en Colombia también. Por eso, rezo para que todo esté bien en Palestina, pero participo para mejorar a Colombia”. Cuando nos tuvimos que ir, Abdullah me invitó a las clases de árabe y estudia el Islam cada sábado en la mezquita. Le dije que probablemente no iría a las clases de árabe, pero sin duda asistiría a la otra clase.

Clase

El 14 de marzo fui a la mezquita por primera vez a la clase de Islam. Está ubicada en un edificio rojo en el segundo piso, en un barrio tranquilo se llama Belén. Había siete colombianos, la mayoría eran mujeres y Abdullah. Quitamos nuestros zapatos, las mujeres cubrieron sus cabezas, y nos sentamos en el suelo. Abdullah nos enseñó con un portátil y nos mostró los lugares geográficos donde Islam es más prominente, y la historia del profeta Muhammad. Gran parte de la discusión estuvo llena de preguntas de colombianos entusiastas, a veces demasiado.

Una pregunta desencadenó una discusión sobre la violencia en Islam, pero específicamente se trataba sobre los rebeldes islámicos en el medio oriente. Abdullah dio un ejemplo de cómo la prensa occidental y otras fuentes conceptualizaban Islam y lo relacionaban con la creación de asociaciones constantes de grupos armados. “Estamos enseñados a que hay un separación entre “la iglesia y el estado”, pero Álvaro Uribe [el presidente de Colombia] ha invocado el nombre de Jesús y la virgen María durante sus discursos, pero nadie dice que su régimen “católico” es responsable de cuatro-millones de personas desplazadas por la guerra” (lo más en el mundo).[1] “Nadie dice que las FARC [las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, el grupo armado izquierdista en el país], son rebeldes católicos extremistas, aunque la mayoría son campesinos católicos desfavorecidos. Nadie menciona que las AUC [Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, el grupo paramilitar más prominente en Colombia], están compuestas por católicos ultra-conservadores, quienes matan a los homosexuales y prostitutas en el nombre de los buenos valores católicos. ¿Y por qué los grupos luchan? Los derechos territoriales (o toma del poder), y la influencia política. Nadie dice que estas grupos son católicas extremistas. Así, aunque no es lo mismo, se puede decir que el Catolicismo es una religión violenta representada por los grupos armados que en su gran mayoría, son católicos. Resulta muy fácil relacionar a una religión, o Islam en el medio oriente, con los grupos armados”. Abdullah terminó la clase, y todos continuaban digiriendo el nuevo concepto de manipulación religiosa occidental.

Fui a la mezquita el sábado siguiente a una clase más grande. También había un grupo de hombres pakistaní que estaban rezando y cocinando, la gran mayoría no hablaban español. Ellos estaban dedicando un año de sus vidas para viajar en Sur America con el fin de enseñar Islam, y usaron su propio dinero para este proceso. Me presenté, y conocí a un hombre llamado Azhar. Originalmente de Pakistán, se mudó a los EEUU y vivía en Boston. Ahora, Azhar vive en Medellín con su esposa colombiana y su hija, y es el dueño de una franquicia Shell Oil.

Poco después, empezamos la clase que básicamente incluyó una explicación del significado y valor del Islam hecho por un hombre de Pakistán. El proceso auditivo involucraba tres lenguas: urdu, a inglés a español. El hombre pakistaní no hablaba inglés ni español, así que Azhar tuvo que traducir a inglés, sin embargo éste no hablaba español muy bien, y por eso Abdullah tuvo que traducir de inglés a español para la clase. Las palabras más impresionantes que oí fue “La mejor cosa que Allah creó en el humano fue el intelecto.” Yo estudié en una escuela católica por diez años, y nunca oí alguien poner énfasis en la pensamiento humano en una religión. Pero la cosa que le sorprendió a muchos de los estudiantes fue el momento apasionado que experimentaba Azhar. Él empezó a explicar la importancia de la cooperación interreligiosa y respeto, “Porque somos seres humanos antes que ser musulmanes.” Su voz empezó temblar, y continuó con que el Islam nos dirige a una buena vida y una existencia espiritual satisfactoria. Las lágrimas cayeron, y Azhar dijo: “Cuando encuentras ese vínculo espiritual contigo mismo y el creador, es increíblemente bonito. Es tan bonito que nunca podría expresarlo completamente a través de palabras. Después mi novia me dijo – que casi llora también -: “Nunca he visto tanta pasión como esa en el catolicismo”.

Jumu’ah

Abdullah nos invitó a jumu’ah al viernes siguiente, con una discusión para suplicar el oficio. Decidí que era una buena experiencia de aprendizaje, así que salí de mi trabajo más temprano para asistir. Cuando llegué, miré a una mujer que estaba trapeando atrás de la mezquita. Nos saludamos, y le pregunté si Abdullah había llegado. Me dijo que vendría pronto, y me preguntó de donde era yo. Le dije que nací en los EEUU, y ella dijo que es colombiana. Empezamos discutir nuestro mutuo interés en el Islam, y le pregunté cómo empezó a ser musulmana. Su hijo ha sido un musulmán por dos años, y le introdujo a la religión. “¿Por qué escogiste ser musulmana y no católica?” le pregunté. “¡Porque todos son iguales!” dijo con una sonrisa grande.

Estuve sorprendido, porque el esteriotipo básico es que las mujeres en Islam son perjudicadas y desiguales. De hecho, cuando le mencioné a un amigo colombiano que fui a la mezquita, me dijo “Esa religión es mierda. No me gusta como se trata a las mujeres”. Pero había conversas femeninas, ¿así qué es atractivo en Islam para las colombianas? En Colombia y en la mayoría de América Latina, es aceptable extraoficialmente si un hombre tiene las relaciones extramaritales o muchas novias. En conversaciones con los hombres de Colombia, me preguntan si yo rumbeo (festejo), y si he “conocido” las mujeres (mientras hacen un gesto con un puño en un mano abierto). Les digo que tengo una novia, y me dicen que eso no importa: “Cualquier Mujer que quieras”. Por el contrario, en la mezquita me preguntan cuando voy a casarme con mi novia, y nunca me animan para “conocer” a otras mujeres.

¿Que más en la cultura musulmana puede ser atractivo para las colombianas? Mucha gente dice que no es justo que las mujeres tengan que llevar más ropa que los hombres. Pero en Medellín hay una expectativa de que las mujeres llevan menos ropa que los hombres, o el material que realza su figura femenina. No solamente hay una presión obvia para mostrar su cuerpo, pero Medellín es unas de las capitales de cirugía plástica en todo de Latinoamérica. Si se camina en las calles del Poblado de la ciudad, hay una cartelera masiva con una mujer muy blanca, casi sin ropa que anuncia cirugía plástica y láser: “Cuando los hombres ven a una paisa, se enloquecen. Cuando la conocen, pierden sus corazones”. En este sentido, una alternativa musulmana provee una libertad de una cultura machista que anima deshumanización sexual y modificación antinatural de la forma femenina.

Cuando esperé por Abdullah, me senté en el suelo y leí un libro que explicaba la última décima del Corán, y más reglas en el Islam. Un hombre pakistaní se acercó a mí, y me preguntó qué estaba leyendo. Le mostré el libro, y él quería saber si yo era musulmán. Le dije que era estudiante en un sentido. “Pues, si eres estudiante, necesitas aprender el shahada!” Y no tenía ninguna idea lo que significaba, pero empezó enseñarme las palabras en árabe. Después de 15 minutos de practica recitación, le pregunté por su nombres. “¡Mehboob! ¿Y tuyo?” Le dije “Ari”. Él agachó la cabeza y dijo “No, no, no. Ahora, tu nombre es Ali, ¡como el grande compañero del profeta! Continuamos con tu clase después”. Antes tuve la oportunidad para decir algo, el sermón empezó. Había casi 30 personas en la mezquita. La gran mayoría eran colombianos, pero había pakistaníes, sirios y turcos también. Abdullah mantuvo el sermón en español, mientras aquellos otros que no hablaban la lengua se sentaron pacientemente de brazos cruzados. Después del sermón, un afro-colombiano robusto cantó la llamada a la oración. Nos organizamos parados en cuatro hileras, las cuales eran supervisadas y perfeccionadas por hombres que nos vigilaban antes de empezar la oración. Antes de eso, nunca había asistido a jumu’ah, y yo no sabía lo que se tenía que decir o cuando se inclinaba hacia abajo, pero seguí a los otros. Un hombre pakistaní guió la oración, y podía oír una cantidad sostenido de árabe por primera vez en vivo. La oración fue maravillosamente sagrada, a nivel colectivo pero en una forma personal. La oportunidad para estar parado, junto con hombres de otras nacionalidades y lenguas diferentes, creó una experiencia compartida, mientras que al mismo tiempo cada persona continuaba formando su propia conexión con Allah. Esto me hizo recordar a hajj en la autobiografía de Malcom X. Después de la oración, pusimos una estera grande y de color verde para cubrir el suelo cuando estábamos comiendo. Fue una buena oportunidad para conocer otros miembros de la comunidad. Conocí a un chico sirio – colombiano que tenía 19 años, también conocí a un vendedor de frutas y verduras, un distribuidor de ropas, otros comerciantes y estudiantes universitarios. También fue una oportunidad para tener unas vacaciones de la comida insípida de Colombia y me dí el gusto de probar la cocina pakistaní. Uno de los hombres pakistaníes notó mi entusiasmo cuando yo estaba comiendo, y me preguntó si me había gustado la comida. Le dije que me encantó, y dijo “No te culpo. No me gusta la comida colombiana. Es lo que damos a la gente enferma en mi país”.

Cuando todos terminaron, limpiamos y salimos a tomar un café. Me di cuenta que el mundo convencional en Colombia puede ser muy diferente en comparación a la mezquita, cuando salimos de ella. Adentro de la mezquita es muy tranquilo, y tiene una atmosfera sobria donde las palabras se dicen con respeto. En el exterior, sin embargo, se pueden ver colombianos que toman licor a las dos en la tarde y los vecinos compiten en todo momento por quién puede poner salsa, vallenato, merengue o reggaetón más fuerte que los otros en sus equipos de sonido. Otra característica distintiva de la mezquita es el contacto entre un hombre y otro, y adicionalmente el de una mujer a un hombre. La cultura colombiana es muy machista, en que los hombres tienen que actuar muy varoniles, y los hombres varoniles no abrazan a otros hombres; solamente se dan la mano. Pero es diferente en la mezquita. Cuando se entra, los hombres se abrazan y se sonríen. Después de mi primera y larga conversación con Mehboob, yo recibí de él un caluroso beso en el cuello cuando salí de la mezquita. Entre los amigos y conocidos, los colombianos y colombianas se besan en la mejilla para saludar y partir. Pero en la mezquita, los hombres y mujeres no se tocan, incluso si son esposos. Aún, las expresiones sentimentales en la calle entre las parejas colombianas confundieron a los pakistaníes. Un hombre pakistaní vio a una pareja que se cogieron de las manos y se besaron en la calle, y él le preguntó a un musulmán colombiano que si había una ocasión especial.

Obama!

Yo fui a la mezquita tres veces seguidas. Un día para asistir a jumu’ah, el sábado para ir a clases, y el domingo porque Mehboob me dijo fuera nuevamente a la mezquita. Durante el día repetimos el shahada, me enseño masah (estuve totalmente mojado porque me corrigió muchas veces), y después las posiciones corporales para salat. También era un traductor entre los colombianos y pakistaníes, que solamente podían decir “¡Hermano! ¡¿Cómo estás!?” Cuando terminamos nuestro te, Omar, un musulmán colombiano, les preguntó a los pakistaníes si querían ir a la casa de su cuñado por cinco minutos. Ellos dijeron que sí, pero solamente si podían llegar a tiempo para la oración.

El contraste entre los hombres que estuvieron vestidos con la ropa musulmana y la comunidad colombiana fue muy obvio. Cuando estábamos manejando a la casa del cuñado de Omar, oímos un grito: “¡Obama!” Omar se rió y dijo “Sí, a veces la gente está confundida entre Osama y Obama, ¡Ellos piensan que son de la misma familia!”. Para salir de la casa en el carro y a la vista pública, es una experiencia mucho más intensa en Colombia que en los EEUU. Los colombianos se orientan a una cultura colectiva para pasar la mayoría del tiempo afuera de la casa con los vecinos, amigos y familia, y por eso toda la gente nos miraba.

Avanzamos por un callejón, y unos niños continuaban aturdidos. Cuando llegamos a la casa del cuñado de Omar, un desfile pequeño de nueve chicos y mujeres nos miraron a través de la puerta; mientras traduje por Mehboob, él le preguntó al grupo si ellos querían ser musulmanes, una mujer contestó: “¡Yo no sé que es un musulmán!” No estuve sorprendido.

Una vez intenté mostrar en mi clase que para aprender inglés es más fácil que otras lenguas, y escribí “Corán” en árabe. Les dije a los estudiantes que significaba, y si ellos sabían de Islam o musulmanes: “Sí, son como judíos, ¿cierto?” contestó un estudiante inteligente de la clase. Solamente el 0.2% de la población está listada como musulmanes (en el 2004), y por eso no es una sorpresa si unos colombianos nunca han oído de Islam.[2]

Después de unos minutos de conversación con el cuñado de Omar, Mehboob estaba insistiendo para que saliéramos cuanto antes para rezar a tiempo; aunque Omar es musulmán, no se puede quitar la cualidad colombiana de llegar tarde constantemente. “No te preocupes, ¡llegaremos!” Cuando salimos, Omar nos preguntó que si no nos importaba ir a un lugar cerca de su suegro para decirle que viniera con nosotros. Mehboob se veía frustrado, pero dijo sí. Cuando llegamos por fin, estuvimos acompañados por el suegro, cuñado y tío de Omar. Su suegro se rió mucho y dijo que le encantaba ir a la mezquita, aunque admitió que solamente va esporádicamente. El tío de Omar fue lo más interesante; originalmente era del campo, y solamente ha vivido en Medellín solo por dos meses. Él estuvo vestido como alguien del campo, con los jeans largos y de color claro y con un bigote clásico.

Fue difícil para entablar una discusión en el grupo después la oración. Un hombre afro-colombiano habló en español, mientras que los pakistaníes, que hablaban inglés, intentaron seguirlo. El orador tenía una voz carismática y fuerte, tanto que las personas que no hablaban español movieron sus cabezas y prestaron atención. El hombre habló sobe la fuerza del Islam y que es nuestro deber construir los estereotipos de los musulmanes mientras se provee la verdad; después mencionó las percepciones occidentales sobre las mujeres en Islam: “La gente dice ‘¡Las pobrecitas! ¡Ellas tienen que cubrirlas! ¡Son oprimidas!’ Hermanos, no hay un ley en Colombia que dice que ellas tiene que cubrirlas, nuestras hermanas escogen estar cubiertas con libertad porque tienen miedo de Allah en sus corazones. ¡Ellas tienen respeto! Ellas escogen para llevar la hijab…” Después hizo una comparación entre las musulmanas colombianas y las colombianas convencionales: “Nuestras mujeres son como los carros privados: son especiales y reservadas para una persona. ¡Sus mujeres son como taxis!” Sin querer yo dije “Owwwwww” como si viera a una persona recibir un puño en la cara. Omar me vio, afirmó con la cabeza y dijo “¡Es verdad!” .

Cuando terminamos el día siguiente Mehboob y los otros pakistaníes preguntaron: “¿Quien iré a Pakistán en cuatro meses? El suegro de Omar estuvo emocionado y dijo que le gustaría ir, con su tío del campo; también me preguntaron: “Alí, ¿irás también, sí?” Les dije “Por qué no”, pero sabía que yo no iría. Aunque fue interesante para ver dos mundos, lenguas y culturas completamente diferentes confluyeron lentamente en una religión: Islam.

Johnny trae tu Corán

Cada vez vengo a la mezquita, siempre veo a Johnny Ochoa, o “Alí”, (su nombre musulmán). Alí es un colombiano alto y robusto que tiene 34 años, y comercializa ropa. Siempre me da una sonrisa grande, un fuerte apretón de manos y un abrazo grande. No fue hasta un mes después que le pregunté a Alí como se hizo un musulmán. Su viaje para convertirse es similar a muchos colombianos: la curiosidad mezclada con insatisfacción con la religión previa (usualmente catolicismo):

Fue en el departamento de Guajira, cerca de 1997. Tuve un descanso del trabajo en el segundo piso, y oí el adan, o la llamada al oración. Estuve interesado, y unos días después yo visité y conocí a un hombre llamado Tarek, un miembro de la comunidad indígena Wayúu. Me enseño mucho sobre Islam, y empecé identificarme con la religión…Se cree en una religión desde la niñez. Los padres toman a los niños de la mano camino a la iglesia, porque sus padres hicieron lo mismo con ellos. Básicamente es una tradición familiar. Empecé reflexionar sobre eso, y me pregunté sobre mis propios pensamientos de la fe, en cuanto al corto viaje que tenemos aquí en el mundo. Por eso, decidí seguir algo que me identifico, algo más personal para mí. Realmente, creo que nunca me identifique como un católico, tal vez es algo que está en mis genes. Allah sabe mejor que yo. De todas maneras, he sido un musulmán hace 11 años.

El aprendizaje de Alí es interesante, en que su primer mentor era un miembro de la cultura Wayúu (un grupo de gente indígena que vive en el noreste de Colombia y el noroccidental de Venezuela). Su experiencia es otro testimonio de la diversidad musulmana en Colombia.

Después le pregunté a Alí como el convertirse al Islam afectó la manera en que interactúa adentro de la cultura colombiana, pero específicamente su vida sentimental.

Cuando se vive en el occidente, no se puede cambiar lo que se es. Se puede disfrutar la palabra “amor” en todas sus maneras en Colombia; no hay una limitación. Pero, si yo quiero tener una relación seria con alguien, necesito ser honesto con ella y decirle lo que soy. Necesitaría seguir las reglas islámicas en mi matrimonio. Pero si yo estuviera viviendo en un país musulmán, mi vida amorosa sería dirigida por las normas allí. Esencialmente, todo es adaptación cultural. Yo nací aquí, mis padres y mis abuelos son de Colombia, y me han dado sus idiosincrasias y cultura. Soy un musulmán, pero soy colombiano también, y en Islam está prohibido discriminar las otras culturas. Necesito aprender, respetar, tolerar, y actuar como un creyente dentro de mi propia cultura.

La aprobación de Alí de su sucesión cultural y alrededores inevitable influye su vida como un musulmán, pero se siente que puede sostener su obligación espiritual sin las negaciones de su nacionalidad y las costumbres que están incluidos. Aunque él se “adapta culturalmente”, el mencionó que si se casa, aplicaría las reglas islámicas a uno de los partes más importantes de su vida. El viaje de Alí es un complemento de dos fuerzas personales fuertes en su vida, al principio con su identidad original, después su conversión musulmána y eventualmente su aprendizaje en como se puede vivir como un musulmán colombiano.

Elección

Un día después jumu’ah, le pregunté a Abdullah sobre los pakistaníes que salieron para continuar con sus viajes en todo de Suramérica. Bromeamos que algunos hicieron eructos absurdos, o carraspearon sus gargantas como un cañón. “Tengo que admitir, me parece increíble que estén dedicando demasiado tiempo afuera de sus familias por su religión”, le dije después a Abdullah; él me contestó: “Creo que ellos están en el lugar correcto para hacerlo”. Le pregunté por qué, y dijo “Hay tres cosas aquí que inclinaría la gente para aceptar el Islam: Primero, mucha gente aquí está desilusionada con la Iglesia Católica y el Papa; ¿Cómo se puede vivir en Italia, en un palacio, e intenta establecer la espiritualidad, cuando hay personas que están muriendo de hambre y violencia en Colombia? Segundo, mucha gente no cree en la Santísima Trinidad porque no lo entiende, y más no saben su invención política. Tercero, hay gente que no creen que Jesús era el dijo de Dios como el sacerdote le dijo. Unos de los pakistaníes estaban hablando de mí a su compañero, y le dijo ‘Soy musulmán porque nací en la religión, pero Abdullah es un musulmán por elección’. La gente aquí está decidiendo ser musulmanes sin fuerza ni incentivo monetario. Por eso, yo creo que Colombia está lista por Islam”.

Personalmente yo no sé si estoy listo para el Islam, pero estoy feliz que he hecho la elección para aprender la religión y conocer la comunidad musulmana en Medellín. Hay un dicho aquí: “Todo es plata”. Porque todo es dinero, y mucha gente no lo tiene, se hace cualquier cosa para obtenerlo. El robo, mendigos, ‘contribución religioso’, o para vender Tang de naranja como jugo de naranja real no es tan inusual aquí. En unas ocasiones me ha dicho para no confiar en nadie porque mucha gente ha tenido buenos amigos o familia que han robaron cosas de los mismos. Pero cuando asisto la mezquita nada es sobre el dinero. Es el tiempo que está dedicado a estudiar la espiritualidad y conectarse con otros compañeros. Nadie le pide dinero a otros miembros, nadie cobra para enseñar sobre la religión, nadie vende los libros religiosos (los dan gratis). Esencialmente, nadie discute dinero en las cosas que están usados para saber la religión y formar una conexión más fuerte con su Dios.

Aparte del placer de un santuario existencial que está libre de materialismo terminal, la oportunidad para oír unas historias diversas que demuestran los contrastes y similitudes entre culturas y la gente me ayuda a entender un país que es famoso solamente para sus drogas, violencia y realismo mágico. La religión hace comunidades, pero las comunidades inevitable ajustan sus vidas espirituales y religiosas a lo que ha sido en su propio país. Si es el reconocimiento de Abdullah que los musulmanes colombianos necesitan preocuparse sobre la violencia represiva en su propio país, o la coexistencia de Alí con su identidad colombiana y musulmana, estas personas y sus ideas son una pequeña representación de su población.

Por más información sobre la Mezquita de Medellín, por favor visite:

http://mezquitademedellin.googlepages.com/

[1] Washington Peace Center, “Rally for Colombia’s Displaced”, http://www.washingtonpeacecenter.org/node/1486 (24 April, 2009).

[2] NationMaster.com, “Colombian Religion Stats,” http://www.nationmaster.com/country/co-colombia/rel-religion (14 April, 2009).

Muslims in Medellín: Identity on the Margin

2009-06-10T08:25:00.000-07:00

by Ari Iaccarino*

The title of the article might be self explanatory, but the impact Islam has on Colombians is less obvious. In fact, many people are unaware of life in Colombia besides the notorious reputation of cocaine, kidnapping, and Gabriel García Márquez. This essay, on the other hand, includes personal observations and comparisons between conventional Colombians and anything Islam or Muslim that has influenced the traditional Catholic country. The following is my personal journey as a “gringo” trying to learn about Islam in Colombia, while also getting to know more about Colombia through the Muslim community.

Abdullah ben Sadiq

In September of 2008 a friend of mine who knew of my travels to South America asked me if I knew of any Muslim communities in Colombia. Through a quick find on Google, I found the Centro Cultural Islámico Medellín, Mezquita de Medellin (Medellín Islamic Cultural Center, Mosque of Medellin). After establishing contact with the director, Julio César Cárdenas Arenas (or Abdullah ben Sadiq, his Islamic name), we met in a local mall.

Abdullah stood out from most Colombians because of his beard, and I was easy to spot because I was wearing shorts (not too many Colombian men have a beard without a mustache, and only gringos wear shorts in Medellín). He was born as a ´paisa´ (native people in the interior of the department of Antioquia), and raised in a Catholic family. During college at the University of Antioquia, he won a scholarship to go to Sevilla, Spain because he was studying Semitic languages, and in the process made a connection with members of the Muslim community. Abdullah graduated with a degree in philosophy, and is pursuing his masters in theology at the Pontificia Bolivariana University.

Abdullah and I talked for two hours about a plethora of subjects related to Islam, religion, politics, and his own transition to Islam. I asked Abdullah why he switched to Islam. He smiled and said “You just feel it in your heart. I felt it, I knew it was right, and that’s why I became a Muslim.” I also asked him about his position about the Israeli – Palestinian conflict. He didn’t explicitly tell me his point, but said “If you see something bad happen, you are responsible for stopping it with your hand. If you can’t do it with your hand, use your tongue and speak out. If you can’t do that, use all of your heart and pray. I worry about my Muslim brothers and sisters in Palestine, but we have problems in Colombia too. For this reason, I pray that everything will be okay in Palestine, but actively involve myself in bettering Colombia.” When it was time to go, Abdullah invited me to Arabic and Islamic studies classes every Saturday at the mosque. I told him I probably wouldn’t make it for Arabic, but I would definitely come for the later.

Class

On March 14th I went to the mosque for the first time, which is located in a red two-story building on the second floor, in a relatively quiet neighborhood in Belen. There were seven Colombians, mostly women, and Abdullah Cesar. We took off our shoes, women covered their heads, and we sat on the floor. Abdullah taught us by using a laptop and demonstrated geographical locations where Islam was most prominent, plus the history of the Prophet Muhammad. Much of the discussion was pelted by questions from eager Colombians, sometimes to the point of being too much.

One question inspired a discussion about violence in Islam, but specifically ‘Islamic’ rebels in the Middle East. Abdullah gave an example of how Western media and other sources have demonized Islam by constantly associating its entirety with armed groups. ¨We are taught that there is a separation between ¨church and state,¨ yet Álvaro Uribe [the Colombian President], has invoked the name of Jesus and the Virgin Mary during speeches, but nobody says that his ¨Catholic¨ regime is responsible for four-million people displaced by war¨ (the most in the world.) Nobody else says that the FARC, [las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, the country’s oldest armed leftist group], are extremist Catholic rebels, even though most are disadvantaged Catholic peasants. Nobody mentions that the AUC [Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, the most prominent paramilitary group in Colombia], is made up of ultra conservative Catholics who kill homosexuals and prostitutes in the name of good Catholic values. And what do these groups fight for? Land rights (or land take-over), and political influence. Nobody says that these armed groups are extremist Catholics. So you see, even though it’s not the exact same, you could say Catholicism is a violent religion as represented by the armed groups who are mostly Catholics. It is very easy to manipulate religion, or Islam in the Middle East, with armed groups.¨ Abdullah ended class on that note, while everybody continued to digest the whole new concept of Western religious manipulation.

I came to the mosque the following Saturday to a slightly larger class. There were also a group of Pakistani men praying and cooking who hardly spoke any Spanish. They were devoting a year of their life to traveling around South America to teach Islam, and used their own money in the process. I introduced myself, and met a man named Azhar. Originally from Pakistan, he moved to the U.S. and lived in Boston. Now Azhar lives in Medellín with his Colombian wife and daughter and owns a Shell Oil franchise in the U.S.

Shortly after, we started class which mainly included listening to a Pakistani man’s explanation of Islam. The listening process involved three languages: Urdu, to English, to Spanish. The Pakistani man did not speak English or Spanish, so Azhar had to translate into English, while he did not speak Spanish very well, so Abdullah had to translate from English to Spanish for the class. The most impressive quote I heard though was “The best thing Allah created in the human being was the intellect.” I went to Catholic school for ten years, and never did I ever hear anybody stress the importance of human thinking in religion. But the thing that surprised many of the students was a very impassioned moment by Azhar. He began to explain the importance of interreligious cooperation and respect, “Because we are human beings before Muslims.” His voice started to shake, and then continued by saying that Islam best directs him towards living a good life and a spiritually fulfilling existence. Tears began to show, and he said “When you find that spiritual bond with yourself and the creator, it is so unbelievably beautiful. It is so beautiful that I could never fully express it to you through words.” Afterwards my girlfriend told me she almost cried too. “I have never seen passion like that in Catholicism.”

Jumu’ah

Abdullah invited us to jumu’ah the following Friday, with a discussion to supplicate the service. I decided it would be a great learning experience, so I left work early to go. When I arrived, I saw a woman mopping in the back of the mosque. We greeted each other, and I asked if Abdullah had arrived yet. She told me that he would be there soon, and asked me where I was from. I told her I was from the U.S., and she said she was Colombian. We began to discuss our mutual interest in Islam, and I asked her how she became a Muslim. Her son had been a Muslim for two years, and introduced her to the religion. “Why do you choose to be a Muslim and not a Catholic?” I questioned. “Because everybody is equal!” she said with a big smile.

I was surprised, since the basic stereotype is that women in Islam are severely disadvantaged and unequal. In fact, when I mentioned to a Colombian male friend of mine that I had been visiting the mosque, he said to me “That religion is shit. I don’t like how they treat women.” Yet there were female converts, so what about Islam is more appealing for Colombian women? In Colombia and much of Latin America, it is unofficially accepted if a man has extramarital relations or multiple girlfriends. In conversations with Colombian men, they ask me if I party, and if I’ve been “knowing” the women (while they make a fist and pounding motion to the other open hand). I tell them I have a girlfriend, and they tell me it doesn’t matter: “Cualquier mujer que quieres,” [Whatever woman you want]. On the contrary, at the mosque they ask me when I am going to marry my girlfriend, and never encourage me to “know” other women.

What else in Muslim culture might be appealing for Colombian women? Many people say that it is unfair that women have to wear extra clothing versus the men. Yet in Medellín there is an expectation that women wear less clothing than men, or material that accentuates their figure. Not only is there a pressure to blatantly show a feminine figure, but Medellín is also one of the plastic surgery capitals of Latin America. If you journey into the Poblado section of the city, there is a massive sign with a very white, barely clad woman that advertises laser and plastic surgery: “When men see a Paisa woman, they lose their mind. When they get to know her, they lose their heart.” In this sense, the Muslim alternative provides freedom from a machista culture that encourages sexual objectification and unnatural modification of the female form.

While I waited for Abdullah, I sat down on the floor and read a book that explained the last tenth of the Koran, plus other rules in Islam. A Pakistani man approached me and asked what I was reading. I showed him the book, and he wanted to know if I was Muslim. I told him I was a student of sorts. “Well, if you’re a student, you need to learn the shahada!” I had no idea what it meant, but he started teaching me words in Arabic. After 15 minutes of recitation practice, I asked the Pakistani for his name. “Mehboob! What’s your name?” I told him “Ari.” He shook his head and said “No, no, no. Now your name is Ali, like the great companion of the prophet! We’ll continue with your lesson afterwards.” Before I had any time to say anything else, the sermon started. There were close to 30 people in the mosque. Most were Colombian, but there were Pakistanis, Syrians, and Turks as well. Abdullah conducted the sermon in Spanish, while those who could not speak the language sat patiently and twitted their thumbs. After the sermon, a sturdy Afro-Colombian man sang the call to prayer. We stood in four lines, perfected by men who checked before prayer started. I had never been to jumu´ah before, and did not know what to say or when to bend down, but I followed along. A Pakistani man led prayer, and I was able to hear a sustained amount of Arabic for the first time in person. The whole service seemed beautifully sacred, collective, yet personal. Standing side by side with men from different nationalities and languages created the shared experience, while each person continued to form their own connection with Allah. It reminded me of Malcolm X’s account of hajj in his autobiography.

After prayer, we set up a large green mat to eat. It was a great opportunity to know other members of the community. I met a 19 year old half Syrian – half Colombian, a fruit and vegetable vendor, clothes distributor, merchants, and university students. It was also an opportunity to take a break from bland Colombian food and indulge in Pakistani cuisine. One of the Pakistani men noticed my enthusiasm when I ate, and asked me if I liked the food. I told him I loved it, and he said “I don’t blame you. I don’t like Colombian food. It’s what we give to sick people back home.”

When everybody finished, we cleaned up and headed out to get coffee. It wasn’t until I left that I realized how different the outside conventional Colombian world can be compared to the mosque. Inside the mosque, it is a quiet, sober atmosphere where words are spoken with respect. In the exterior though, you can see Colombians drinking at two in the afternoon and neighbors having implicit competitions of who can play salsa, meringue or Reggaeton louder than the other. Another defining characteristic of the mosque is the aspect of touch between men and men, plus women and men. Colombian culture is very machista, in that men have to act very manly, and manly men don’t hug; they shake hands. It’s different in the mosque though. When I enter, men exchange hugs and big smiles. After my first long conversation with Mehboob, I actually received a hearty kiss on the neck when I left. Between friends and acquaintances, Colombian men and women kiss on the cheek to greet and depart. At the mosque though, men and women do not touch, even if they are a couple. Even the regular interactions on the street between Colombian couples confused some of the Pakistani men. One Pakistani man saw a couple holding hands and kissing on the street, and he asked a Colombian Muslim what the special occasion was.

Obama!

I ended up coming to the mosque three days in a row. One day for jumu’ah, Saturday for class, and Sunday just because Mehboob told me to come. We spent the day going over the shahada, he taught me masah (I was soaked because of how many times he corrected me), and then the corporal positions for salat. I also acted as a translator between the Colombians and Pakistanis, who could only really say “¡Hermano! Cómo estás!?” [Brother! How are you!?]. After wed finished tea, Omar, a Colombian Muslim, asked the Pakistani men if they wanted to go to his brother-in-law’s house for five minutes. Mehboob said sure, as long as they were back in time for evening prayer.

The contrast between the three men dressed in Muslim attire and the Colombian community was quite apparent. While we were driving to Omar’s friend’s house, we heard a person shout “Obama!” Omar started to laugh and said “Yeah, people get confused between Osama and Obama; they think they’re from the same family!” When we got out of the car, eyes were immediately on the three men. Stepping out of a house or car and into the public view is a more of an intense experience in Colombia than in the U.S. Colombians orient towards a collective culture by spending a lot of their time outside of the house with neighbors, friends, and family, so the whole community stared at us.

We proceeded to walk through an alley, and little children continued the dazing process. We arrived at Omar’s brother-in-law’s house, and a small parade of nine youngsters and women looked at us through the door. While I translated for Mehboob, he asked the group if they wanted to be Muslims. One woman replied “I don’t even know what a Muslim is!” I wasn’t surprised. One time I had tried showing my class that learning English was easier than other languages, and I wrote “Koran” in Arabic. I told the students what it meant, and if they knew about Islam or Muslims. “Yeah, aren’t they like Jews?” replied the brighter student of the class. With only .2% of the population listed as Muslims (as of 2004), it’s not surprising if Colombians have never heard of Islam.

After a few minutes of talking at Omar’s brother-in-law’s house, Mehboob was insisting that we leave as soon as possible so we could pray on time. Although Omar is a Muslim, you can never take away the Colombian quality of being perpetually late. “Yeah don’t worry, we’ll get there!” As we drove away, Omar asked us if it was okay if we stopped by somewhere close to tell his dad to come with us to the mosque. Mehboob was visibly frustrated, but said sure. When we finally arrived, we were joined by Omar’s father-in-law, brother-in-law, and uncle-in-law. Omar’s father-in-law smiled a lot and said he loved coming to the mosque, although he admittedly that he only came sporadically. Omar’s uncle-in-law though was the most interesting. He was originally from the rural countryside of Colombia, and had only been in Medellin for two months. He was dressed like somebody from the country, with long light jeans and a trademark mustache.

It was hard conducting the group talk after prayer. An Afro-Colombian man led the discussion in Spanish, while the English speaking Pakistanis tried to follow along. The speaker had a powerful and charismatic voice, enough to make the non-Spanish speakers move their heads and pay attention. The man spoke about the strength of Islam and that it is our duty to deconstruct stereotypes of Muslims while providing truth. He then mentioned Westerners’ perceptions of women in Islam: “People say ‘Oh those poor women! They have to cover themselves! They must be oppressed!’ Brothers, there is no law in Colombia that says they have to cover themselves. Our sisters freely choose to cover themselves because they have the fear of Allah in their hearts. They have respect! They choose to wear the hidjab…” He then went on to make a comparison between Colombian Muslim women and conventional Colombian women. “Our women are like private cars: they are special and reserved for one person. Their women are like taxis!” I unintentionally let out an “Owwwww” like I had just seen somebody get punched in the face. Omar looked at me with his head nodding and said ¨It’s true!¨

We finished the day with Mehboob and other Pakistanis asking ¨Who’s coming to Pakistan in four months?¨ Omar’s father-in-law was excited and said he would like to go, along with his uncle-in-law from the country side. They also asked me. ¨Alí, you’re going, right?¨ I told them ¨Sure, why not,¨ knowing that I wouldn’t go. It was interesting though seeing two completely different worlds, languages, and cultures slowly merging into one religion: Islam.

Johnny Get Your Koran

Every time I go to the mosque, I always see Johnny Ochoa, or “Alí,” (his Muslim name). Alí is a tall, sturdy 34 year old Colombian guy who buys and sells clothes. He always gives me a big smile, firm hand-shake, and a massive hug. It wasn’t until a month later that I finally asked Alí how he became a Muslim. His journey as a convert is similar to many Colombians: curiosity mixed with dissatisfaction in the previous religion (usually Catholicism):

It was in the Guajira department, around 1997. I was taking a break on the second floor at work, and I heard the adan, or the call to prayer. I was pretty interested, and a few days later I visited and met a man named Tarek, a member of the Wayúu indigenous community. He taught me more about Islam, and I began to identify myself with the religion…

You believe in a religion since you’re a kid. They take you by the hand to church, because their parents did the same. It’s basically a family tradition. I started to reflect about it, and question my own thoughts about faith, in terms of the short journey we’re allotted here on Earth. So I made the decision to follow something that I identify with, something more personal for me. I guess I never identified with being Catholic, maybe it’s my genes. God knows why better than I do. Either way, I’ve been a Muslim for about 11 years now.

Alí’s learning is also interesting, in that his first mentor happened to be a member of the Wayúu (a group of indigenous people who live in north eastern Colombia and north western Venezuela). His experience is another testament to the diversity of Muslim memberships in Colombia.

I then asked Alí how the change to Islam affected the way he interacted in Colombian culture, but specifically his love life.

When you live in the West, you can’t change what’s already there. You can enjoy the word “love” in all sense of the word in Colombia; there’s no limitation. But, if I want to have a serious relationship with somebody, I need to be honest with her and tell her who I am. I would need to follow Islamic rules in my marriage. But suppose I was living in an essentially Muslim country, my love life would be guided by the norms there. Essentially, it’s all cultural adaptation. I was born here, my parents and grandparents are from Colombia, and they gave me their idiosyncrasies and culture. I’m a Muslim, but I’m also Colombian, and in Islam it is prohibited to discriminate against other cultures. I need to learn, respect, tolerate, and act like a believer inside of my own culture.

Alí’s acceptance of his cultural inheritance and surroundings inevitably influences his life as a Muslim, yet he feels he can sustain his spiritual obligation without denying his nationality and the customs that are included. Even though he “culturally adapts,” he does mention that if he were to marry, he would apply Islamic rules to one of the most intimate parts of his life. Alí’s journey is a compliment of two strong personal forces in his life, beginning with his original Colombian identity, afterwards his Muslim conversion, and eventually learning how to live as a Colombian Muslim.

Choice

One day after jumu’ah, I asked Abdullah about the Pakistani men who left to continue traveling throughout South America. We joked about how some of them would make absurd burping noises, or clear their throat like a cannon. “I have to admit though, it is amazing that they are dedicating this amount of time away from their families for their religion,” I commented afterwards to Abdullah. He replied “I think they’re in the right place to be doing it though.” I asked him why, and he said “There are three things here that would incline people towards Islam. One, a lot of people here are disillusioned with the Catholic Church and the Pope. How can somebody in Italy live in a palace and try to dictate spirituality, while there are people dying of hunger and violence here in Colombia? Second, many people don’t believe in the Trinity because they don’t understand it, and even more aren’t aware of its political invention. Thirdly, there are people who don’t believe that Jesus was the son of God like the priest told them. One of the Pakistani men was talking about me to his fellow traveling partner, and said ‘I’m Muslim by chance, but Abdullah is Muslim by choice.’ People here are making the choice to be Muslim without force, monetary incentive, or cultural inheritance. For all these reasons, I think Colombia is ready for Islam.”

I’m happy I’ve made the choice to learn about the religion and the Muslim community in Medellín. There’s a saying here: “Todo es plata.” Everything is money. Because everything is money, and many people don’t have it, they’ll do anything to get cash. Stealing, begging, ‘religious contribution,’ or selling orange Tang as real orange juice is not unusual here. In some instances I’ve been told not to trust anyone because many people have had good friends or family steal from them. When I go to the mosque though, nothing is about money. It is time purely devoted to study, spirituality, and connecting with fellow members. Nobody asks members for money, nobody charges to teach about the religion, nobody sells religious books (they give them away). Essentially, nobody discusses money for items and services that would lead somebody to form a closer connection with their god.

Besides the pleasure of finding existential sanctuary free of terminal materialism, the opportunity to hear diverse stories that demonstrate contrasts and similarities between cultures and people helps me to understand a country that is only infamous for drugs, violence, and magical realism. Religion makes communities, but communities inevitably adjust their spiritual and religious lives to what has already been in their own country. Whether it’s Abdullah’s admittance that Colombian Muslims need to worry about repressive violence in their own country, or Alí’s coexistence with his Colombian and Muslim identities, these people and their ideas are representative of a small but noticeable population.

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* Ari Iaccarino (Marlboro College, Marlboro, VT) is a native of Davenport, IA; he has spent extensive time in Colombia studying motivation in the English classroom.
** For more information about the mosque in Medellín, please visit:
http://mezquitademedellin.googlepages.com/